HomeMy WebLinkAboutKosmont Los Angeles Inclusionary Housing study
INCLUSIONARY
HOUSING STUDY
PREPARED FOR:
CENTRAL CITY ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES
&
GREATER LOS ANGELES/VENTURA CHAPTER
OF THE
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
JUNE 2003
Submitted by:
Kosmont Partners
601 S. Figueroa Street Suite 3550
Los Angeles, CA 90017
ph 213.623.8484 fax 213.623.8288
Inclusionary Housing Study
PREPARED FOR
CENTRAL CITY ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES
AND
GREATER LOS ANGELES/VENTURA CHAPTER OF THE
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
PREPARED BY
KOSMONT PARTNERS
June 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction......................................................................................................................................1
Purpose.............................................................................................................................................1
Background.......................................................................................................................................1
Sources of Data and Information.................................................................................................1
Organization of the Report............................................................................................................1
II. Executive Summary........................................................................................................................2
Findings from Survey of Jurisdictions..........................................................................................3
Findings from Literature Survey...................................................................................................5
III. California Jurisdictions.................................................................................................................7
City of Carlsbad...............................................................................................................................7
City of Pasadena ............................................................................................................................11
City of Sacramento........................................................................................................................16
City of San Diego..........................................................................................................................20
City of Santa Rosa.........................................................................................................................24
City of Sunnyvale...........................................................................................................................28
IV. Jurisdictions Outside of California...........................................................................................32
City of Boston, Massachusetts.....................................................................................................32
City of Denver, Colorado.............................................................................................................35
Montgomery County, Maryland..................................................................................................41
State of New Jersey.......................................................................................................................45
V. Survey of Literature on Inclusionary Zoning...........................................................................49
Introduction...................................................................................................................................49
Overview of Literature .................................................................................................................49
Appendix 1 – Summaries of Key Articles
Inclusionary Housing Study
California Building Industry Association
Greater Los Angeles/Ventura Chapter
June 2003
I. INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
At the request of the Central City Association of Los Angeles (“CCA”) and the Greater Los
Angeles/Ventura Chapter of the Southern California Building Industry Association (“BIA”),
Kosmont Partners (“KP”) undertook a study of inclusionary housing1 (“IH”), both in
practice and in theory. The scope of this study is described in the KP proposal dated March
18, 2003. The study focuses on six (6) IH programs in jurisdictions within the State of
California, four (4) programs in jurisdictions outside of California, and literature from both
academic and professional trade journals that examines the impacts of such programs. The
study provides insight into the guidelines of programs throughout the country and the
impacts these programs appear to have on affordable housing development and housing
development in general.
BACKGROUND
In 2000, the City of Los Angeles retained David Paul Rosen & Associates (“DPRA”) to
prepare a study to assess the feasibility of implementing an IH program in the city. That
report was released in March 2003 and asserts that IH is a feasible option for providing
affordable housing in the City of Los Angeles. The BIA is concerned that the City of Los
Angeles will pass an IH ordinance without fully examining the potential negative impacts of
such a program.
SOURCES OF DATA AND INFORMATION
The data used in this study comes from several primary and secondary sources. The
information on the various cities analyzed in the survey came from conversations with city
staff, city documents, newspaper articles, local trade organizations, and online research. The
information used in the literature survey came from academic journals, trade publications,
professional studies, and online research.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
An executive summary of the implications of the implementation of an IH ordinance for the
City of Los Angeles, findings from the city survey, and findings from the literature review is
presented in Section II. Section III presents the information on the California jurisdictions
examined in the survey and Section IV presents information on the jurisdictions from
outside of California. The complete findings of the literature review are presented in Section
V. Summaries of key articles used in the literature are provided in the Appendix.
1 Inclusionary housing (also known as inclusionary zoning) is defined as a mandatory or voluntary requirement
that calls for a minimum percentage of lower and/or moderate-income housing to be provided in new
residential development.
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II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Executive Summary presents the conclusions regarding the implications of an
inclusionary housing ordinance on the City of Los Angeles. It also presents the findings of a
survey of jurisdictions (both inside and outside California) that have inclusionary housing as
well as a survey of relevant literature. The findings of those surveys are the basis for the
conclusions reached.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES
The following are the key implications for the City of Los Angeles housing market if an
inclusionary housing program is implemented:
1. The values of properties to be used as sites for new residential development will be
permanently lower than they would be without the implementation of an inclusionary
housing ordinance.
2. Because the value of properties to be used as sites for new residential development will
be lowered with the implementation of an inclusionary housing ordinance, new
residential projects will be in a less competitive position in the market compared to
alternative (or even existing) land uses.
3. With new residential development at a competitive disadvantage, there will be less new
residential development than there would be without an inclusionary housing ordinance
because fewer properties will be acquired as sites for new residential projects.
4. Existing uses on sites that would be suitable for new residential development will remain
in place longer (and may deteriorate further) before being redeveloped as new residential
projects. In some cases, this will contribute to blight conditions in the City.
5. Los Angeles is particularly vulnerable to this effect because there are few large unused
sites available for new residential development and most new residential development
will concentrated in areas that previously have been fully built-out.
6. For a variety or reasons, incentive programs often associated with inclusionary housing
are unlikely to materially reduce the detrimental impact of an inclusionary housing
ordinance in Los Angeles.
7. The City’s residential market will become increasingly polarized at the high and low ends
of the spectrum. Middle-income families whose income is only marginally higher than
households that are eligible for inclusionary units will have to pay a larger percentage of
their income for housing or move out of the City.
8. When the residential market softens, as it was in the first half of the 1990s, these impacts
will be magnified and the disincentives to develop new housing will increase.
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FINDINGS FROM SURVEY OF JURISDICTIONS
The survey of IH programs in six jurisdictions in California and four jurisdictions elsewhere
in the United States provided a number of insights into the operations of those programs. It
also gave an indication of their impacts on residential development in the jurisdictions in
which they are located. The following is a summary of the overall findings from the survey.
1. Inclusionary Housing in California’s Largest Cities
While citywide IH programs are found in a number of smaller cities throughout the state,
most of the largest cities do not have such programs. San Francisco is a notable exception
which does have a citywide IH program.2 There is no city similar in size to the City of Los
Angeles that has a citywide program that could be used as a direct comparison. The City of
San Diego is currently in the process of implementing a citywide program.
2. Amount of Affordable Housing Produced
Inclusionary housing programs are not an affordable housing panacea. Only two of the ten
jurisdictions comprehensively track the number of affordable units produced by their IH
programs. None took a definitive position that more affordable housing is being produced
than would have been produced without IH. Those jurisdictions with an IH program of long
standing are reviewing their programs because they believe an insufficient amount of
affordable housing is being produced with those existing programs.
3. Alternatives to Building On-Site Units
Among the jurisdictions in this survey, the payment of in-lieu fees was the most common
alternative compliance option selected. Developers always elect to pay an in-lieu fee when it
is determined to be more cost effective than providing the units.
4. Incentives to Offset the Burdens of Inclusionary Housing
Developers rarely take advantage of density bonuses and parking reductions because they
have already maximized these aspects of their development based on physical and
construction constraints and the marketability of the units located within their projects.
5. Purchase Financing for Low-Income Families
Some developers contend that it is difficult for low-income families who are buying
inclusionary units to find mortgage financing. Lenders are reluctant to provide financing to
2 The City of San Francisco was not selected for this survey because of the significant differences between the
regulatory atmosphere and the built environment in comparison to Los Angeles. San Francisco has a high
residential density and a relatively low percentage of single-family housing. As a point of reference San
Francisco passed its inclusionary housing program in April 2002. It requires that 10% of newly developed
residential units must be set-aside as inclusionary units. Alternative compliance options include provision of
inclusionary units off-site or payment of an in-lieu fee.
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low-income groups, particularly when the policy places limits on the appreciation of the
property. This increases the financial risk to the developer and his lender.
6. Burden of Inclusionary Housing Programs
Residential developers will not build if they believe that a project will not produce the
required rate of return. The costs of an IH program are usually shifted to landowners by
means of developers paying lower prices for sites. In some cases the burden may be shifted
to market rate renters through higher rental rates. Jurisdictions bear a significant
administration cost associated with IH programs.
7. Total Housing Units Produced
Although it is difficult to determine whether or not IH programs result in the development
of fewer housing units than would have been produced without the program, residential
developers believe that IH programs result in a different mix of product types being
produced. Instead of a more normal mix of units across the pricing spectrum, developers
tend to produce a mix of high-end units and affordable units with significantly fewer middle-
income units.
8. Periodic Evaluation of Inclusionary Housing Programs
Inclusionary housing programs impose a heavy economic burden on a portion of the private
sector. Nonetheless, jurisdictions with IH rarely undertake periodic comprehensive
examinations of how many units are being produced and at what total cost. Consequently,
IH represents a very expensive public policy program that is seldom evaluated to determine
the level of efficiency at which it operates.
9. Administrative Burden
IH programs require significant administrative efforts that result in increased costs to the
jurisdiction. After a program is created, the jurisdiction must monitor both the inclusionary
units and the occupants to ensure compliance with all of the program’s affordability
guidelines.
10. Greenfield Development3 Versus Infill Development
Production of inclusionary housing units becomes increasingly difficult when development
occurs on infill property rather than greenfield property. Infill development is often riskier,
more costly, and takes place on smaller parcels than greenfield development. These factors
make it more difficult to obtain financing or secure federal and state subsidies for affordable
housing in an infill setting. Residential infill projects must also compete with existing uses for
land. The factors combine to make inclusionary requirements more burdensome in infill
environments.
3 Greenfield development is defined here as development on virgin land primarily located on the urban fringe.
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11. Relationship Between Income and Home Prices
Inclusionary housing becomes more burdensome to provide as increases in home prices
outpace increases in median income. If the median home price is only marginally higher than
a median income household can afford to pay, the economic burden of providing
inclusionary housing may be relatively small. However, when the median home price is
significantly higher than a median income household can afford to pay, the economic burden
of providing inclusionary housing may be very large.
FINDINGS FROM LITERATURE SURVEY
Literature in both academic journals and trade publications were reviewed. Some articles
asserted that IH is beneficial under some circumstances. However, many articles highlighted
inherent problems with IH as a solution to a perceived shortage of affordable housing. The
following is a listing of some of the key drawbacks to IH that were cited in those articles.
1. Total Housing Units Produced
IH makes new housing developers less competitive in bidding for sites against developers of
other types of properties or even existing uses. Consequently, less land can be expected to be
made available for new housing development than would be the case without IH.
2. Beneficiaries of Inclusionary Housing
IH programs tend to benefit only the moderate-income first time homebuyers at the expense
of the neediest of the needy. The numbers of households that have benefited from IH have
been very small compared to the total need and studies have shown that at most 10% of the
total affordable housing needs will be met through IH.
3. Incentives to Offset the Burdens of Inclusionary Housing
Many IH programs offer a range of “incentives” intended to offset the economic burden of
compliance and to encourage the development of housing. In most cases however, other
land use regulations, physical limitations and the nature of the housing market make those
incentives ineffective or only partially effective at best.
4. Burden of Inclusionary Housing Programs
Demand and supply factors, and the efficiency of the housing market will determine who
bears the cost of IH. Developers will try to shift the cost to the land seller or pass it on to
the tenant/homebuyer. Failing that, they will have to operate at a lower margin or suffer
losses. This would result in lowered land values, increased prices of market rate units, and/or
certain strata of population being priced out of the market. There is also the possibility of
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developers opting not to build and withdrawing from the market thereby limiting housing
supply.
5. Maintaining Long-Term Affordability
Costs are incurred by owners of both rental and for-sale affordable housing units in finding
suitable replacements. Ceilings on resale prices or profit sharing could also act as a
disincentive for property maintenance and lead to reduction in affordable housing stock.
6. Administrative Burden
IH programs have significant costs of supervision by government agencies and are time
consuming, complicated and cumbersome.
7. Efficient Allocation of Scarce Resources
It may be more efficient to increase the amount of affordable housing by providing subsidies
to specialized non-profit developers rather than requiring for-profit developers to build
affordable units.
8. Alternatives to Inclusionary Housing
Builder/developers who can efficiently assemble low cost financing using the Low-income
Housing Tax Credit program may be more efficient producers of affordable housing.
Demand side measures like Section 8 vouchers and certificates make housing affordable to
greater sections of the population.
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III. CALIFORNIA JURISDICTIONS
CITY OF CARLSBAD
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of Carlsbad was included in this study because it experienced strong growth in the
1990s and has had an inclusionary housing program through 1993. Though this does not
provide a direct comparison to Los Angeles, it is particularly important to include Carlsbad
in this study because it is one of the cities used as a point of comparison in the Rosen study.
City Information
The City of Carlsbad is located in northern San Diego County, just over 30 miles from
Downtown San Diego.
Carlsbad is a medium sized city with a population of approximately 78,000 and nearly 34,000
housing units. The city experienced significant population and housing growth during the
1990s, with the population and the total number of housing units both growing by
approximately 24%.
Based on 2000 Census data, there was an overall vacancy rate of 6.7% and the median home
value was $330,000. Over 50% of dwelling units are single-family detached homes. The
median annual income is approximately $65,000.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The City of Carlsbad adopted its IH Program by ordinance in May 1993. The program was
updated in April of 2000. The purpose of the program is to help the city meet its general
plan objective of ensuring that “all residential development, including master planned and
specific planned communities and all residential subdivisions, provide a range of housing
opportunities for all identifiable economic segments of the population, including households
of lower and moderate-incomes.” On the city’s website, it is stated that this program “brings
the private sector of the economy into the business of providing affordable housing, making
it a fact of the marketplace in Carlsbad.”
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• IH requirements apply to all residential market-rate dwelling units resulting from new
construction of rental and for-sale projects, as well as the conversion of apartments to
condominiums.
• 15% of newly constructed units shall be made affordable to lower income households.
This refers to households earning 80% AMI or less.
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• For developments in which ten (10) or more units are required to be available to lower
income households, at least 10% of the lower income units shall have three (3) or more
bedrooms
• Rental units must remain reserved for targeted income level households for a minimum
of fifty (50) years.
• Ownership units must remain reserved for targeted income level households for a period
of thirty (30) years.
In addition to the basic guidelines described above, the ordinance sets certain standards
related to location, design, and construction of the inclusionary units. They are as follows:
• Whenever possible, inclusionary units must be built on-site.
• Inclusionary units should be constructed concurrently with market rate units unless the
city and developer reach an agreement for an alternative development schedule.
• Inclusionary units should be located on sites that are in proximity or will provide access
to employment opportunities, urban services, or transportation resources and are
compatible with adjacent land uses.
• The design of inclusionary units must be consistent with the design of the total
development in terms of appearance, materials, and finished quality.
• The inclusionary portion of a development must provide a mix of unit types in terms of
number of bedrooms.
Alternative Compliance
As an alternative to providing inclusionary units on-site, the Carlsbad IH program provides
various alternative compliance options. Included among these options is payment of an in-
lieu fee, providing units off-site, rehabilitation of existing residential units for use by lower
income households, construction of second dwelling units and contribution to special needs
projects. These are all discussed in greater detail below.
In-Lieu Fee
An in-lieu fee can be paid in place of providing inclusionary units in residential projects with
six (6) or fewer units. According to the zoning code, the per unit fee is 15% of the subsidy
needed to make one newly constructed, typical attached housing unit affordable to a lower
income household. The current fee, determined in 2000, is $4,515 per unit. The fee is
deposited into the city’s housing trust fund, and the money is used to provide funding
assistance for the provision of affordable housing. As an alternative to paying the in-lieu, the
city council can permit a developer to dedicate land with a value greater than or equal to the
amount of the in-lieu payment if the dedication assists the city in furthering its affordable
housing goals.
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Off-Site Compliance
Residential project with seven (7) or more units must provide inclusionary units. As an
alternative to providing the units on-site, they can be provided off-site or through a
combination of on-site and off-site. The 15% provision of inclusionary units still applies to
off-site projects and the off-site location must be in the same quadrant of the city as the
original development.
Other Alternatives
Other alternatives that may be approved by the city council include acquisition and
rehabilitation of affordable units, conversion of existing market units to affordable units,
construction of second dwelling units, or contribution to a special needs housing project
(shelter, transitional housing, etc.).
Offset Packages
The city is willing to work with developers to offset the costs of providing inclusionary units.
Specific incentives mentioned by city staff include density bonuses, financial assistance
(often in the form of construction loans), and reduced standards for interior finishes.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
Carlsbad’s IH Program was an outgrowth of the city’s 1990 Housing Element Review. This
review indicated that the city needed to take greater steps to provide affordable housing. The
program was designed to assist the city in reaching its low-income housing goals.
Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
The Carlsbad IH program has produced 768 rental units, 137 for-sale units, and 125 second
dwelling units. This is a total of 1,030 affordable dwelling units.
Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
Though the city encourages the development of inclusionary units on-site, some residential
developers in Carlsbad have taken advantage of alternative compliance options. Two
apartment projects provided inclusionary units off-site for a total of 482 units. City staff
mentioned that these projects were relatively far along in their planning process when the IH
program was implemented, so they allowed a substantial number of inclusionary units off-
site. Another alternative compliance option is payment of an in-lieu fee. This is not a
common option because it is only applicable to projects with 6 or fewer units. Since 1993,
the city has collected just over $1.7 million in in-lieu fees. Smaller projects in the southern
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half of the city have the option to purchase housing credits from the city in place of building
units on site. The availability of housing credits grew out of an excess number of affordable
units developed in the Villa Loma housing project. The developer of this project built 160
more units than were required. The price of the housing credits is currently $41,000 per unit.
Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
KP was unable to obtain detailed information on the incentive that the city provides
developers to help offset the cost of providing inclusionary units. The most popular
incentive has been in the form of financing from the city’s affordable housing trust fund.
The city follows the state density bonus guidelines and allows for standard modifications for
inclusionary projects. These incentive options are less popular.
Effects on Housing Production
No determination was reached in terms of overall production of residential dwelling units in
the City of Carlsbad. The city still experienced residential development after the ordinance
was passed, but no study has ever analyzed whether the level of development would have
been the same without the program in place.
The city is concerned about the production of dwelling units available to middle-income
households. In April of 2002, the city’s housing and redevelopment director praised the
program for producing nearly 1,000 homes for lower-income households but also said that
the market has not adequately provided households for those in the middle-income range.
Though this has not been directly attributed to the IH program by any type of study, the
development industry believes that the provision of affordable units in market projects
reduces the creation of units affordable to middle-income families.
Who Bears the Burden?
Both the San Diego County Apartment Association and the Building Industry Association of
San Diego County feel that the cost is born by the owners and renters of the market rate
units. These feelings were expressed in letters written to the city when the inclusionary
ordinance was revised in 2000 and reiterated in conversations with KP during the course of
this study. Many planned communities provide a range of housing types, and the
inclusionary units replace the units that would normally be affordable to the middle-income
households.
Self-Evaluation
The City of Carlsbad IH ordinance does not require regular self-evaluation. Though the city
reviewed the program when it was revised in 2000, no comprehensive assessment of the
program was accomplished. The city planning department also updates affordable housing
production in its Annual Housing Update. Information on the program was not available
from a single city department, indicating that regular analysis of the IH program within the
city might be difficult.
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CITY OF PASADENA
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of Pasadena was selected because it is a large city in which most of the
development that occurs is in-fill. This means that residential development must compete
with other uses, including existing uses for land. Though the ordinance is relatively new, it
can provide insight into the impacts of inclusionary housing on residential development in
largely built-out cities.
City Information
The City of Pasadena is located in central Los Angeles County, approximately 10 miles from
Downtown Los Angeles.
Pasadena is a large city with a population of approximately 134,000 and over 54,000
households. Growth was nearly flat in the city during the 1990s. There was a net increase of
only 1,100 housing units.
Based on 2000 Census data, there was an overall vacancy rate of 4.2% and the median home
value was $286,000. Over 45% of dwelling units are single-family detached homes and 19%
are in structures with 20 or more units. The median annual income is over $46,000.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The City of Pasadena Inclusionary Housing Ordinance was passed on July 16, 2001. The
purpose of the ordinance is “to require that residential and mixed use projects include a
share of housing that is affordable to low and moderate-income households.” The program
is “intended to supplement other programs that assist and encourage affordable housing in
the city.”
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• Inclusionary housing requirements apply to residential projects with 10 or more units.
• 15% of newly constructed units within ownership projects must be made affordable to
low or moderate-income households.
• In rental projects, at least 10% of the units must be for low-income households and the
remaining 5% must be for low or moderate-income households.
• Rental units must remain reserved for targeted income level households in perpetuity.
• Ownership units must remain reserved for targeted income level households for a period
of thirty (30) years.
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• The ordinance requires that city staff reports to City Council on the performance of the
program within the first three years of its existence.
In addition to the basic guidelines described above, the ordinance sets certain standards
related to location, design, and construction of the inclusionary units. They are as follows:
• The inclusionary units must be “reasonably” dispersed throughout the project.
• Inclusionary units must be comparable to the market rate units in terms of base design,
appearance, materials and finish.
• All inclusionary units must be constructed concurrently with or prior to the construction
of the market rate units.
Alternative Compliance
In-lieu of providing inclusionary units on-site, developers are provided with three alternative
compliance options. These options – payment of in-lieu fees, provision of inclusionary units
off-site, or donation of land – are discussed below.
In-Lieu Fees
The city permits payment of in-lieu fees in place of providing inclusionary units. The amount
of the fee is determined by a City Council resolution. The in-lieu fee is based on a calculation
that determines the affordability gap for low and moderate-income households in different
regions in the city. This gap was then multiplied by a 75% factor to determine the in-lieu fee.
All in-lieu payments are deposited in the Inclusionary Housing Trust Fund, which was
established for the specific purpose of providing the city with funds to assist in the
development of housing that is affordable to low and moderate-income households.
Off-Site Compliance
A developer can fulfill his inclusionary requirements by providing the units off-site. The off-
site units must be developed according to the criteria set forth in the program guidelines.
Eligible land for the off-site units must have the proper zoning, adequate infrastructure,
environmental clearance, and clear title. The proposed off-site units must not create an over
concentration of affordable units in a neighborhood. According to the program’s guidelines,
over concentration exists when 50 rental units legally restricted to very low and low-income
households are located within 1/8-mile of the proposed off-site units or when 200 rental
units legally restricted to very low and low-income households are located within ¼-mile of
the proposed off-site units. The proposed off-site units must also be within ¼-mile of the
original residential development unless the developer can make a case for providing them in
a different location. The design or use in terms of size, appearance, materials, and finished
quality of the proposed off-site units must be similar to the market rate units in the original
development.
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Land Dedication
A developer can fulfill his inclusionary requirements by a conveyance of land to the city. The
site suitability is based on the same criteria used for off-site units. Additionally, the fair
market value of the donated land must be at least equal to the in-lieu fee that the developer
would otherwise have to pay.
Offset Packages
The developer may request that the city provide one or more of the following incentives to
help offset the cost of providing inclusionary units:
• Density bonus
• Fee waivers
• Marketing for for-sale inclusionary units through the Pasadena Community
Development Commission
• Financial assistance to low and moderate-income households for either buying or renting
units
• Financial assistance to the developer for units in excess of the 15% inclusionary units
requirement or to make low-income units affordable to very low-income households
• Reduction in inclusionary unit requirement as follows:
1. If very low units are provided in lieu of the required low-income units, a credit of 1.5
units to every 1 unit shall be provided.
2. If low-income units are provided in lieu of the required moderate-income units, a
credit of 1.5 units to every 1 unit shall be provided.
3. If very low-income units are provided in lieu of the required moderate-income units,
a credit of 2 units to every 1 shall be provided.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
The Pasadena IHO was implemented in response to produce more affordable housing by
housing advocates in the city. It was also a response to skyrocketing housing costs in
Pasadena and a need for the city to provide its fair share of affordable housing.
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Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
As of the writing of this report, 65 inclusionary units are under contract with the city to be
built. An additional 302 units have contracts pending or are under plan review. These 367
inclusionary units are part of 26 projects that will provide a total of 3,348 new units.
The city indicated that the inclusionary units do not comprise 15% of new units as is
required by the IH ordinance for the following two reasons:
1. In its first year of existence, the IH program required that only 6% of new residential
units be made affordable as opposed to the 15% requirement now in place.
2. Some developers opted to pay an in-lieu fee rather than provide affordable units on site.
Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
The most common alternative to providing units onsite is the payment of in-lieu fees. This
option is particularly popular for developers of for-sale projects. There has been a recent
increase among developers of ownership projects of negotiating with non-profit affordable
housing developers to provide units off-site. No land donation offers have been made.
Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
The draft report to City Council on the performance of the program indicates that the only
two incentives used by developers were density bonuses and fee waivers.
Effects on Housing Production
The city contends that the program has not had a negative effect on housing production. In
response to the potential for reducing total housing production in the city, the draft report to
City Council on the performance of the program states, “The IHO has demonstrated it can
fulfill its mission without dampening overall housing production, and based on new housing
applications received, the production rate has not slowed.” This evaluation does not
consider how the market would act if IH was not in place in the city. It is only a qualitative
measure and deserves more focused analysis.
Who Bears the Burden?
Land Owners
Prior to the implementation of the IHO in Pasadena, one report indicated that the owners of
land on which residential development might take place would bear the burden. Because of
the reduced future returns resulting from the provision of affordable units, developers would
not be able to pay as much for land as they would have been able to pay without IH.
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city staff indicates that a reduction in land values has not been observed. In response to
reduced land prices the staff report states, “It was speculated that land prices would have to
trend down to accommodate inclusionary housing production. From staff observation this
phenomenon has not occurred due in most part to the aggressive market to assemble scarce
land for housing. Land owners had no sympathy to trend down to serve affordable housing
needs.” The logic behind this argument is flawed for a number of reasons. The question is
not whether the cost of land for housing was actually reduced but whether it increased as
much as it would without inclusionary housing. This question is not asked. Additionally, the
seller of the land does not determine the price of the land. The market determines the price
of the land. This issue therefore deserves more focused analysis.
City of Pasadena
The IHO enables the City Council to establish a fee for administrative costs associated with
the program. This is indicative of the fact that inclusionary programs are a burden on the city
in which they are located. The city reported that there is a minimum of six departments
connected with administering IHO standards. This requires significant coordination among
different departments and the dedication of the time and resources of the departments. If
the city chooses to establish an administrative fee, this burden will be born by the
landowner. Until that time, it is the city’s burden.
Self-Evaluation
The ordinance does require an evaluation of the program within its first three years in
existence. A draft report was obtained by KP and reviewed. The report presents
observations on the performance of the program and identifies issues that should be
resolved regarding the policy. The report provides a qualitative discussion of the
performance of the program rather than a quantitative analysis. It does not ask whether
more housing would have been produced if the program was never implemented.
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CITY OF SACRAMENTO
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of Sacramento was selected because it is one of the largest cities in California and is
one of the few large cities in the state with an inclusionary housing program. Like Los
Angeles, Sacramento has a strong housing market with growth in housing prices outpacing
growth in household income. Sacramento’s IH program is not citywide. It is geographically
limited to new growth areas in the city. Though this does not provide a direct comparison to
Los Angeles, it is particularly important to include Sacramento in this study because it is one
of the cities that are used as a point of comparison in the Rosen study.
City Information
Because the Sacramento IH program applies only to the city’s new growth areas, the
following contextual information focuses solely on these areas.
According to city staff, the North Natomas community is the primary focus for the IH
program. It is a higher income community consisting primarily of single-family homes in
planned developments. The North Natomas community has large parcels available for
development and about 1,500 new homes are expected annually as the community grows.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The City of Sacramento Mixed Income Housing Ordinance was passed on October 3, 2000.
The adoption of this ordinance implemented an inclusionary housing program in the city.
The stated purpose of the program is “to assist the city achieve a diverse and balanced
community with housing available for households of all income levels.”
The ordinance applies to residential development in new growth areas. “New growth areas”
means: (1) geographically defined, newly developed communities; (2) major redevelopment
opportunity areas, including the Railyards Special Planning District and the Curtis Park West
Railyards site; and (3) any future annexation areas of the City of Sacramento. Residential
development outside of these areas is exempt from the city’s inclusionary housing program.
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• Inclusionary housing requirements apply to residential projects with 10 or more units.
• 5% of all residential units within a real estate development project that includes market
rate housing must be affordable to and occupied by low-income households.
• 10% of all residential units within a real estate development project that includes market
rate housing must be affordable to and occupied by very low-income households.
• Rental units must remain affordable for a minimum of thirty (30) years.
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• Ownership units must remain reserved for targeted income level households for a period
of thirty (30) years.
In addition to the basic guidelines described above, the ordinance sets certain standards
related to location, design, and construction of the inclusionary units. They are as follows:
• Phased developments shall provide for development of inclusionary units concurrently
with market rate units.
• The mix of inclusionary unit types should accommodate different family sizes.
• Inclusionary unit must have the same exterior appearance as market rate units.
• The city avoids over-concentration of inclusionary housing by preventing developments
containing eight (8) or more units and consisting of more than 50% inclusionary units
for very low or low-income households from being built adjacent to or in the vicinity of
the same type of development.
Alternative Compliance
As an alternative to providing inclusionary units on-site, Sacramento provides two alternative
compliance options, land dedication and off-site compliance. These options are discussed
below.
The plans for alternative compliance are subject to the approval of the city’s planning
director. Both alternative compliance options are required to provide a more cost-efficient
solution to the inclusionary housing component than the standard approach of providing
inclusionary units on-site. The land used for either of these options must be suitable from
the perspective of size, configuration, physical characteristics, physical and environmental
constraints, access, location, adjacent use, and other relevant planning criteria.
Offset Packages
A developer may request an incentive package from the city or the SHRA to help offset the
cost of providing inclusionary units. Below is a list of incentives mentioned in the Mixed
Income Housing Ordinance:
• Fee waivers or deferrals
• Modification of planning and public works development standards
• Reductions in quality of interior finishes
• Streamlining and priority processing
• Density bonus
• Local public funding
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Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
The original push for an IH program in the City of Sacramento began in 1990. Home prices
in the city began rising during that time period prompting housing advocates to call for the
creation of an IH program. The City Council responded and passed measure requesting the
preparation of an IH ordinance by a vote of 6-3 in September 1991. Shortly thereafter, the
California housing market crashed and the ordinance was never adopted.
The prospect of an IH ordinance was revisited in 2000. The city pointed to high levels of job
growth among lower wage earners and the need to provide housing for them in a market
with rising home prices. The city also recognized that new housing in the growing North
Natomas community was being built for higher income families. Housing advocates and city
staff determined that an IH ordinance would be a way to ensure that affordable housing was
provided in this new growth area.
The City Council passed its Mixed Income Housing Ordinance in fall 2000. The ordinance
was limited to the new growth areas and excluded older communities with infill sites. City
staff determined that the in-fill areas already had a good mix of housing and that most of the
potential sites for residential development in the in-fill area were too small. According to city
planning staff, projects built in more than 2 acres of land could better accommodate
affordable housing because larger sites have a better chance at competing for state and
federal subsidies for the development of affordable housing.
Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
Since the ordinance was adopted, four projects’ IH plans have been approved by the city.
These projects include 324 inclusionary units. An additional 450 affordable units will be
included in projects that are awaiting approval of their IH plan or are in the beginning stage
of plan review by the city.
Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
No alternative compliance options have been utilized.
Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
The most common incentives used to offset the burden of providing affordable housing are
priority processing and fee reductions. Developers receive a $4,000 per unit fee reduction for
the provision of units affordable to very low-income households and a $1,000 per unit fee
reduction for the provision of units affordable to low-income households.
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Effects on Housing Production
Residential development continues to occur in the North Natomas community. Most of the
projects occurring there are larger planned developments. Market rate developers enter into
partnership with developers that specialize in affordable housing. The inclusionary units are
normally provided as multi-family rental projects while the market rate units are single family
detached.
Smaller developers have had not developed many projects in North Natomas. The projects
that have been approved range in size from 146 units to 1,120 units. City staff mentioned
that smaller developers are unable to create feasible projects when they are required to
provide inclusionary units. The city is working on refining the ordinance to better
accommodate smaller projects.
Who Bears the Burden?
The deal structure between the market rate developers and the developers who specialize in
affordable housing is unknown. Therefore it is hard to determine how the burden is born.
The city bears a large portion of the burden by absorbing the unit fee reductions. In
addition, they also bear the administrative costs by allocating staff to work on this program.
Self-Evaluation
The Mixed Income Housing Ordinance does not require the city to evaluate the success of
the program.
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CITY OF SAN DIEGO
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of San Diego was selected for this study because it is the second largest city in the
State of California and is one of the few large cities in the state with an inclusionary housing
program. Like Los Angeles, San Diego has a strong housing market with growth in housing
prices outpacing growth in household income. San Diego’s inclusionary program is not
citywide. It is geographically limited to the northern Future Urbanizing Area (FUA) of the
city, an area that is comprised of green field land and planned developments. Though this
does not provide a direct comparison to Los Angeles, it is particularly important to include
San Diego in this study because it is one of the cities used as a point of comparison in the
Rosen study.
It should be noted that at the time of the writing of this study, the San Diego City Council
had directed staff to prepare an ordinance for citywide inclusionary housing. This ordinance
was passed by City Council on May 20, 2003. It calls for residential developments with more
than two units to set aside 10% of the units for affordable housing. The new ordinance also
allows for the payment of a fee in-lieu of providing units. Because the program has been in
place for less than one month, the following discussion focuses on the inclusionary program
in the FUA.
City Information
The contextual information for the San Diego inclusionary program focuses on the FUA
rather than the entire city because the inclusionary program only applies to this
geographically defined area. The FUA generally includes land which is presently vacant and
is zoned for agricultural uses. It is far removed from San Diego’s central business district and
existing developed areas of the city. The FUA include five subareas. They are Black
Mountain Ranch, Torrey Highlands, Pacific Highlands Ranch, Del Mar Mesa, and Carmel
Valley. The inclusionary ordinance does not apply to Carmel Valley.
Prior to the 1990s very little development occurred in the FUA and few people lived there.
The total population in 2000 was 320 people, and there were fewer than 90 housing units.
The predominant housing type is single-family detached for sale homes on large lots. The
median household income was over $110,000 per year in 2000.
Development is now on the rise in the FUA and all of the projects are planned unit
developments predominantly comprised of single-family detached homes.
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Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The inclusionary housing program in the FUA was codified in 1997. The program is
intended to ensure that residential development in these areas includes housing
opportunities for low-income households.
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• In 3 of the 4 subareas (Black Mountain Ranch, Torrey Highlands, and Pacific Highlands
Ranch) that must adhere to this program, all planned developments are required to make
20% of the total units available to households with income no higher than 65% AMI4.
• In the remaining subarea (Del Mar Mesa), planned developments are required to make
10% of the total units available to households with income no higher than 65% AMI.
• Units must remain affordable for 55 years.
• The affordable units must be designed and integrated into the overall development plan.
Alternative Compliance
Alternative compliance options available to developers include payment of an in-lieu fee,
land dedication, or the purchase of credits from other developers who have provided an
excess of affordable units.
In-Lieu Fee
Developers can pay a fee to a special revenue fund in-lieu of providing the units on-site for
projects with 10 or fewer units or with an average lot size of 1 acre or greater. The in-lieu fee
is based on the present value of the difference between rents on market rate units and
affordable units (at 65% AMI) over a 55 year period. The in-lieu fee was last calculated in
1996 to be $4,840 per market lot in Black Mountain Ranch, Torrey Highlands, and Pacific
Highlands Ranch and $2,420 per market lot in Del Mar Mesa. The use of the funds is
restricted to projects in the FUA.
Off-Site Compliance
As an alternative to providing affordable units on-site, developers can make a donation of
developable land of a value equivalent to the in-lieu fee.
4 The affordability threshold is an average of all of the affordable units provided. This means that a developer
provides half of the affordable units at 80% the other half must be provided at 50% AMI.
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Purchase of Affordable Unit Credits
Some developers provide an excess (greater than 20%) of affordable units in their projects
and sell the credits to developers of other projects. These credits are applied to the total
number of affordable units that the developer must provide.
Offset Packages
The FUA inclusionary housing program provides a number of incentives to help offset the
cost of providing affordable housing. These incentives are discussed below.
Density Bonus
A density bonus of up to 25% is permitted to help offset the costs of providing affordable
units.
Reduced Fees
Projects with fewer than 50 units are eligible for reduced impact fees like water and sewer
fees.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
Relatively few landholders owned the land in the FUA in the early 1990s. In order to
develop the land, a general plan framework requiring approval through a citywide vote was
necessary. The landholders in the FUA sought approval for their general plan in the early
1990s. This was voted down in the citywide election. In order to gain approval, the general
plan was revised to include provisions for more open space and affordable housing. The
inclusionary program was the affordable housing provision.
Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
Since the implementation of this program, 548 affordable units have been constructed or are
under construction. An additional 1,271 units have been approved for phased development,
but there is no guarantee that these will be built. The majority of the affordable units are
rental rather than for-sale.
Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
Payment of an in-lieu fee and purchase of affordable unit credits have both been used, but
land dedication is yet to be utilized.
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Approximately $770,000 in in-lieu fees has been collected. Most of the in-lieu fees have
come from the Del Mar Mesa subarea. This is because projects in this subarea are generally
smaller and thereby eligible to pay the in-lieu fee. In fact, all development projects in Del
Mar Mesa have opted to pay the in-lieu fee. Projects in the other subareas are generally large
planned developments that are not eligible to pay the in-lieu fee. Of the $770,000 collected,
none has been committed to affordable projects.
San Diego Housing Commission staff indicated that the purchase of affordable unit credits
had occurred but did not have any numbers.
Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
All projects have taken advantage of the density bonus and smaller projects have benefited
from the reduced impact fees.
Effects on Housing Production
Development has continued to occur in the FUA. There are no competing uses for land in
the FUA because commercial development will not occur without a market created by
residential development. The value of the land is less than what it would have been without
the inclusionary program, but the people of San Diego would not have allowed development
to occur in the FUA without provisions for affordable housing.
Most projects have become partnerships between a large master planner and an affordable
housing developer. KP was unable to obtain information regarding the details of the deals,
but the basic model is that the master planner sells land to the affordable developer to
produce higher density projects with most of the units available to low-income households.
These projects often receive funding from the San Diego Housing Commission or through
affordable housing tax credit program.
Who Bears the Burden?
The burden of providing affordable housing falls on the landowners in the FUA. As a result
of the inclusionary program, residential development will net a smaller future cash flow
because of the provision of affordable dwelling units and this will reflect in a lower residual
land value.
Self-Evaluation
The San Diego FUA inclusionary housing ordinance does not require regular self-evaluation.
Information as to the total number of units produced is available but no comprehensive
analysis of the program has occurred.
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CITY OF SANTA ROSA
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of Santa Rosa is a relatively large city that experienced significant growth in the
1980s and 1990s. It was chosen because of its large size and in order to identify the reasons
why this 11-year-old program has not produced a significant amount of inclusionary units
on-site.
City Information
The City of Santa Rosa is located in central Sonoma County, just over 50 miles from the City
of San Francisco.
Santa Rosa is a large city with a population of approximately 150,000 and over 56,000
households. The city experienced significant population and housing growth during the
1990s, with the population growing by over 30% and the number of households growing by
nearly 25% during the decade.
The housing market is generally strong. Based on 2000 Census data, there was an overall
vacancy rate of 2.7% and the median home value was $245,000. Nearly 60% of dwelling
units are single-family detached homes. The median annual income is nearly $51,000.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The City of Santa Rosa Housing Allocation Plan (HAP) was originally passed in 1992 and
was amended in 1995 and 2002. The adoption of this ordinance led to the implementation of
an inclusionary housing program in the city. The stated purpose of the program is threefold.
First it is intended to “provide a variety of housing types and residential environments in
order to satisfy the needs of all segments of the city’s population.” Second, the program is
intended to help “maintain the varied neighborhoods traditionally associated with the city,
and to avoid large areas of undifferentiated living environments and housing types that
characterize many rapidly growing cities.” Finally, the program intended to help the city
achieve its affordable housing goals set forth in its general plan.
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• Inclusionary housing requirements apply to all residential developments in the city.
• Residential units in mixed use projects are exempt from the requirements of the HAP.
• The program applies to rental and for-sale projects.
• 15% of all residential units within a residential development must be made available on-
site to low-income households.
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• Low-income households are defined as having an annual income, adjusted for household
size, of not more than 80% the area median income.
• Rental units must remain affordable for a minimum of thirty (30) years.
• The term of affordability for ownership units is subject to an occupancy agreement
approved by the City Council prior to project approval.
• The Department of Community Development is required to prepare an annual report on
the HAP evaluating and updating the City Council in regards to the number of units
produced by the program, the amount of in-lieu fees collected, and identifying problems
with the program and how it might be fixed.
Alternative Compliance
As an alternative to providing inclusionary units on-site, Santa Rosa provides three
alternative compliance options for certain types of projects. These options are payment of an
in-lieu fee, land dedication, and off-site compliance. They are discussed below.
In-Lieu Fees
In-lieu fees, established by the City Council, may be paid in place of providing inclusionary
units in residential developments of 15 gross acres or less. Projects that are built on more
than 15 gross acres of land do not have the option of paying the in-lieu fee.
The amount of Santa Rosa’s in-lieu fee has changed over time. Projects approved between
July 24, 1991 and July 9, of 2001 were subject to an in-lieu fee of $2,600. Projects approved
between July 10, 2001 and June 13, 2002 were subject to a fee of $9,707. Projects approved
on or after June 14, 2002 are subject to an in-lieu fee based on the gross square footage of
each unit which is developed. The fee per square foot increases with the size of the unit. The
fee scale ranges from $0.82 for a 900 square foot unit to $7.35 a square foot for units over
4,500 square feet. Units that are 900 square feet or less are not subject to the fee.
Off-Site Compliance
The HAP allows for inclusionary units to be provided off-site in residential developments of
20 gross acres or less. The number of off-site inclusionary units to be provided must equal
20% of the total number of dwelling units in the development, which is determined by
adding the total number of units located both on-site and off-site. Off-site units must be
located in the same quadrant of the city as the original development and a finding must be
made that the inclusionary units will not overly impact the surrounding area.
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Land Dedication
In order to meet its inclusionary requirement, a development may dedicate or convey land to
the city, which can then be used for the development of affordable housing. The dedicated
land can be located on-site or off-site.
On-site parcels can be offered to the city for developments of more than 20 gross acres. The
land must constitute 7.5% of the site. It must also be improved and greater than or equal to
½ net acre in area.
Off-site parcels can be offered to the city for developments of 20 gross acres or less. The
amount of land offered must be equal to at least 10% of the development’s on-site net
acreage and cannot be less than 1 net acre in area.
Offset Packages
The HAP does not address the use of offset packages or provide any description of
developer incentives.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
The City of Santa Rosa passed its HAP as a result of the pressure from affordable housing
activists and non-compliance with the state housing element law. Santa Rosa experienced a
housing boom during the 1980s, and the perception was that only larger, more expensive
units were produced. The city was also high on the National Association of Home Builders
ranking of the nation’s most expensive housing market. This ranking is based on the area’s
income levels and home selling prices.
The HAP was passed contemporaneously with the city’s growth management plan. It is
ironic that attempts to curtail growth coincided with attempts to increase the amount of
affordable housing because it is likely that the growth management plan made the existing
housing stock even more expensive by limiting supply.
Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
A total of 4 inclusionary units have produced on-site since the inception of the HAP.
Additional affordable units have been produced using subsidies funded by the payment of
fees in-lieu of providing units on-site. These on-site production numbers have fallen far
short of what the city envisioned.
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Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
The payment of a fee in-lieu of providing units on-site was the only alternative compliance
option utilized by developers. Developers have not opted for off-site compliance or land
dedication.
Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
The HAP does not identify any incentives and developers have not taken advantage of any
incentives to offset the burden of the inclusionary requirement
Conclusions
The HAP had failed to produce a large number of units on-site because developers
predominantly opted to pay the in-lieu fee. Prior to 2001, the in-lieu fee was $2,600 per
market rate unit produced. This fee was based on the average cost of subsidy for an
affordable unit multiplied by 20%, the percentage of affordable units that should be
produced per each market rate unit produced according to the housing allocation plan.
Developers recognized that it was cheaper to pay the in-lieu fee than to build the units on-
site. In 2000, the city determined that this in-lieu fee was far below that actual subsidy for
providing affordable units. The fee was increased to the amounts described above. The new
amount is based on an updated average cost of subsidy for an affordable unit, the amount of
affordable units the city must produce according to the Association of Bay Area
Governments’ (ABAG) Regional Housing Needs Determination, and a sliding scale
according to unit size. It is too early to determine the impacts of this new in-lieu fee.
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CITY OF SUNNYVALE
Reason for Selecting this City
Sunnyvale was selected because it is a relatively large city and its IH program has been in
existence since 1980. This case study helps to show the operations and impacts of an IH
program over a long period of time.
City Information
The City of Sunnyvale is located in northwest Santa Clara County, about 40 miles from San
Francisco.
Sunnyvale is a relatively large city with a population of over 131,000 and approximately
54,000 housing units. The city experienced moderate population growth during the 1990s
(12.4%), but housing production did not keep up with population growth. The city
experienced a net increase in housing units of only 5.8% during that time period.
The housing market is tight, with a citywide vacancy rate of 2.3% and median home value of
495,000 according to 2000 Census data. Nearly 40% of housing units in Sunnyvale are
single-family detached. The median household income in 2000 was nearly $75,000.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The City of Sunnyvale Below Market Rate (BMR) Housing ordinance was originally passed
in 1980 and was amended in 1991 and in January 2003. The adoption of this ordinance led
to the implementation of an inclusionary housing program in the city. The stated purpose of
the program is to “enhance the public welfare by ensuring that future housing development
contributes to the attainment of the housing goals set forth in the general plan of the City of
Sunnyvale by increasing the production of residential units affordable to households of low
and moderate-income.”
The basic program guidelines are described below. The new guidelines resulting from the
February 2003 ordinance revision are only now being implemented. The following narrative
focuses on the old guidelines that have dictated residential development for the last 20 years.
The updates to the program are provided in footnotes.
• Inclusionary housing requirements apply to residential developments with 10 or more
units5 with the exception of projects in the lower density R-0, R-1, R-1.5, and R-
1.7/PUD zones.
• Projects with fewer than 10 units6 are exempt from the requirements of the BMR
program.
5 Changed to 9 or more units.
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• The program applies to rental and for-sale projects.
• 10% of all units7, excluding bonus units, must be maintained as below market rate units.
• For-sale units must remain affordable to moderate-income household for a period of
twenty (20) years.8
• Rental units must remain affordable to very-low or low-income households for a
minimum of twenty (20) years9.
Alternative Compliance
The only alternative compliance option permitted is the payment of a fee in-lieu of providing
BMR units.
In-Lieu Fee
The option to pay a fee in-lieu of providing BMR units on site is limited to smaller projects
ranging between 10 and 19 total units. For for-sale projects, the in-lieu fee is equal to the
difference between the fair market value of the BMR unit and the BMR price as established
by the BMR guidelines. For rental units, the in-lieu fee is equal to the difference between the
market rent for the BMR units and the established BMR rent capitalized over twenty years10.
Offset Packages
In order to offset the cost of providing BMR units the city ordinance addresses three
incentives for developers. They are density bonus, priority processing, and technical and
financial assistance.
Density Bonus
The city allows a density bonus of up to 15% of the number of units permitted by the
applicable zoning regulations. The developer is not required to pay fees for the bonus units
and the bonus units are not included in the calculation of the number of BMR units
required.
6 Changed to fewer than 9 units.
7 Changed to 12.5% of all units in for-sale projects and 10% in rental projects with the possibility of an increase
to 15% in rental projects if vacancy rates remain at 3% or less and rents show a net increase of 20% or more
during a 24 month period.
8 Increased to thirty (30) years.
9 Increased to fifty-five (55) years.
10 Increased to fifty-five years.
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Priority Processing
All residential developments providing 10% BMR units or more shall receive priority
processing, by which residential developments will be reviewed and check for all required
city permit and other approvals in advance of other pending developments.
Technical and Financial Assistance
The BMR ordinance indicates that the city will provide technical assistance to developers of
projects with BMR units for financial subsidy programs, environmental review procedures,
and economic analysis. The city will provide Community Development Block Grant funds,
when available, to help defray the costs of off-site improvements and other expenses.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
The ordinance was originally adopted to help the city meet the housing goals set forth in its
General Plan. The city has revised the plan numerous times because it has not fully satisfied
the city’s needs in terms of the provision of affordable housing. According to the city’s
consultant, Bay Area Economics, the program was most recently revised due to a number of
factors, including rising home values, decreasing affordability, and the need to meet Regional
Housing Needs (RHNA) Determinations set forth by the Association of Bay Area
Governments (ABAG).
Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
A total of 737 BMR units have been produced since 1980 as a result of this program. This
includes 180 for-sale units and 557 rental units. As is indicated by the city’s constant revision
of the ordinance to help it reach its RHNA numbers, the BMR program has not been
completely successful in creating affordable units in Sunnyvale.
Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
No developer has taken advantage of alternative compliance options.
Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
The density bonus incentive has only been used once. City staff indicated that it is likely that
developers already provide the highest density that they feel is physically and financially
feasible on their projects.
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Effects on Housing Production
The city has not made any statement on the impacts on overall housing production by the
BMR program, but the building community was particularly vocal when the program was
revised in January and February of 2003. The Home Builders Association of Northern
California and the Tri-County Apartment Association were particularly concerned that the
program discouraged overall residential development, emphasizing that IH programs
increase risk to developers and lenders by reducing returns. The HBA also stated that
landowners are not required to sell their land at a reduced price, which results in project
delays. One developer wrote a letter indicating that a multi-family project that he proposed
for Sunnyvale was halted because the BMR program did not produce the return he required.
A report done for the city by its consultant, Bay Area Economics, indicated that in-fill multi-
family projects were made infeasible by IH programs during market downturns. It
specifically states, “Rental projects typically operate with a relatively thin profit margin, and
are highly sensitive to changes in rents, vacancy levels, and land values. Consequently, an
economic downturn can negatively impact the feasibility of a market rate project.”
Who Bears the Burden?
According to representatives of the building and apartment owners’ communities, the
market rate homeowners and landowners bear the burden of IH programs. IH programs
also squeeze the middle-class out of the housing market. They both support the production
of affordable housing when the burden is born by society as a whole. IH is unfair because it
focuses the burden on certain groups within society.
The City of Sunnyvale also bears the burden of administering the program. The program
requires staff in multiple departments to dedicate their time to maintaining the program.
This money is taken from other city programs.
Self-Evaluation
The ordinance does not require the city to evaluate the program or its impacts on housing
production in Sunnyvale.
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IV. JURISDICTIONS OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA
CITY OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of Boston was selected because it is one of the few large cities in the country that
has a citywide inclusionary housing program. It also is built out, for the most part, and most
projects are developed on infill sites. The city has what many developers consider to be a
complicated entitlement process that often includes lengthy dealings with the city and
community resistance to development. The housing market is very strong in Boston and
housing costs have been rising faster than inflation in the city. Though it exists in a different
regulatory atmosphere than Los Angeles, many of the development issues are similar.
Brief Contextual Information on City
Located in Massachusetts, Boston is the largest city in New England. The city is a short drive
from the states of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New
York. It is located on the Atlantic Ocean and has a port complex.
Boston’s population in 2000 was 589,141. The city did not experienced significant
population growth between 1990 and 2000 (2.6%), but population growth far outpaced
growth in the number of housing units (0.4%), when only approximately 1,100 net new units
became available.
The majority of the housing stock is multi-family units. Approximately 68.6% of housing
units are in structures with 3 or more units. 21.5% are in structures with 20 or more units.
The median home value in 2000 was just over $190,000 and has risen substantially since
then. The median household income was nearly $40,000 in 2000.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
Boston’s inclusionary housing policy was implemented by an executive order issued by
Mayor Thomas Menino on February 28, 2000. The program is not a part of the city code
and can be eliminated by the mayor at any time. It is administered by the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA). The stated purpose of the policy is to “promote the
production of affordable housing in Boston.”
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• The inclusionary housing policy applies to:
1. any proposed project that is undertaken or financed by any agency of the City of
Boston or the BRA or to be developed on property owned by the city or BRA that
includes 10 units or more, or
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2. any housing project that includes 10 or more units and requires zoning relief.
• 10% of the units in a housing project must be made affordable to moderate-income and
middle-income households.
1. Moderate-income includes households with an income equal to or below 80% AMI
2. Middle-income includes households with an income between 80% and 120% AMI
• No more than 50% of the inclusionary units can be for middle-income households.
• The program applies to rental and for sale projects.
• No term of affordability is defined in the policy.
Alternative Compliance
Developers have two alternative compliance options. They are payment of an in-lieu fee or
provision of affordable units off-site. These options are described in greater detail below.
In-Lieu Fee
Subject to the approval of the Director of the BRA, the developer may propose to meet its
affordable housing obligations by making a dollar contribution. This is calculated by
multiplying the total number of units by 15% and the resulting number by an affordable
housing cost factor, currently standing at $52,000. These funds are used to subsidize other
affordable housing developments in Boston. The affordable housing cost factor is adjusted
annually on July 1st.
Off-Site Compliance
Subject to the approval of the Director of the BRA, the developer may choose to create 15%
of the total number of units off-site. 50% of the off-site units shall be affordable to
households earning below 80% of median income. The remaining 50% shall be affordable
to households earning between 80% and 120% of median income, provided that, on
average, these units are affordable to households earning 100% of median income.
Offset Packages
The policy does not outline any offset packages or incentives for residential developers.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
In 2000, the Boston Globe called affordable housing “this year’s hot political issue.” Mayor
Menino also considered the shortage of affordable housing in the city to be his “top
priority.”
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In the second half of the 1990s, housing prices continued to increase in Boston, forcing
moderate-income households to look elsewhere for housing. Menino began receiving
pressure from organizations like the Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance and the
Boston Tenant Coalition. The tenant coalition is particularly strong in Boston, where nearly
70% of the residents are renters.
Menino created the city’s inclusionary policy through an executive order as an attempt to
provide more affordable housing in the city and appease groups that were placing political
pressure on his administration regarding that issue.
The fact that the program is the result of an executive order is important because of the
flexibility it provides the administration. Menino made the claim that he opposed writing the
program into the zoning code because it would be harder to eliminate if it was not working
as planned. He showed concern that inclusionary housing could slow development in an
economic downturn. If the policy was codified, making changes would be a long public
process.
Impact of the Program
In trying to determine the impacts of the program, KP spoke with city staff and
representative of the residential building industry in Boston. Below is a summary of the
information provided by these sources.
Based on information provided by the city, 71 on-site inclusionary units have been
completed or are under construction as of February 2003. An additional 591 units are at
some stage of the development review process. There is no guarantee that these units will be
produced. The city has not yet been able to provide the number of units built off-site or the
amount of in-lieu fees paid to the city. Additionally, the city has not provided information on
the number of affordable units whose construction has been subsidized by the in-lieu fees
paid to the city’s housing fund. This indicates that the information is not readily available
and an accurate evaluation of the city’s inclusionary program cannot be easily accomplished.
Discussions with a representative of the Boston residential building industry indicated that it
was hard to build housing in Boston prior to inclusionary housing, and the policy only makes
it more difficult. The program means building housing becomes more expensive. When
developers plan projects, developers create market rate units that have the highest profit
margins. These tend to be higher end units. The inclusionary units replace the middle range
units, creating a project that has high end housing and inclusionary units with fewer units in
between.
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CITY OF DENVER, COLORADO
Reason for Selecting this City
The City of Denver, Colorado was selected because it is one of the few large cities in the
county with a citywide inclusionary housing program. It is also in the western United States
and has experienced development patterns somewhat similar to the City of Los Angeles.
Though the program is relatively new, the experiences of the building community and city
staff in Denver can provide insight into what can occur in Los Angeles.
City Information
With nearly 555,000 residents, the City of Denver is the largest city in the State of Colorado.
The city’s population grew approximately 18.6% during the 1990s and the number of
dwelling units only grew by 4.9%. The population growth was fueled in large part by jobs
created by public investment in major real estate development projects, including new sports
stadiums and a convention center. The housing production has not kept up with demand.
Denver has slightly more homeowners (52.5%) than renters (47.5%) and nearly 50% of all
housing units are single-family detached. The median home value in Denver in 2000 was
$165,000 and the median income was $39,500.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
The City of Denver created its Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Program (MPDU) in
August 2002. Based on the city’s legislative findings that a “severe housing problem exists in
Denver with respect to the supply of moderately priced housing units,” the stated purpose
of the program is to “increase the availability of additional low and moderate-income
housing to address existing and anticipated future housing needs in the city” and “assure that
moderately priced housing is dispersed throughout Denver consistent with the
Comprehensive Plan.”
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
• Inclusionary housing requirements apply to for sale residential projects with 30 or more
units.
• 10% of all residential units within a project that includes market rate housing must be
affordable to and occupied by households earning no more than 80% of the AMI.
• If a residential project is 3 or more stories high, has an elevator, and over 60% of its
parking is in a structure, then 10% of all units must be affordable to and occupied by
households earning no more than 95% of the AMI.
• The owner of the MPDU may sell the unit at fair market price, but in order to prevent a
windfall, must provide the city with 50% of the proceeds of the sale.
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• The incentives provided by the MPDU program can be applied to projects with fewer
than 30 units if the developer meets the 10% inclusionary unit requirement.
• Rental property developers can take advantage of the MPDU incentives if 10% of the
units are affordable to households making 65% AMI. The affordability requirement
increases to 80% in residential developments with 3 or more stories, an elevator, and
60% of its parking in a structure.
Alternative Compliance
Alternative compliance options available to developers include payment of an in-lieu fee or
provision of units off-site. The Director of the Community Planning and Development
Department (CPDA) must approve both of these options. These options are discussed in
greater detail below.
In-Lieu Fee
Developers can pay a fee to a special revenue fund in-lieu of providing the units on-site. The
in-lieu fee is equal to 50% of the sale price per MPDU for each MPDU that is not provided.
Off-Site Compliance
One or more of the required MPDUs can be built off-site in the same or adjoining statistical
neighborhood as defined by the Director of the CPDA.
Offset Packages
The MPDU program provides a number of incentives to help offset the cost of providing
affordable housing. These incentives are discussed below.
Reimbursement
The Director of the CPDA can authorize a cash reimbursement of $5,000 per MPDU built
(up to 50% of the total units in a development). A reimbursement of $10,000 is available for
MPDUs made available to households at 60% AMI. The amount of the reimbursement is
limited to the amount available in the special revenue fund. The special revenue fund was
initially funded by a $1 million transfer from the general fund is expected to be funded by
payment of in-lieu fees and other appropriations to the fund.
Density Bonus
A density bonus of up to 10% is permitted in some residentially zoned districts. The MPDU
requirement is based on the total number of units in the project including the bonus, and the
bonus must result in the minimum addition of 1 MPDU.
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Parking Reduction
Except in PUDs, reduced parking requirements of up to 20% of the spaces required by the
applicable zoning will b granted. Additional MPDUs must be provided at a rate of 1 MPDU
per 10 spaces reduced. A minimum of 1 additional MPDU must be provided if a parking
reduction is granted.
Expedited Processing
If a developer satisfies all requirements provided on a development review checklist, CPDA
will review the plan within 180 days.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
The Denver MPDU ordinance was prompted by an increase in significant housing price
compared to rises in household income and a shortage of affordable housing in the city. In
2000, the Denver Comprehensive Plan set forth the goal of dispersing a diverse range of
housing throughout the metropolitan area. The city also experienced an influx of low-wage
service workers during the 1990s that had problems finding affordable dwelling units within
the city boundaries.
Elected officials in Denver received pressure from religious groups and affordable housing
advocates. The MPDU program was seen as an effort to address the city’s affordable
housing shortage.
Impact of the Ordinance
Number of Units Produced
Since the ordinance was passed in August of 2002, 14 projects have been required to provide
MPDUs. These projects will provide the city with 756 MPDUs through phased
developments. The city has paid for 300 rebates thus far, indicating that 300 MPDUs will
actually be provided in the first year. At this point, there is no guarantee that the remaining
units will be constructed.
Alternative Compliance Options Used in Place of Providing Units On-Site
In the first 9 months of this program, only 1 of the 14 eligible projects has complied by
producing the MPDUs off-site and no developers have requested to pay the in-lieu fee.
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Incentives Used to Offset the Burden
The most popular incentive to date has been the $5,000 rebate per MPDU provided. This
has been paid for all of the 300 MPDUs that will be provided in the first year. The
development community feels the other incentives, density bonuses, parking reductions, and
expedited permit processing, do not help offset the burden of providing MPDUs.
According to the Denver Board of Realtors, density bonuses and parking reductions cannot
be used by are not a realistic option. They wrote, “In most instances, developments that will
result in the construction of 30 or more units necessitate a rezoning to PUD. A PUD is a
unique zone district for each site that already prescribes allowable densities and parking
standards.”
Conversations with residential developers in Denver reveal that the expedited processing is
unlikely to occur and, to date, no developer has taken advantage of it.
Effects on Housing Production
It is too early to tell if the program has or will have any effects on housing production in
Denver. The development community feels that this will have a negative overall impact on
housing production in the city, while city feels that it will not negatively impact housing
production. Because the program applies to only one type of residential development project
(for-sale projects with 30 or more units) it will be interesting to see if there will be an
increase in smaller for-sale or rental projects as a percent of total residential development
projects. It is interesting to note that although rental and smaller projects can take advantage
of incentives if they provide MPDUs, none have done so to date.
Who Bears the Burden?
The MPDU program was presented as a program that forces the residential development
industry to bear its costs because they have failed to provide moderately-priced, affordable
housing and have instead focused on building only higher priced housing. This perspective
means residential developers will have to bear the burden by not receiving the high returns
that they would receive if they were building only market rate units.
The Denver development community does not view this exactly the same way. Based on
conversations with developers familiar with the Denver residential market and development
organizations, developers feel the cost will be passed through to landowners and purchasers
of market rate units. Residential developers will not be able to pay as much for land because
future returns will be reduced. This means that other land uses, including the existing use,
might be able to out bid residential developers for land. It also acts as a tax on landowners
whose land is only suitable for residential development. Developers also feel that market rate
buyers will bear the burden because the affordable units will reduce the supply of less
expensive new units.
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In addition to landowners and market rate home-buyers paying the costs of providing
affordable housing, the city is also paying for the administration of the program and for the
rebates that developers receive. The cost of the rebates is expected to be covered by
payment of the in-lieu fee, but, as is indicated above, no developer has opted to pay the in-
lieu fee. The start money for the rebate fund came from a transfer from the general fund. If
no developers pay the in-lieu fee in the future, the money will have to come from the general
fund transfers, or else the rebate payments, the most popular incentive, will cease to exist.
This means city money is taken from other programs to pay for a program that is supposed
to limit the cost to the city.
Other Developer Concerns
Marketability
The development community feels that there will be marketability issues related to the
MPDUs. Problems associated with finding occupants for the MPDUs include inability to
find financing for the tenants, a small market of potential tenants, and competition from
affordable market rate single-family homes located outside of the city. Developers fear that
they will build units that might not be filled, leading to greater financial risk that they and
their lenders must consider.
Reduced Production in Economic Downturns
The Downtown Development Association is particularly fearful of the impacts of the
MPDU program during economic downturns. In a white paper provided to the Denver City
Council, they wrote:
It is likely that the Ordinance would work poorly or not at all in difficult economic times
because developers may choose not to absorb additional regulatory burdens that impact their
minimum profit objectives. The workforce affordable housing issue is present in all
economic times; tools to provide affordable housing need to work in all economic times.
Unfair Burden
The development community is particularly concerned that the ordinance specifically
focuses on a small segment of society to pay for a program that benefits the entire city. The
program is directed only at for-sale housing developers and no other group.
Self-Evaluation
The Denver MPDU program is one of few programs that require self-evaluation. Per the
MPDU ordinance, the CPDA must prepare a written report assessing the program and
evaluating the its effectiveness in achieving the stated goals of the program. The evaluation
includes an opportunity for public testimony from community members.
Because the program is less than one year old, no report has been prepared to date.
Conversations with city staff indicate that the city is happy with the program thus far. They
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expected between 300 and 500 new affordable units to be built on an annual basis with 300
being produced in “down” years. As is stated above, 300 units received approvals in the first
9 months of the program. This is higher than expected because officials recognize this as a
down year.
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MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
Reason for Selecting this County
Montgomery County’s Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU) ordinance is the oldest IH
program in the country. It is considered as the most productive IH program in the country
with nearly 11,000 units produced over the past 20 years. Many IH ordinances around the
country have also been modeled on their program. However this county has seen a decrease
in the production of AH units as well as a decline in the total number of such units over the
past several years.
County Information
Montgomery County is a predominately suburban county located in the Greater Washington
DC region. It is adjacent to the national capital and also borders the Maryland counties of
Frederick, Carroll, Howard and Prince George’s, and the State of Virginia.
In 2000, the population of Montgomery County was approximately 873,000. The county’s
population grew a total of 15.4% from 1990 to 2000. The total number of housing units
located in Montgomery County grew at a slightly slower rate of 13.2% during the 1990s.
Over 51% of the housing units in Montgomery County are single-family detached. The
median home value was over $220,000 in 2000 and the overall vacancy rate for the county
was approximately 3.0%. The median household income is over $71,000.
Description of the Program
Stated Purpose and Guidelines
Enacted in 1974, the MPDU ordinance is the oldest IH program in the country. The
ordinance applies to both single and multi family developments. The ordinance applies to
most jurisdictions within the county excepting several incorporated towns, villages, and
special taxing districts.
The basic program guidelines are as follows:
Unit Threshold and Set Aside
The ordinance require 12.5 to 15% of the units to be set aside as affordable housing in
developments of 3511 or more residential dwellings, whether for rent or ownership. In
addition, the ordinance only applies to residential zones with lots of less than one acre per
unit, thereby making large-lot developments exempt.
11 This threshold was reduced from 50 or more unit in 2002 in order to allow for a greater number of projects
to qualify as land for larger projects begins to diminish.
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Eligible Participants
The program targets households earning 65% or less of the area median income. Eligible
participants cannot have owned a residential property in the past five years, and preference is
given to those applicants who live or work in the county. Should the developer be unable to
rent or sell an affordable unit to an eligible participant within 90 days, he or she may make
the unit available to anyone, regardless of income. However, the unit must be offered at the
predetermined affordable price, and all IH requirements remain in place. The county’s
Housing Opportunities Commission also has the right to purchase up to one-third of a
project’s MPDUs and rent them to even lower income households. The county uses state
and federal money to purchase the units at the affordable price less 4.5% for marketing and
sales commission.
Adherence to the Regulations
The rental units will be locked in under this ordinance for 20 years while owner occupied
dwellings are regulated for 10 years. Owners of AH units can sell before 10 years however
the resale price cannot exceed the original sales price plus CPI adjustments, approved
improvements, sales commissions and any closing costs. These units should also be offered
exclusively for 60 days to eligible participants.
Profit Sharing on Sale of AH Units
An amendment to the ordinance in 1989, requires profits on 1st sale after control period to
be split between the homeowner and the county’s Housing Initiative Fund (HIF). On sale,
the Homeowner gets $10,000 or 50% of the total profit whichever is greater. In order to
maintain the supply of AH units, the Housing Opportunity Commissions purchase 33% of
these affordable units and qualified non-profits can purchase what the HOC does not buy.
These purchased units are set-aside as rentals for very low-to low-income households.
Alternative Compliance
A major amendment provides for alternative methods of meeting the MPDU requirement
when the units are not affordable because of high condominium or homeowner's association
fees and where the services provided cannot be eliminated or modified for the MPDU
residents. An example would be a luxury high-rise, condominium building. In such cases, a
developer could fulfill the inclusionary housing requirements by either building or providing
land for affordable units at other sites in the same or adjoining planning area; contribute to
the HIF funds or any combination of the three that will result in production of more units.
However the county has been very reluctant in approving requests for providing units in
alternate locations and from 1989 to 1999, only 10 such requests were allowed.
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Offset Packages
Density Bonus
In return for providing AH units, developers are allowed a density bonus reaching 22%. An
amendment to the ordinance based the provision ranging on a sliding scale from 12.5% to
15% that links the percentage of AH units to the amount of density bonus units a developer
can accommodate on the site.
Financing
The county can provide financial subsidies on a project-by-project bases. One form of
subsidy is a property tax break.
Findings
Factors that Prompted Implementation of the Ordinance
The ordinance was created in the 1970s in response to a shortage of housing available to low
and moderate-income households. The growth that the county experienced during this
period combined with growth control policies and limited public infrastructure led to
increase housing prices that was faster than the rate of inflation. During this time period, the
region also transformed from a bedroom community to the second largest employment
center in the Washington D.C. region. Lower paying retail and service jobs accompanied this
commercial growth, and many of these people could not afford housing in the county.
The League of Women Voters and the Maryland Fair Housing group drafted the proposal
for the MPDU program in the early 1970s. The legislation was revised numerous times
before its passage and overcame a veto by the county executive. The law took effect in 1974.
Impact of the Ordinance
Because of its age and ability to produce measurable tangible results, the Montgomery
County MPDU program is one of the most regularly analyzed inclusionary housing
programs in the country. The MPDU program has produced over 11,200 units since its
inception in 1974. 72% of these units are owner-occupied units. This amount of production
is generally used to indicate the success of the MPDU program, but in all the research on the
program no study has ever analyzed the opportunity cost of the program. In other words, if
the program did not exist, would more housing have been produced? In addition to the lack
of research on this issue, other reports recognize the limitations inherent in the program.
These limitations are discussed below.
Much of the production of MPDUs occurred prior to the 1990s. Planned residential
developments with predominantly single-family homes constituted the majority of the
housing projects. The county is now nearly built out and production of the types of projects
that produce MPDU is on the decline. There is not a large amount of land that can
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accommodate projects with 50 units or more. This is why the county lowered the threshold
to projects with 35 units or more. Additionally, according to the director of the MPDU
program, it is harder to produce MPDUs in infill projects. The sites are often smaller, and in
order to exceed the threshold, developers have to build high-rise projects. These projects
require more of a subsidy in the form of property tax breaks to cover the cost of providing
affordable units. The director envisions a reduction in the number of MPDUs produced in
the future as smaller infill projects becomes more common. The production of affordable
units is dependent on market production in general. Changes that occur in the market will
impact MPDU production. This is reiterated in the literature referenced below.
Additional Findings
According to Karen Destorel Brown’s discussion paper prepared by The Brookings
Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, there has been a dramatic reduction in
the creation of rental MPDUs since 1989. This decline has been attributed to the overall
reduction in production of multi-family housing, and changes to the tax codes. However
growth management policies and lesser availability of large plots of land have led to fewer
residential developments passing the 50 units threshold that triggers inclusionary housing.
Affordable units in high rises also fell in 1980s primarily because the high construction costs
makes it financially infeasible to include affordable units. Bonus density does not provide
enough incentive to construct such apartment projects. Therefore developers unable to pass
on the cost to renters will lead to a reduction in construction of such types of development.
The county has also identified other limitations inherent in its MPDU program. The
program's most significant limitation is its reliance on a favorable housing market; the
production of MPDUs is based on the accompanying production of market rate housing.
The rate of production decreased following the economic slow down of the early 1990's, and
fewer than 350 units are being produced annually; supplying less than 20% of those on the
waiting list.
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STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Reason for Selecting this State
New Jersey had a long lasting and diverse experience with IH and it has become a significant
element in the provision of affordable housing on a statewide level. There is also a shortage
of IH programs elsewhere in the country. Therefore it was felt necessary to include New
Jersey as one of the studies.
IH is a Supreme Court driven measure that has virtually made it an obligatory element of
municipal compliance (Calavita et al, 1997). Affordable Housing provisions became a
constitutional obligation of each municipality in the state.
Since the program is administered and regulated at the state level, we will therefore be
analyzing this case study at the state level and the write-up is presented in a different format.
History of Inclusionary Housing in New Jersey
IH in New Jersey emerged from the landmark Mt. Laurel I, II, and III decisions of the New
Jersey Supreme Court which ruled that every municipality has a State Constitutional
obligation to provide its fair share of its regional need for low and moderate-income
housing. They also held that builders who bring this "socially beneficial" litigation should be
entitled, in most cases, to a "builder’s remedy" or zoning that would permit them to develop
their property at a reasonable density provided they built lower income housing.
In response to the Mount Laurel decisions, the New Jersey legislature passed the Fair
Housing Act in 1985 to provide for low and moderate-income housing. The Act led to the
establishment of an administrative agency called the Council on Affordable Housing
[COAH] to implement the statute's "fair share" housing plan. The COAH has imposed
detailed state regulations governing the scope, character, and salient features of inclusionary
development.
The Fair Share Act Analysis
The Fair Housing Act (N.J.S.A. 52:27 D-301) was enacted on July 2, 1985, to proactively try
to overcome exclusionary zoning in the state and ensure that each municipality in New
Jersey supplies its fair share of affordable housing.
At the core of the Act is the fair share plan created by each municipality that explicitly
outlines their low- and moderate-income housing requirements for a six-year period. These
plans become part of the municipal master plan.
The plans include an inventory of the municipality’s housing stock by age, condition,
purchase or rental value, occupancy characteristics, and type including the number of units
that are already affordable to low- and moderate-income households. The inventory informs
the municipal officials of current housing conditions and identifies future needs.
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A municipality can submit their fair share plan to the COAH for certification. If certified by
the COAH, the Fair Housing Act stipulates that the municipality is protected from any
lawsuit claiming that its zoning excludes people of low- and moderate-incomes.
Each municipality in New Jersey is part of one of six larger housing regions determined by
the COAH. The municipalities within a region are collectively responsible for meeting the
fair share requirements of the region.
Implementation Mechanisms by Municipalities
The most common mechanism used by municipalities is an inclusionary housing policy.
"Inclusionary development" is defined in the Fair Housing Act as "a residential housing
development in which a substantial percentage of the housing units are provided for a
reasonable income range of low- and moderate-income households."
Often municipalities can meet a portion of their fair share obligation through rehabilitation
of existing units. To provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of new units,
municipalities may zone specific sites for residential developments by the private sector.
Developers must agree to build a fixed percentage of affordable units---usually 20%---of the
total constructed on the site, to market to low and moderate-income households and to
maintain affordability for 30 years.
Other methods for meeting the obligation include municipally sponsored construction using
for-profit or nonprofit builders, the purchase of existing units for sale or rent to eligible
householders, regional contribution agreements (RCAs), the creation of accessory
apartments within existing structures, a write-down/buy-down program and the provision of
alternative or congregate living arrangements including group homes for the physically
handicapped or developmentally disabled.
The COAH has developed guidelines regarding unit distribution, bedroom distribution,
range of affordability, and documentation.
Unit Distribution
The unit distribution in an inclusionary development requires at least 50% of the
inclusionary units to be for low-income households. Also, no more than 25% of the units
can be "age-restricted" for seniors.
Bedroom Distribution
A minimum of 35% of all low- and moderate-income units must be two bedroom units; a
minimum of 15% must be three bedroom units; and no more than 20% of all units can be
efficiency units.
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Range of Affordability
Pricing is determined by what a lower-income household can afford to pay rather than the
cost of developing the unit. Housing should be affordable to households at 57.5% of the
region’s median income.
Every 20 low- and moderate-income units should follow a pricing stratification as shown
below:
Income Status Number of Units for Every 20 Percent of Median Income
Low 1 40 through 42.5
3 42.6 through 47.5
6 47.6 through 50
Moderate 1 50.1 through 57.5
1 57.6 through 64.5
1 64.6 through 68.5
1 68.6 through 72.5
2 72.6 through 77.5
4 77.6 through 80
Municipalities that use an inclusionary housing policy must have supporting documentation
outlining the policy in their fair share plan. The documentation must demonstrate that the
specific sites to be used for inclusionary developments are suitable, available, developable,
approvable, and have adequate services.
Regional Contribution Agreement
A municipality can avoid providing all of their own fair share requirements by transferring
the requirements to other parts of the housing region. For example, a more rural area may
apply to transfer some of their requirement to a more urbanized area within the housing
region. Up to 50% of fair share requirements can be transferred. The cost to the sending
municipality is approximately $20,000 per unit of its transferred share. The receiving
municipality may use the $20,000 for new construction or rehabilitation of low- and
moderate-income housing.
Findings
Factors that Prompted the Implementation of the Ordinance
The Mt. Laurel decision led to a plethora of litigations filed by Developers against errant
municipalities on the basis of exclusionary practices. It is estimated that between 80,000 and
120,000 housing units, mostly multi-family, were built as a result of litigation initiated during
this period including between 20,000 and 25,000 lower income units affordable to families
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making less than 50% of the lower income or less than 80% of the moderate-income (Hill
Wallach website, NJ law firm).
This resulting litigation created a political uproar, which resulted in the passage in 1985 of
the Fair Housing Act pursuant to which COAH was created to administer Mount Laurel
compliance. This Act was designed to decrease the magnitude of the municipal "fair shares"
which the court’s were assigning, take the issue of exclusionary zoning out of the courts,
further minimize the impact on the suburbs by permitting them to transfer lower income
units through Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs) to poorer cities through the
payment of monies, encourage municipalities to make some smaller provision for affordable
housing and abolish the "builder’s remedy". Under the Fair Housing Act COAH
membership is made up largely of elected municipal officials.
Impact on the Provision of Affordable Housing
Inclusionary housing policies are responsible for 70% of all new low- and moderate-income
housing. According to COAH monitoring reports, the opportunity for 53,500 affordable
units have been provided, with 23,100 of these either built or under construction, 14,600
units with zoning in place, 6,300 regional contribution agreement units, and 9,500 units that
have been rehabilitated. However, case studies carried out in New Jersey suggest that the
Mount Laurel plan is for the most part ineffective in dealing with the housing affordability
problems due to the lack of accountability for the actual production of the units that are filed
with the COAH (Lugger &. Temkin, 2000). COAH has also been delaying the third round of
determination of unmet housing needs since 1999 (NJBA initiatives). It instead has adopted
a “Stop-gap Administrative Action” to extend expiring substantive certifications to
municipalities until new determinations of needs were adopted. The New Jersey Builders
Association has opposed the extension and has been in litigation to compel COAH to meet
its responsibilities under the Fair Housing Act.
Sharp Reductions in IH Production From the 1980s to the 1990s
The early IH units were part of the large-scale PUD developments. The developer could
successfully integrate the lower income housing into such townhouse and condominium
projects. With the shift in the market place towards smaller scale developments made up of
detached SFH, the resistance to the inclusion of low or moderate-income units resurfaced.
Another factor in the eighties was the building boom. Developers were treating IH costs as
simple costs of doing business, and were offset by the rapidly rising profit margins in the
overheated markets. In the nineties, the costs were reflected in lower land prices, or paid by
market buyers in elite communities. Developers who were unable to pass the costs backward
or forward were unwilling to move forward with IH development and this was a major
factor in the sharp decline in new IH units added in the 1990s (Calavita et al, 1997).
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V. SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
INTRODUCTION
This survey includes studies that have been published in both academic and trade
publications as well as any available analyses that have been performed in connection with
news publications and in connection with public policy debates.
The reviewed articles mostly dealt with public policy implications, economic analyses, and
pros and cons of Inclusionary Housing. There were also a few studies that focused on
measuring the performances of jurisdictions and costs associated with such a program.
Many articles reviewed in the literature survey contend that IH may work under most or
certain circumstances. However, these articles also highlight inherent problems with IH as a
solution to a perceived shortage of affordable housing. These problems cannot be ignored.
The following is a listing of some of the key drawbacks to IH that were cited in those
articles.
OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE
1. Overall reduction in housing development compared to the amount that would
be produced without IH.
Demand and supply factors, and the efficiency of the housing market will determine whether
the landowner, the developer or the final buyer bears the costs of IH. IH will have an
impact on total housing production for any of the above-mentioned scenarios.
If the landowner bears the costs, then it might lead to a reduction in the rate of conversion
of land to residential use at the urban fringes. For a built-out city like Pasadena where non-
residential uses are also permitted, the ability of housing developers to compete with
commercial developers for building sites will be degraded (Selvidge, 2001) and will lead to a
change in the highest and best use. Any significant new development in the future will take
place on properties that have become less valuable in their existing use compared to their
value as a site for a new housing project. It is that economically rational trade-off that will
determine how much land will be made available for new housing development in Pasadena
in the future.
If the developers are unable to pass on the costs to land sellers or market rate buyers or they
are unable to recoup the costs in other projects, they will find the prospect of building this
type of development infeasible, and move to other businesses. This will ultimately be
reflected in fewer new housing being provided.
If buyers bear the costs and a sizeable section of the population are priced out of the market,
developers will respond by targeting the smaller number of higher-income buyers with units
that provide greater margins, or by going into other business (Lugger and Temkin 2000,
Selvidge, 2001).
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Marc Smith et al. in their 1996 study concludes that it is difficult to assess i) the extent to
which inclusionary housing lowered the overall housing production, ii) the social frictions in
mixed-income developments, iii) whether households not able to obtain an inclusionary unit
found their housing situation worsened as a result of higher prices caused by an inclusionary
ordinance or iv) how many AH would have been provided without the inclusionary
ordinance.
However what seem clear is that there will be an overall reduction in housing development
compared to the amount that would be produced without IH regardless of who bears the
burden. IH can lead to a reduced supply of new housing into the market thereby leading to
an increase in price and render housing unaffordable to the middle-income strata.
2. Magnitude and type of population benefiting from IH is small and narrow.
Inclusionary housing programs tend to benefit only the moderate-income first time
homebuyers (Calavita et al 1998, Conine 2000). Also the numbers of households that have
benefited over the years have been very small compared to the total need (Conine 2000).
Marc Smith et al. estimates that even under the best conditions, at the most 10% of the
community’s needs could be met with IH.
On the other hand, the Housing Trust funds have been found to be successful in catering to
the needs of the low-income groups (Calavita et al 1998). In Montgomery County, the
Housing Opportunity Commissions and qualified non-profits purchase affordable units that
are sold at the market rate at the end of the 10-year price control period and are set-aside for
the very low to low-income groups.
3. Incentives may not be practical or feasible.
The feasibility of incentives that are provided to developers for offsetting costs deserves a
hard look. Different types of incentive packages include density bonuses, fee reductions, in-
lieu fees, regulatory relief, etc. Case studies conducted in Sunnyvale or Palo Alto reveal that
developers shy away from using density bonus as incentives “due to neighborhood
opposition to higher-density projects, perceived impacts on the marketability of market rate
units in a mixed income project, and the perceived lack of demand for higher-density
projects” (Bay Area Economics 2002). Also, projects located on small sites render them
unsuitable for high-density development (Bay Area Economics 2003).
Montgomery County has seen a reduction in high-rise multi family rental development since
density bonuses are not able to offset the high construction costs of such projects. The
study by Karen Brown emphasizes that there needs to be a comprehensive look at how
development ordinances work with codes and plans since zoning regulations could prohibit
developers from realizing the full density bonus.
The inclusionary housing study done by Andrew Allen on San Diego did a financial pro
forma analysis with three offset proposals (lower quality of AH units, 10% density bonus
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and fee reduction) for rental as well as ownership types of development. The author
concludes that “cost offsets in the form of either lesser quality units, density bonuses, or fee
reductions generally are too small” for both development types.
Robert Burchall, outlining the cons of IH says that increased density in a community is a
form of unwanted and unplanned development that burdens the capacity of public services
and the environment.
Even if we assume that IH should be a tool, it will be difficult to quantify the scale of
development at which IH should apply, the type and magnitude of offsets to be provided
and whether they will be adequate. There is a danger of these requirements becoming ad-hoc
since market conditions change frequently and could unfairly affect the bottom line of
developers and run them out of business.
4. Who bears the cost of IH?
As mentioned earlier, the costs of inclusionary housing depending upon elasticity of demand
and supply, and the efficiency of the market, would be borne by the landowner, the
developer or the final buyer.
In a discussion of the impact of Pasadena’s IH ordinance, Ross Selvidge concludes that the
value of the existing properties as sites for new housing will be significantly and permanently
reduced compared to its value without IH. It is unlikely that such burden will be borne by
the developer as they will merely lower the price that they will be willing to pay for a site in
order to meet their required rate of return on the development.
Allen Andrew, in his San Diego IH feasibility study, is unsure about who finally bears the
cost of the affordable units. If the demand is inelastic, then most of the costs of inclusionary
housing are passed onto the buyers of the market rate units rendering them less affordable.
The Lugger and Temkin’s study mirrors this theory and also concludes that if the developer
is marketing houses for which there is relatively lower price elasticity then the regulatory
costs are transferred forward to the buyer with a multiplier factor. This multiplier was
estimated to be around 4.0 suggesting that if these costs are $20,000 to the developer then
the buyer ultimately will pay as high as $80,000 more for the unit. This prices out a large
section of the households out of the market and seem to be consistent with home ownership
trends.
Developers who may have incorrectly forecast the regulatory costs would end up having to
incur part or the entire burden and end up with lower profits. Most of the developers
interviewed in Lugger and Temkin’s study indicated they did lose money on some projects
but were able to recoup that loss on another project. However, some developers who could
not make up their losses have gone out of business.
Most IH ordinances “target” residential developers. However, a policy question is whether
landowners/sellers should bear the burden or whether residential developers should be the
only group paying for affordable housing or whether the entire developing fraternity or
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society at large should be targeted. Residential developers in the City of Mountain View
pointed out that it is commercial and industrial development that generates jobs that increase
the need for housing and therefore the entire developer community should pay the price.
5. Challenges of maintaining long-term affordability.
IH puts a cost on the owner of the affordable units (both owner and rental properties) by
requiring them to find a buyer who will meet the AH qualifications. Ceilings on resale prices
or profit sharing could also act as a disincentive for maintenance of the property. This in
turn can hasten the dilapidation of the property and lead to a reduction in affordable housing
stock.
6. IH entails considerable administrative liability.
IH entails considerable administrative liability. The cost of administrating the program is
expensive and varies from $40,000 to $110,000 per year in Sunnyvale or Palo Alto, cities
with populations between 60,000 to 132,000 (Bay Area Economics, 2003). Program
managers characterized monitoring of inclusionary requirements as time consuming and
cumbersome. The study on three Bay Area cities show that complications arise from the
units’ resale, owners renting out the units and tenants and owners becoming disqualified as
their income grows.
7. Diversion of scarce resources.
Offsetting the costs to developers of IH through financial incentives may divert resources
away from non-profit developers who are often more efficient in producing affordable
housing thereby leading to an overall reduction in affordable housing (Allen 2002).
Affordable housing goals may be better achieved by focusing on providing subsidies to non-
profit developers rather than requiring for-profit developers to build affordable units
(Pyatok, 2003). Developers in such jurisdictions are reluctant to provide affordable housing
since they do not possess the specialized skills and consider this a high risk investment and
tend to prefer in-lieu fees as an alternative (Calavita et al, 1998).
8. Alternatives to IH ordinance.
Experiences with IH has shown that in spite of the amount of affordable units created over
the last two decades, the number of households who have benefited from the programs is
relatively small. Therefore society should rethink those planning, zoning, and housing
policies that will have the greatest impact on the price of housing (Conine, 2000).
The San Diego study included a consumer surplus analysis and concludes “for the same
costs, more households can be helped through income subsidies than from the production
of inclusionary units.” This will take the form of Demand side measures like Section 8
vouchers and certificates. The study also shows that builder/developers who can efficiently
piece together low rate financing like tapping funds from the Low-income Housing Tax
Credit program to fill in the gap will be better off producing affordable housing.
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APPENDIX 1
Summary of Key Articles
Article 1
Allen, Andrew T. PhD 2002 “Inclusionary Housing in San Diego: An Economic Analysis”.
Real Estate Institute, School of Business, University of San Diego.
The study reviews existing inclusionary housing programs and analyzes the potential effects
of an inclusionary program in San Diego.
The author makes a general conclusion that it is not economically feasible for private for-
profit developers/builders to build low-income housing. Requiring them to do so as part of
an inclusionary policy imposes significant costs that either must be offset through financial
incentives or are passed along to market-rate renters or buyers.
Offsetting these costs with financial incentives simply re-directs scarce taxpayer resources
away from those non-profit institutions that are efficient at producing low-income housing
and towards firms that are not efficient at producing low-income housing. As a result of this
wasteful and inefficient spending, costs are imposed on society at-large.
Specific Findings
1. An inclusionary housing program would help some moderate-income households but
not many low or very low-income households.
2. An inclusionary housing program would help some small households but not many large
households.
3. An inclusionary housing program would not produce a steady and reliable stream of low-
income housing.
4. A reason low-income housing is unaffordable in San Diego is its restrictive regulatory
environment.
5. The benefits of economic and racial integration, at the city block level, are unknown.
6. Cost-offsets in the form of lesser quality units, density bonuses, or fee reductions
generally are too small.
7. Specialized low-cost financing, like the LIHTC, allows the production of affordable low-
income housing units.
8. For the same cost, more households can be helped through income subsidies than from
the production of Inclusionary units.
9. Inclusionary units may not go to those who value them the most.
10. Most inclusionary units will be built in low-income areas.
11. Inclusionary housing programs may make housing less affordable.
Appendix 1-1
12. Inclusionary housing programs may not result in any additional low-income housing.
13. When inclusionary housing programs make housing less affordable, middle-income
households are pushed out and down to lower quality units while the program places
low-income households in higher quality units.
Article 2
Bay Area Economics 2002 “San José Inclusionary Housing Study” Prepared for: Housing
Department, City of San Jose.
This report approaches inclusionary housing as one of many policies that could be adopted
to increase affordable housing opportunities in the city to meet all levels of need. This report
analyzes the feasibility and impacts of inclusionary housing policy options on private
developers assuming no public subsidies are available to support the affordable housing
component.
Conclusions
Method of Implementation
• Negotiated Case-by-Case – this approach has the disadvantage of resulting in uneven
treatment of projects.
• Voluntary Program – would likely require incentives to encourage participation, but
common incentives such as density bonus or parking requirement reductions do not
appear to be stimulants to local developers.
• City Policy – this would be a mandatory policy, but could be implemented with some
discretion by city.
• Inclusionary Housing Ordinance – this approach would be the most comprehensive and
affect all market rate housing projects outside of Redevelopment Project Areas.
It should be noted that, subject to a legal opinion, it is likely that a mandatory inclusionary
housing ordinance would require a “nexus” study to determine the relationship between the
ordinance and San José’s affordable housing needs. While earlier ordinance adoptions by
many California cities did not encompass a nexus study, more recent proposed inclusionary
ordinances have been adopted following this type of study, in accordance with legal opinions
recommending this approach.
Affordability and Percent of Inclusionary Units
BAE formulated a series of “baseline” pro formas representing typical current development
projects in San José in consultation with local developers and industry representatives. The
baseline pro formas illustrate the economics of developing five project types, including a
standard lot single-family development, a small lot single family development, a townhouse
Appendix 1-2
project, a condominium project, and a multifamily rental project. Assumptions were
developed based on interviews with residential developers in San José.
For ownership projects, a 10% inclusionary requirement with units affordable to low,
median, or moderate-income households is a workable option at current market prices.
Should the city choose to extend the policy to aid very low-income households, a combined
requirement of 6% affordable to moderate-income households and 4% affordable to very
low-income households is also feasible. However, if home values continue their downward
trend, the city may need to adopt a less aggressive approach, and reserve the inclusionary
policy to median and moderate-income households. In a down market, projects would face
too much difficulty generating enough of a profit to support units affordable to low-income
households. A 15% inclusionary requirement, particularly for moderate-income households,
may become viable if home values begin to rise again. Such a policy would increase the
production of affordable units, albeit for households at higher income levels. Low and very
low-income households would not benefit from this policy.
For rental housing, current market conditions pose a challenge in developing market rate
units. However, when economic conditions improve to a state similar to the 1st Quarter
2001, urban rental housing is feasible, and can absorb 10% inclusionary units for median
income households.
Length of Term
Programs implemented throughout the state range from a low of 20 years of affordability
limits to upwards of 50 years or more. Some cities with a history of implementation using
the shorter terms have found that they still need the housing stock at affordable levels at the
end of the term. Most programs also include a city buy out clause so that the seller of the
ownership unit is not burdened by trying to locate an eligible buyer and to help ensure that
the unit remains within the affordable housing stock after the term expires.
Minimum Project Size and Fractional Units
Many cities with a 10% inclusionary requirement except projects of less than 10 units to
avoid a fractional unit problem while others apply their policy across all project applications,
and allow payment of the in-lieu fee for fractional units. Still others round up so that every
project is obligated to provide at least one affordable unit. Smaller projects also lack the
economies of scale that help support inclusionary units.
Specific Geographic Area Exceptions
Another option, as illustrated by Sunnyvale’s existing program, is to exclude certain areas
(e.g., low density single family zones) and/or certain types of projects (assisted living and
special needs) from a mandatory inclusionary program. This concept could be considered for
special target areas of the City of San José where other policies are encouraged, such as
higher density development near transit stations. However, it should be noted that the legal
implications of exclusions or exceptions to a mandatory program are not known to BAE,
and would need to be further explored during a nexus study prior to ordinance adoption.
Appendix 1-3
Incentives
Other jurisdictions, such as the City of Sunnyvale, incorporate a density bonus into their
inclusionary programs to help offset additional costs on developers. San José currently
provides a density bonus under Planned Development zoning in order to encourage the
production of affordable housing units. However, few developers take advantage of this
option, due to neighborhood opposition to higher-density projects, perceived impacts on the
marketability of market rate units in a mixed income project, and the perceived lack of
demand for higher-density projects. Some stakeholders participating in a review of this
report suggested that a “guaranteed” density bonus might be a more attractive incentive for
developers. A guaranteed bonus, which could be tailored to different zoning designations,
would ensure developers of the right to build at specific densities, and help overcome
NIMBY opposition to projects.
Periodic Review of Program
Although none of the programs reviewed for this study formally build in a program review,
some jurisdictions reacting to affordable housing crisis have initiated reviews and/or
refinements to their programs after years of implementation. This trend, along with changing
market conditions and development economics, suggests that the city may want to build in a
defined program review milestone (e.g., every five years) to ensure that the inclusionary
program is effective and is maximizing inclusionary opportunities through private
development projects.
Article 3
Calavita, Nico and Kenneth Grimes. "Inclusionary Housing in California: The experience of
two decades," APA Journal, Spring 1998, pp.150-169.
This paper presents a case study of Inclusionary Housing (IH), a program that can foster
both residential integration and affordable housing. Through a system of incentives and
disincentives, several local jurisdictions have adopted IH programs as mechanisms to help
bring about compliance with state law and produce affordable housing. The resultant IH
system in California can be described as decentralized, flexible, ad hoc, diverse, and complex,
as it reflects the political, economic, and cultural (Ramsay 1996) traits of each locality over
time. Survey findings for 75 IH programs show that they have produced more than 24,000
units, provide flexibility to the developers in meeting program requirements, establish
affordability terms that are usually met at 30 years or longer, and favor moderate-income
homebuyers. Interviews with planners in San Diego County reveal that IH programs are
usually established as a response to an actual or perceived threat of litigation due to
noncompliance with state housing element law. Planners can enhance new comprehensives
by emphasizing state mandates and regional housing needs and by pursuing IH as one of the
regulatory choices available to decision-makers.
Based on the survey of IH in California used in this study, the following specific and
characteristic propensities of IH can be enumerated:
Appendix 1-4
Program Flexibility
To reduce economic impacts on the developer, inclusionary programs generally allow in-lieu
fees, offsite units, and fewer amenities. In-lieu provisions are concessions especially valued
by developers, because most have little experience building low-income housing and scant
motivation to enter an unfamiliar market perceived to entail a high degree of risk (Schwartz
and Johnson 1983; Mallach 1984).
Lasting Affordability
65% of programs responding to this survey require that affordability restrictions be enforced
for at least 30 years. But maintaining the affordability of units built under IH programs
remains controversial. For example, Mallach reports that for many decision-makers, resale
controls constitute "an intolerable intrusion by public regulation into the exercise of a
fundamental and closely held property right" (1984, 147). This deep-seated ideological
opposition explains why more than a quarter of the programs have affordability restrictions
of less than 30 years. On the other hand, Davis (1994, 2), in The Affordable City, notes that
"many people have questioned the wisdom of working so hard to produce affordable
housing if the affordability of those units may soon be lost."
Targeted Populations
IH programs have placed too much emphasis on moderate-income, first-time homebuyers.
Only 53% of all programs require housing for very low-income households. There are
political as well as economic reasons for the lack of attention to the needs of this population.
In the absence of organized pressure, local decision-makers usually favor home ownership
programs for middle-income groups over rental housing for lower-income groups. An
exception to this rule involves housing trust funds, which have been successful in providing
housing for very low-income groups.
Program Inconstancy
Inclusionary programs respond to needs and concerns within a locality, as well as to the
vagaries of regional and state political-economic conditions. IH was shaped around a variety
of factors, including threats to quality of life, affordability crises, and increased regulatory
costs, and was filtered through shifting ideological lenses. A pronounced, politically
conservative shift became apparent in the 1990s, with HDC characterizing IH as
"governmental constraint" on the production of housing-an illustration of the quixotic
nature of the program.
Impetus for Enacting IH Programs
Our analysis of the origin of IH programs in San Diego County found that the impetus for
the enactment of IH programs is not a generic desire to provide affordable housing, but the
perceived threats arising from noncompliance with housing element law. This finding
suggests that the impetus for IH in California derives from the legislatively mandated state
Housing Element Law and fair share doctrine. Without such state intervention, it is doubtful
that IH in California could have reached any level of significance.
Appendix 1-5
Developer Opposition and Cost Offsets
Most developers resolutely oppose IH programs and remain firmly convinced that they are
detrimental to their financial interests. While there are at least 75 jurisdictions in the state
with inclusionary programs, many other proposed programs have been defeated (Sacramento
County in 1992 and the City of Stockton in 1993) or put on hold (San Diego in 1993).
The cost-offset approach anticipates and to some extent accommodates political opposition,
by neutralizing or reducing the additional costs developers incur in providing affordable
units. But, in return for regulatory relief that significantly reduces the costs of development,
localities should not shirk their responsibility to impose lasting affordability standards that
more closely reflect housing needs, particularly those of very-low-income households.
Housing Production
In the face of the critical paucity of affordable housing in California, the success of the
state's IH programs, particularly when measured by the production of 24,000 low-income
units over the past two decades, is arguable. That number of units, although commendable,
is manifestly insufficient to meet the housing needs of all lower-income households.
Obviously, any meaningful effort to meet the needs of lower income people requires a more
comprehensive range of tools and remedies.
By setting these precedents, IH in California has established itself as a multifaceted and
thoroughly feasible option available to officials and policy-makers who are responsible for
meeting local, regional, and state housing needs and for promoting more community social
and economic balance and self-containment. The root source of IH, it should be
remembered, is its legislatively mandated housing element and fair share doctrine. In the
wake of reduced support from the federal government, it behooves all planners to engage in
concerted efforts to pursue IH as one of the regulatory choices to be made available to
decision-makers, and to advance IH by advocating the state/regional/local framework of the
California system and the principle of regional fair share, to expand the role of IH in any
state's affordable housing strategy.
Article 4
Calavita, Nico, Kenneth Grimes, and Alan Mallach. “Inclusionary Housing in California and
New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis” Housing Policy Debate. Vol. 8, Issue 1, 1997, pp. 109-
142.
This article examines the experiences of New Jersey and California where IH has been
applied frequently over an extended period. While the concept of regional “fair share” is
central to both states’ experiences, the origins of the programs, their applications, and their
evolutions are quite different.
Appendix 1-6
Similarities Between The States
Intervention of Higher Level of Government/Courts
In New Jersey, IH was achieved through the imposition by the courts of fair-share
obligations on local jurisdictions. In California, it was achieved through a legislatively
mandated housing element and fair-share doctrine. This goal is made explicit in the
requirement that all jurisdictions prepare a housing element that meets the standards
established by the state.
Cost Offsets to Developer
Both states seek to lower the burden on the developer though a cost –offset approach.
Role of Courts
The New Jersey courts played a more visible and crucial role in promoting IH, evident from
the Mt. Laurel I and II cases. In California, given the general plan consistency requirement
of the housing element that meets state law, a municipality that fails to adopt a housing
element that meets state requirement can be subject to a court order limiting its development
approval powers through litigations. This fear of litigation has been an effective tool in
furthering IH policies in communities.
Differences Between the States
Affordability standards are stricter in New Jersey where half the affordable units must be
affordable to households making less than 50% of the median income. In California,
emphasis has been placed on households close to 80% of median income and on units for
sale. Thus the neediest families rarely benefit in California.
In New Jersey, this is also true to a lesser extent and evidence show that the beneficiaries of
IH have been suburbanites. This tendency has been exacerbated by the widespread and
increasing use of Regional Contribution Agreement (RCA) in lieu of producing the units.
Changes in Regulatory Climate
Significant changes in the socio-economic climate have forced a reappraisal of IH in New
Jersey. It seems to be moving to the model of California where the enactment and continued
survival of IH reflects political compromises between different parties and adjustments to
changing political and economic circumstances.
Conclusions
The authors feel that IH has been the best way over an extended period to offer residential
integration and housing affordable to a less affluent population. However IH programs have
also limitations and any truly serious effort to address the needs of lower income
populations must call upon a more comprehensive range of tools and remedies.
Appendix 1-7
The experiences of both states indicate that IH can and should be part of an overall
affordable housing strategy but that it is unlikely to become the core of such a strategy.
Article 5
Newman, Morris. 1993. "California Sweet-talks Its Way Into Affordable Housing." Planning
59,2 (February): 16-20.
Until recently, local governments have simply required developers to build units, or dedicate
the land, or pay an in-lieu fee. This paper calls for a more proactive approach to inclusionary
programs through communities offering incentives to developers, or at least to guarantee
that the builders will not lose money. Irvine, Chula Vista, and Monterey County in California
now have inclusionary housing policies with incentive programs.
Monterey County
This policy is mandatory. It requires every new project--both rental and for-sale--to make at
least 15% of the units affordable. Monterey County has taken an activist approach to
development of affordable housing by arranging "predevelopment conferences" with
builders and county officials. Brunings says most of the county's incentives are reserved for
builders who promise to make 25% of their units affordable.
Incentives include fee waivers and density bonuses. Qualifying projects are processed quickly
(from six to nine months) and are "put in the front of the line" for processing says Brunings.
Building permit fees are waived on the inclusionary units. And the county is willing to pay
the cost of environmental review, which can reach $150,000, for projects that are 100%
affordable.
The county discourages building the affordable units on a site separate from the market-rate
units. If the developer chooses to build off-site, the county requires a two-for-one exchange.
Both for-sale and rental housing built under Monterey County's inclusionary code must
remain affordable for 30 years.
Chula Vista
Under Chula Vista's inclusionary rules, 10% of new projects with 50 or more units must be
affordable to low-and moderate-income residents. A developer may satisfy the requirements
either by building housing or dedicating land equal in value to the required units--or in some
cases, by payment of an in lieu fee. The inclusionary program applies equally to rental and
for-sale units, all of which must remain affordable for 30 years.
As incentives, Chula Vista offers a density bonus or a transfer of density to another housing
complex within the same master planned community. The city also offers tax-exempt bond
financing for builders and gap loans for construction. In both cases, funds come from the
city's redevelopment budget. The city also takes advantage of federal mortgage certificates,
which give low-income households a 20% tax credit on their mortgage payments (in addition
to the existing deductible mortgage interest). Another strategy for home buyers is a "silent"
Appendix 1-8
second mortgage--a second mortgage taken out at roughly the same time as the first, with a
deferred repayment schedule.
City of Irvine
Irvine redesigned its inclusionary housing policy with David Rosen’s help in 1991. Now the
housing element of the city's general plan offers an array of incentives to builders who set
aside up to 25% of their units for affordable housing. Half of those units may be reserved
for low-income residents (defined as households with an income of 50 to 80%of the city's
median of $52,700) and nearly half for very-low-income residents (those with below 50% of
the median). 1% may be set aside for households with "very, very low" income (up to 30%
of the median).
Irvine's inclusionary policy requires that housing remain affordable for 30 years; that the
units offer a mix of sizes comparable to that of market-rate units (particularly two-and three-
bedroom units for families); and that the units be dispersed through the project. 10% of the
affordable units must be accessible under the standards set by the Americans with
Disabilities Act, including ramps. Units are to be marketed under an "affirmative marketing"
program, including ads in local Spanish-and Vietnamese-language newspapers. The tenant
selection process gives priority to those who work in Irvine or who have Section 8
certificates.
Incentives offered to qualifying projects include waiving development fees, making financing
available through federal block grants and state housing bonds, below-market-rate
construction loans, and land "write downs."
Article 6
Robert W. Burchell and Catherine C. Galley. 2000. “ Inclusionary Zoning: A Viable Solution
to the Affordable Housing Crisis? Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons,” New Century
Housing Newsletter, October: 1.
Positive Features and Outcomes of Inclusionary Zoning
Minimal Cost to Local Governments
Production of affordable housing at little cost to local government. Inclusionary units are
delivered in step with market units through incentives to developers such as density bonuses,
fee waivers and/or local tax abatements offered by the local jurisdiction.
Creation of Income-integrated Communities
The integration of a percentage of low- and moderate-income housing units into market-rate
housing developments avoids the problems of over concentration; ghettoization and
stigmatization generally associated with solely provided and isolated affordable housing
efforts. Suburban and exurban employers further benefit from the presence of this
proximate low- and moderate-income work force (Downs 1992). Inclusionary zoning
significantly reduces the oft-cited spatial mismatch between available suburban jobs and
employment-seeking urban households.
Appendix 1-9
Less Sprawl
IH provides the critical mass necessary to create a town center and reduce the proliferation
of sprawled bedroom subdivisions
Negative Features and Outcomes of Inclusionary Zoning
Shift of the Cost of Providing Affordable Housing to Other Groups in Society
Inclusionary zoning may change the financial characteristics of real estate developments and
reduces the saleable value of the development upon completion. Critics equate inclusionary
zoning mandates with a tax on new development—especially when there are no
compensating benefits provided to developers to cover the full cost of providing affordable
housing.
Inclusionary zoning strategy is that it is based on a market-supply equation that relies
primarily upon a developer’s ability to sell market-level units—as an example, eight market
units for every two affordable units produced. This reliance on the private sector to finance
affordable housing based on the sale of market units is not necessarily a major issue when
the economy flourishes, but it is a very serious one when the economy falters.
Inclusionary programs that are mandated without compensation were challenged
constitutionally in the 1990s as a taking.
Breaking Up Pockets of the Poor
Inclusionary zoning "distills" the most upwardly mobile poor from central neighborhoods
and artificially transports the citizens who could do the most for reviving central city
neighborhoods to the suburbs.
In-kind housing subsidies are non-transportable devices that may not significantly improve
the welfare of recipient families (Ellickson 1985). These programs may provide individual
economic benefits that are difficult to "cash out." For example, affordable housing units
usually carry with them affordability controls that typically limit the sales price increase on
such housing to a small multiple of the rate of inflation.
More Development/Induced Growth
Criticisms about "massing" have emerged where density bonuses are provided as part of the
inclusionary solution. Some argue that increased density represents an unwanted and
unplanned-for glut of development that burdens both the overall environment and the
public service capacity of local governments (Innovative Housing Institute 1999a).
Conclusions
In summary, inclusionary zoning has been criticized for shifting the burden of affordable
housing provision to other groups, for distilling the upwardly mobile poor from the
remainder of central city residents and for causing undue growth in locations that would not
Appendix 1-10
otherwise experience it. These criticisms, while warranted and substantive, pale by
comparison to the roster of accomplishments and benefits attributable to inclusionary
housing programs.
Inclusionary zoning will continue to be sought in tight and expensive housing markets where
there is socially responsible interest in providing both housing opportunity and economic
balance. The technique must be implemented cautiously, however, with sensitivity to the
locality paying for it and the population benefiting from it.
Article 7
Smith, Marc, Charles Delaney, and Thomas Liou. 1996. "Inclusionary Housing Programs:
Issues and Outcomes." Real Estate Law Journal (Fall).
This article reviews the economic, historical, and political aspects of inclusionary housing
programs and evaluates the output of inclusionary housing programs as practiced in
Montgomery County, Maryland and in the states of California and New Jersey.
Conclusions
Experiences in the jurisdictions studied suggests that inclusionary zoning programs provided
communities a regulatory tool that has produced affordable housing units with little or no
financial commitment. This is the attractive part of inclusionary zoning programs in an era
of diminishing resources.
What cannot be assessed is the extent to which inclusionary housing lowered the overall
housing production, the social frictions in missed-income developments, whether
households not able to obtain an inclusionary unit found their housing situation worsened as
a result of higher prices caused by an inclusionary ordinance or how many AH would have
been provided without the inclusionary ordinance.
Available records points out that Inclusionary zoning can only be a part of the solution to
resolving the shortage of affordable housing. A study points out that even under the best
circumstances, inclusionary housing can provide only about 10% of a community’s needs.
Regulatory actions such as inclusionary zoning programs are themselves reactive and can
only be imposed on new developments, which constitute a small portion of local housing
stock.
Appendix 1-11
Article 8
Dietderich, Andrew. "An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed." Fordham Urban Law Journal. Fall 1996.
The author studies Inclusionary Housing through the following three typical regimes:
Regime One - The Voluntary Inclusionary program
The voluntary set-aside program should increase the stock of housing available to low- or
moderate-income persons. In fact, there is no basis in economic theory for rejecting the
voluntary set-aside program. If overused, the program may damage the Exclusivity Premium
that the neighborhood charges its new residents. But this can only occur if market failure
stops the customers of the developer from valuing the Exclusivity Premium, or from
communicating their preferences to the builder. Furthermore, most of the Exclusivity
Premium stems from the effects of tax base segregation - and any change in the local
distribution of wealth is not a regional loss. Finally, the portion of the lost Exclusivity
Premium that remains (feelings of separateness and racism) is simply outweighed -
empirically and normatively - by the transfer of development sites from low to high value
uses.
Although certainly not necessary to justify it as a matter of sound economics and housing
policy, the distributive fairness of the voluntary set-aside program is an additional benefit. It
transfers wealth from those persons who have benefited most from the system of
exclusionary rules to those whom the system has most injured.
Regime Two - Mandatory Set-Asides With Density Bonus
Moving from a voluntary to a mandatory program generally will increase the number of
affordable units in the housing stock whenever the inclusionary obligations of the developer
are not extreme and there is adequate demand for high density housing. Although total
developer revenue may decrease, little of this loss will be borne by the developers
themselves. The developers will shift the new costs to two groups of people, in amounts that
depend upon the elasticities of consumer demand and the supply of land. Buyers of non-
inclusionary units may pay more and/or get less. Owners of undeveloped land may see a
drop in sale price. As long as developer revenue does not fall too far, neither of these costs
will lead to a significant retraction of supply. Dangerous drops in total revenue appear likely
only when programs insist on setting a low-income ceiling, and do not provide adequate
public subsidies to make production of the inclusionary units profitable.
Regime Three - Mandatory Set-Asides Without Density Bonuses
Local Regime Three interventions can increase the stock of affordable housing in all
jurisdictions with high Filter Loss, inelastic demand among market-rate buyers, or very
inelastic supply of land. Regional interventions, to the extent that they face a more inelastic
demand curve, are likely to be more successful (although they must be careful to avoid
gentrification). Regime Three also affects a substantial income transfer from wealthy
consumers to poorer ones. Sometimes that wealth transfer will benefit only those who
Appendix 1-12
actually receive the inclusionary units. Unless development is slowed considerably, however,
the wealth transfer will usually benefit even those low-income housing consumers who do
not receive inclusionary units directly. Their new wealth is "taken" from, in decreasing order
of probable incidence: landowners, wealthy homebuyers, and developers.
Although Regime Three fares well against the status quo or even a free market, it will almost
always be worse than Regime Two.
If Regime Three has advantages vis-à-vis the other Regimes, these advantages are political,
rather than economic. Regime Three may curtail new construction that competes with the
existing stock. Regime Two can do that as well. But Regime Two also creates cost savings
from higher density and efficient use of inputs - meaning a greater number of new units.
Obviously, more units is good from the standpoint of housing policy. But more units,
especially more affordable units, will endanger the “Exclusivity Premium” and intensify
political opposition from existing home owners. Regime Three, on the other hand, limits
construction and makes sure that inclusionary units fit exclusionary density patterns.
Conclusions
The choice between the pure builder's remedy and an inclusionary program with set-asides
depends upon the buying power of the target population. If the target population has
adequate income, or the government is ready to provide some form of subsidy, a builder's
remedy may be best. Builders will naturally respond to the demand for affordable
construction and self-enforce the inclusionary rules. Housing stock will increase. The market
will function more efficiently, unless so many remedies are awarded that stock and efficiency
gains are outweighed by legitimate regional externalities. There will be no public costs
besides those necessary to hear appeals.
If the buying power of the target population is low, a builder's remedy may not make much
difference, absent scarce government subsidies. Set-aside programs (voluntary or mandatory)
that trade density variances for set-aside obligations can help solve the problem of the
buying power of the poor.
The choice between voluntary and mandatory programs is also a function of how much
buying power a particular jurisdiction wants to distribute to the poor. If the target
population needs only a shallow subsidy (or if a deep subsidy can be provided without losing
developer enthusiasm), then a voluntary regime is probably an acceptable solution. In areas
where a greater transfer of neighborhood wealth is necessary to promote affordable housing,
zoning rules should be mandatory. In the latter case, below-cost construction will be paid for
primarily by homeowners and owners of developable land.
In some situations, the needs of the target population may be so great that inclusionary
zoning cannot provide enough affordable homes without reducing the profitability of luxury
residential construction. Local authorities should be cautious in such situations. It would still
be wrong, however, to reject inclusionary programs as harmful to the poor.
Even inclusionary programs that threaten builders' profits change the nature of the housing
stock, increase the Filter Rate, distribute the regional tax base more evenly, lessen price
Appendix 1-13
pressure in existing urban communities, and increase the mobility, opportunities, and wealth
of the American poor.
The policy debate about inclusionary zoning - which involves many more issues than the
economic consequences set forth above - should move forward with this in mind
Article 9
Affordable Housing Policy Review. "Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons Learned in
Massachusetts." January 2002. http://www.nhc.org.
An Inclusionary Housing Case Study: Newton, Massachusetts
This case study reviewed Newton’s 30-plus year history with inclusionary housing. Newton
was the first community in the state to adopt the practice of inclusionary housing during the
1960s. To date, this ordinance has provided about 225 units of affordable housing over a
30-year period. During approximately the same time period, there were 12 developments
containing about twice that number of affordable units constructed under the Massachusetts
“Anti-Snob” Zoning Ordinance, known as Chapter 40B. This law allows local zoning and
land use regulations to be overridden if at least 25% of the units in a proposed development
qualify as affordable.
The IH ordinance suffers from the limitation that all units created under the ordinance must
be rental units and leased through the Newton Housing Authority at a price established by
the city or agency funding source. Pricing guidelines were established by a state-aided public
housing program that no longer exists so the mechanics of this process remain vague.
Moreover, there is no provision to allow for affordable homeownership units within a for-
sale development and there is no provision for moderate-income homeownership units,
which is a major issue that’s been addressed in the city’s housing plan. This makes the
economics of the inclusionary ordinance a long, unnecessary burden on the developer.
The affordable units are required to remain affordable for a period of 40 years as per the
amended Ordinance, a longer term than the original 15 years. To date, use restrictions on 50
of the 225 units created have expired and these units have converted to market.
There is a payment formula for developments under 10 units, which is admittedly low. This
formula has produced only $600,000 over 26 years. The fee structure is not tied to inflation
and is less of a burden on developers than the formula when more than 10 units are built,
thus influencing developers to keep the units under 10 and pay the fees rather than increase
the units and come under the ordinance’s formula. As a result, cash payments are less than
optimal.
Newton’s ordinance requires that the affordable units be equal in size, quality and
characteristics as the market units. In some instances, low-income renters receive the
benefits of very large units (3,000-plus square feet) when negotiations could produce more
affordable units of a smaller scale (while still keeping within the non-stigmatizing or
community integration intent).
Appendix 1-14
By restricting the affordable units to low-income renters within a luxury condominium rather
than allow for moderate-income buyers, a greater stigma may result in the development—
which is contrary to the goal of the ordinance.
Because the density increases allowed by special permit are not significantly higher than
those densities allowed by right, the formula tied to 25% of the increase simply does not
create very many units. In order to make it a more effective tool, zoning densities have to be
increased under the special permit and the ordinance has to be made more inclusive, more
flexible, with higher affordability requirements and with more administrative control in
relation to city housing policy.
An Inclusionary Housing Case Study: City of Cambridge (By Roger Herzog and Darcy
Jameson)
The city administration responded to the impending crisis of an end to the rent control
system by identifying local solutions to the local housing market conditions. Inclusionary
zoning represented one of the most appealing policy options, for a number of reasons. The
city had the authority to enact the policy without state approval, as an amendment to the
city’s zoning ordinance. The market was very strong, and the city was generating significant
new multifamily housing production for the first time since the 1970s. Finally, the policy was
designed to engage the private sector in helping to meet the affordable housing needs of low
and moderate-income residents.
The city enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance that established mandatory requirements
for the inclusion of low- and moderate-income housing in any new residential development
of 10 or more units (or 10,000 square feet or larger). 15% of new units must meet the
affordable housing requirements. The policy applied citywide, in virtually all-zoning districts
(the one district excluded had more stringent existing inclusionary requirements).
As compensation to the developers, the policy offered a density bonus that was crafted to
hold the developer harmless from the significant financial cost of creating the affordable
housing units. The density bonus affects two zoning factors, the floor to area ratio, and the
minimum lot area per dwelling unit. Based on an economic analysis of the costs and returns
of developing market and below market rate housing, the city determined that the profit
earned from one additional market rate unit would offset the cost to the developer to create
an affordable unit. Therefore the city offered a 30% floor to area ratio bonus and an
adjustment to the minimum lot area per dwelling unit to allow two additional units for each
required affordable unit.
The ordinance created a strong priority for on-site units, but in hardship situations, a
developer could apply to make cash payment to the city’s Affordable Housing Trust Fund.
There was no off-site option.
There were concerns from some citizens about the impact of increased density on the quality
and character of residential neighborhoods. To mitigate these concerns, the city established a
minimum project size of 10 units to trigger the inclusionary requirements. Based on an
analysis of development potential in the city, very few larger sites are located in existing
Appendix 1-15
residential neighborhoods and therefore the increased density associated with the policy
would not affect these neighborhoods.
Units Produced So Far
Since the ordinance was enacted in 1998, the city has secured an affordable housing deed
restriction on 89 units, including a mix of rental and homeownership housing. The
restriction is recorded as a senior interest in the title, ensuring the long-term affordability of
the units. These developments are in various stages of development, ranging from complete
and occupied to under construction. As units are competed, the city’s Community
Development Department (CDD) assists developers to market and identify qualified renters
or buyers. Given the high cost of acquisition and construction costs over the last three years,
challenges with siting affordable housing, and the challenge of securing public subsidies, the
inclusionary zoning ordinance has been a successful addition to the city’s multifaceted
approach to creating and preserving affordable housing.
An Inclusionary Housing Case Study: Boston (By Meg Kiely)
In February 2000, the city implemented an inclusionary development policy to help Boston
meet its housing needs across all economic levels. The policy is aimed at two types of
developments:
• Any residential project financed by any agency of the City of Boston or the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA), or to be developed on a property owned by the city or
the BRA that includes 10 or more units.
• Any project that includes 10 or more units of housing and requires zoning relief.
Under Boston’s inclusionary policy, projects are required to make no less than 10% of the
total number of units affordable to moderate-income households (those earning below 80%
of the area median income) and middle-income households (those earning between 80 and
120% of the area median income). Furthermore, of the 10% affordable units, 50% of the
units shall be affordable to households with earnings below 80% of area median income.
Other Options for Developers
Under the discretion of the director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, a developer
has two other options to meet the inclusionary development policy: 1) an offsite production
option, or 2) a cash contribution to the city’s affordable housing efforts.
If the off-site production option is utilized, the developer is required to provide a number of
affordable units equal to 15% of the total number of market rate units, at affordable levels as
outlined above. The cash contribution option requires the developer to make a payment to
the Boston Redevelopment Authority in an amount equal to 15% of the total number of
market rate units times an affordable housing cost factor. The affordable housing cost
factor, initially established at $52,000 and derived from the average subsidy needed to
develop a unit of affordable housing over the previous year, is adjusted annually on July 1.
Appendix 1-16
Results
Several projects have met their obligation through a cash contribution. To date, developers
have contracted to contribute over $4 million for affordable housing construction and 72
affordable units have been constructed as a result of this policy.
The study claims that the inclusionary development policy has not had a negative effect
upon the pace of housing construction in the city.
Article 10
M. Lugger and K. Temkin (2000) Red Tape and Housing Costs Center for Urban Policy
Research, Rutgers university, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Conclusions
The main concern of this exercise has been with what the authors consider unnecessary or
excessive regulation, not with regulation per se. They estimated the direct cost of excessive
regulations to the developer to be approx $10,000 to $20,000 per new housing unit, on
average. The key is how those costs are distributed in the short run among landowners in the
form of lower land prices, developers in the form of lower profits, and home buyers in the
form of higher housing prices.
There is no single answer to that local conditions dictate the impact regulations may have. If
demand is robust and a developer is marketing houses for which there is relatively lower
price elasticity, the costs are immediately shifted forward to buyers, with some multiplier.
Using reasonable values for land's share in total housing production, as well as survey results,
that multiplier was estimated to be in the vicinity of 4.0. That means that excessive regulation
could add as much as $40,000 to $80,000 to the final price of a house.
If that were the case, there would be a direct link between regulation and the ability of New
Jersey residents, especially first-time buyers, to purchase a home. Chapter 1 gave the example
of a home that would have sold for $175,000 but was offered for $185,000 instead. This had
the effect of pricing 63,500 households out of the market. If that $175000 home sold for
$235,000 because of excessive regulation (adding the midpoint of the $40,000 to $80,000
range to $175,000), approximately 430,000 households would be priced out of the market,
according to census income data. Those simulations are not far-fetched; they are consistent
with home ownership trends in New Jersey.
Thus, if the impact of regulations is on households, there will be a fall in demand, especially
at the lower end of the market. The supply side will respond by targeting the smaller number
of higher-income buyers with units that provide greater margins, or by going out of business.
Both of these phenomena have been observed.
There is evidence that developers shift some or all of the $10,000 to $20,000 cost of
excessive regulation back to landowners, who are often farmers at the urban fringe. The
interviews with developers and the authors reading of land economics literature suggest that
Appendix 1-17
the shifting backward slows the rate at which land is converted to residential use. Therefore,
once again a reduced supply of housing is being brought to market.
Finally, especially if developers have incorrectly forecast the regulatory costs they would
incur, they may eat some or the entire excessive burden and have lower profits. Indeed, all
the developers interviewed indicated they had lost money on some projects but were able to
recoup that loss on another project. However, as stated earlier, many developers have not
been able to make up their losses and have gone out of business.
Article 11
Kent Conine. 2000. “ Inclusionary Zoning: A Viable Solution to the Affordable Housing
Crisis”? A Home Builder’s Policy View on Inclusionary Zoning, New Century Housing
Newsletter, October: 1. http://www.inhousing.org/NHC-Report/NHC-Main.htm
The author discusses the policy implications of inclusionary zoning. The public policy
questions raised by IH requirements are whether such programs impose a cost, and if so,
who bears that cost- the builder or the purchaser of the market-rate homes? If there is a cost
to the builder (even if only in more work or regulatory complications), is it fair for the
builder to shoulder the cost of providing a needed social good? If there is a cost to the
purchaser of the market-rate units, is it sensible housing policy to use a technique that
further raises home prices in already high-cost areas? Are housing prices for the majority of
homebuyers made higher in return for lower prices for a few?
Since these questions are difficult to answer without significant research, the more important
question is whether inclusionary zoning is the best method of government intervention to
achieve the goals of affordability and inclusion for the largest number of people. A
legitimate criticism of inclusionary zoning programs is that, in spite of the amount of
affordable homes built over two decades, the number of households that benefit from the
programs is relatively small compared to the need. The programs have been of greatest
benefit to the children of the middle class rather than helping families from low-income
backgrounds attain middle-class status.
Rather than rely on the particular tool of inclusionary zoning to bring affordable
homeownership to more Americans, society should be rethinking the planning, zoning, and
housing policies that have the greatest impact on the price of housing.
The author calls for a more comprehensive “Smart Growth” approach to increasing
homeownership amongst lower income households. Elements include planning adequately
for growth; providing the infrastructure needed to accommodate growth; and providing
revitalization of central cities and older suburbs with a strong housing component.
Appendix 1-18
Article 12
California Association of Realtors. Unofficial. 2003. “The California Inclusionary Housing
Reader”. Inclusionary Zoning Issues Briefing Paper. The Institute for Local Self
Government. Sacramento
The following is for study only and has NOT been approved by the Local Governmental Relations
Committee, the Housing Affordability Committee, the Land Use and Environmental Committee, the
Executive Committee or the Board of Directors.
Throughout the time that inclusionary zoning has been considered a viable policy alternative,
C.A.R. has maintained its opposition to such ordinances. C.A.R. opposes inclusionary
zoning for several reasons:
Unfair burden on developers: It is unfair to place the burden of providing affordable
housing solely on developers. The lack of affordable housing is a societal problem, and as
such, all of society should share the responsibility for addressing it.
Does not address factors that cause high housing costs: Inclusionary zoning does not
address the factors that contribute to the high cost of market rate housing, i.e., high land
costs, lack of available sites, developer fees and exactions, cumbersome permitting process,
etc. Moreover, inclusionary zoning only adds costs to the development of market rate
housing.
Financial hardships on developers: Inclusionary zoning places financial hardships on
developers. Ultimately, they will no longer be able to provide housing in the community
because the costs are too high, or they will pass the costs on to market rate buyers, thus
making it more expensive for them to buy a home.
Resale controls are economically inefficient: Resale price controls eliminate
homeowners' ability to realize a reasonable profit on the resale of their home and takes away
the incentive for them to maintain their home. This makes it harder to resell inclusionary
units, which hurts the real estate market.
High Implementation costs: The cost of implementing an inclusionary zoning ordinance
for a local government entity is significantly high. Most local governments cannot afford the
staff resources and experience necessary to implement and administer an effective program.
More effective alternatives available: Local government can best provide housing that is
affordable for its constituents at all income levels by making it easier for developers to build
such housing. Incentives such as reduced land costs and land restrictions, increased
availability of housing sites, and reduced fees make the development process less costly and
time consuming.
Tax on homeowners: Because market rate homeowners and renters ultimately bear the cost
of in-lieu fees, implementing such fees constitutes a tax on homeowners and renters.
Appendix 1-19
In lieu fee programs not effective: Many jurisdictions collect in-lieu fees, but do not
leverage the revenues to build more affordable housing. Instead, in some cases, the money is
not spent to produce new affordable housing.
Critical Look at the Basics of Inclusionary Zoning
Analysis of Inclusionary zoning reveals fundamental weakness based on common problems
that have occurred in the cases that were chosen for the study. Localities frequently cite
problems with such provisions as threshold requirements, fees, qualifying buyers, meeting all
of the affordable housing needs of the community, realizing incentives, legal and technical
issues with resale controls, enforcement, and administrative time.
Conclusions
Cities and counties that are considering adopting an inclusionary zoning ordinance must ask
themselves if the proposed ordinance will produce enough affordable housing units and
meet enough of the affordable housing needs of the community to justify their existence.
They also conclude that in case realtors choose to oppose an inclusionary zoning proposal in
their community, they must be prepared to offer alternatives for meeting the local
population’s affordable needs.
Article 13
Michael Pyatok. 2003. “The California Inclusionary Housing Reader”. Inclusionary Zoning:
Some Doubts. The Institute for Local Self Government. Sacramento.
The author makes the point through a series of actual case studies that while the goal of
creating economically integrated communities may be laudable, in some instances it may
have the effect of breaking up traditional ethnic communities.
Case Study 1
A Latino neighborhood situated in a white upper middle class town in southern California,
sued the city for fair share of affordable housing. The city offered IH but the Latinos
rejected it since they wanted a cohesive community, political clout, and wanted to form their
own development corporation and build their economic capacity. Within three years of
getting the money, they had a mixed use project development with 100 units.
Case Study 2
A non-profit corporation organized four different language groups of Southeast Asian
immigrants in western Washington to get affordable housing. They accepted an inclusionary
opportunity within a suburban subdivision only if the housing was developed exclusively by
a non-profit organization that serves Asian immigrant needs. The reasons included codes,
covenants and restrictions that accompanied the larger white subdivisions disallowed many
behaviors that typify their cultures, wanted the architectural character to reflect their cultural
traditions and their non-profit to gain the expertise in developing this type of housing.
Appendix 1-20
Case Study 3
In Washington, a group of African-Americans wanted affordable housing for families like
themselves in the Pacific Northwest and they rejected Inclusionary housing on the grounds
that they wanted to maintain the traditions and build their economic strength as a minority
within the larger community.
Conclusions
The author is particularly sensitive to the argument of the value of “mixed income” housing
because it actually reduces the amount of housing affordable to very low-income
households.
Based on his experiences in Oakland, he says that for-profits merely produce units as a
measure of success whereas non-profits work for rebuilding the community. Therefore
limited subsidies needed for providing affordable housing to such communities should go to
non-profit developers and should not be siphoned off to for-profit developers.
Affordable housing advocates should rather use their energies and political capital to work
with others to raise those subsidies that will be needed by non-profit developers. Without
their ample availability neither the private nor non profit sectors will be productive, because
without them, affordable housing advocates will continue to beat up the private developers
resulting in slowing them down or chasing them away. Therefore the focus should not be
on Inclusionary zoning but on how to increase the overall subsidy pool that will be needed
to provide for such housing.
Article 14
Bay Area Economics 2003 Three Bay Are Case studies “The California Inclusionary Housing
Reader” The Institute for Local Self Government. Sacramento.
The case studies of the cities of Sunnyvale, Palo Alto and San Francisco reveal that these
cities have produced AH units at the annual rate of 39.0 units 9.4 units, and 24.9 units
respectively till 2001. What remains to be seen is whether the cities has been able to achieve
this rate of production in a soft market that has been prevailing since the tech meltdown.
Summaries
Density bonus has not been a preferred option by developers in Sunnyvale or Palo Alto for a
number of reasons including small sites that limit the attractiveness of a density bonus.
The cost of administrating the program is expensive and varies from $40,000 to $110,000
per year. Program managers characterized monitoring of inclusionary requirements as time
consuming and cumbersome. Complications also arise from the units’ resale, owners renting
out the units and tenants and owners losing out on the qualifications as their income grows.
Appendix 1-21
Article 15
Ross Selvidge 2001 “Significant Impacts resulting from the enactment of the Pasadena
Inclusionary Housing Ordinance”.
Compared to the housing market conditions that would prevail without IHO, the following
significant impacts will occur if the proposed IHO is implemented in Pasadena:
1. The value of existing properties, as sites for new housing will be significantly and
permanently reduced
2. The economic burden of this reduction in value will not be borne by future developers
of projects. Rather, it will be borne by the current owners of properties that may at
some time in the future be converted into sites for new development
3. The ability of housing developers to compete with commercial developers for building
sites will be significantly and permanently degraded
4. Properties with existing uses or improvements will have to decline in value further or
deteriorate more before it becomes economically rational for them to be converted into
sites for new housing
5. Over the near, intermediate and long-term, fewer properties in Pasadena will be
converted to sites for new housing projects
6. Fewer new housing projects will be built, and the total number of new housing units
produced in Pasadena will be lower
7. The lower number of new housing units produced in Pasadena will consist of a mix that
is more polarized in terms of value and rental rate with fewer units in the middle value
range
8. The pricing (i.e., value and rental rates) of existing housing units in Pasadena will
increase more rapidly, and those units presently priced in the affordable range (and not
restricted by law to remain so) will more quickly rise above the affordable range
9. The lower total number of housing units being produced, the more rapid increase in
value or rents of the existing housing stock, and the shift of the new market rate units
being produced to a higher value range will impede Pasadena’s ability to meet its regional
housing goals.
A key underlying factor in these impacts is the fact that Pasadena is effectively built-out with
virtually no land that has not already been improved and placed in use for residential or
other purposes. This means that any significant new development in the future will take
place on properties that have become less valuable in their existing use compared to their
value as a site for a new housing project. It is that economically rational trade-off that will
determine how many new housing sites are available in Pasadena in the future.
Appendix 1-22