HomeMy WebLinkAbout07-02-18 Public Comment - L. Revenaugh (SWMBIA) - Inclusionary Zoning PrimerFrom:linda@swmbia.org
To:Agenda
Subject:Inclusionary Zoning
Date:Monday, July 02, 2018 12:11:32 PM
Attachments:iz-primer-2018 (1).pdf
Hello Cyndy, I-Ho, Jeff, Terry and Chris,
Attached is a newly released Inclusionary Zoning primer we hope you will consider
reviewing. The Inclusionary Zoning Primer (updated June 2018) is a summary of
resources highlighting the latest information on inclusionary zoning, including
research, economic trends, best practices, case studies and alternative programs.
Please let us know if you have any questions or need any further information.
Sincerely,
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Inclusionary Zoning Primer
Updated June 2018
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary and Introduction ...................................................................................................... 3
Research on Inclusionary Zoning .............................................................................................................. 6
Price and Production Effects ..................................................................................................................... 6
Statutory, Implementation, and Effectiveness Issues ................................................................................ 8
Latest Reports ......................................................................................................................................... 16
Promising State and Local Alternatives for Providing Affordable Housing ....................................... 20
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 26
Appendix .................................................................................................................................................... 27
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 36
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
Millions of American families struggle to find housing that meets their needs at a price they can afford, as the gap between family incomes and the cost of housing grows larger every year. Many families are forced
to commute long distances, pay a disproportionate share of their incomes on housing, or live in housing that simply does not meet their needs.
The reasons for this gap are many. Local governments have developed plans that foster job growth but do not provide for sufficient housing for the workers filling those jobs, and some still discourage or limit
multifamily housing. Ever more elaborate planning and zoning schemes, or outdated ones, make it difficult
to develop land and a range and mix of housing types, especially lower-cost housing, that is needed to keep up with demand. Complex, lengthy, and uncertain development approval processes and environmental
requirements constrain the availability of developable land and drive up the cost of housing, and an ever-
growing number of fees imposed on new housing add to that. NIMBY groups resisting higher density development have become more sophisticated and organized over time and deter growth and development.
Thus, the housing affordability gap continues to be a multi-dimensional problem. As a result, it demands the use of many different tools and a comprehensive strategy to successfully meet the varied needs of people
on different steps of the income ladder, from very low income even to above median income in many
markets today. It calls for a combination of approaches that either increase income, reduce costs, or both. The reality is that different market segments may require different tools for improving affordability, from
direct or indirect subsidies at the low end of the income bracket, to better planning for housing and regulatory barriers removal strategies that allow the market to work better at the upper end of the income range. The underlying causes of the affordability shortfall and the nature of the local market will dictate the
strategies that will work best under various circumstances. There is no silver bullet strategy that can fundamentally address it all, and no single strategy works in every market.
However, many communities have come to rely on inclusionary zoning (IZ) as a simple, expedient requirement they can adopt to show they are addressing the affordability problem, without examining the
causes of the problem locally and without having to understand the complexities and diversity of housing
needs and the market. IZ involves shifting the public and community burden for the affordability problem to the private sector, by requiring developers to subsidize a certain percentage of affordable units within
market-rate developments. Percentages range from 10 to 25 percent of total units, with price controls established for the subsidized units based on income levels.
There is currently renewed interest in IZ as communities are once again becoming concerned about affordability after building and development have resumed after the Great Recession. During the Recession, little land development took place as lenders tightened credit requirements, which resulted in a lot shortage
and corresponding land and home price increases. The renewed focus on IZ has also been spurred by Sustainable Communities planning grants to local
communities from HUD and EPA beginning in 2009, which recommended IZ as a local tool that can be used to spur affordable housing units. All indications are that HUD’s final rule on Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing, which took effect on August 7, 2015, (although the requirement to submit plans is currently
on hold until 2020), will apply further pressure on local communities to adopt “quick fix” strategies such as IZ to satisfy HUD’s new requirements that local governments submit their plans to HUD for review,
with an emphasis on actions to deconcentrate poverty.
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IZ has been used for several years in California, Montgomery County, Maryland, and scattered communities across the nation, and so does have a legacy as a planning tool. Until rather recently, however, there has
been anecdotal but little empirical research on its effectiveness, best practices or its effect on housing supply
and prices. NAHB obtained three credentialed consultant research reports on inclusionary zoning to help fill this information gap; all are available at www.nahb.org by searching on the report titles noted in this
paper.
The economic study for NAHB, “Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning”, examined price and
production effects on IZ based on a robust data set from California did not find an increased in overall housing production from IZ and concluded that IZ acts like a tax on housing. It also found a drop in single family housing production, with a shift to multifamily. Based on NAHB’s experience, this is a problem,
because the building industry is still fairly specialized—it is not easy for a builder or developer to be able to do both types of products because the construction involved in horizontal versus vertical development is so different.
The legal study conducted for NAHB concluded that IZ is a complex undertaking, one with many more
moving parts and practical considerations than most communities realize or are equipped to administer.
Based on NAHB’s substantial experience reviewing ordinances from across the country and access to
builders and developers, we also know that, while most IZ ordinances offer incentives such as density
bonuses, parking reductions, expedited review procedures, and on, in an effort to avoid a takings claim and also allow the developer to recoup some of his subsidy to the lower priced units. But implementing these
incentives is not always achievable in today’s development approval process that includes heavy citizen
input, and they don’t begin to make up for the subsidized costs. It is difficult enough to obtain the density theoretically already allowed by zoning, and so the IZ density bonuses end up only restoring part of what
should have been allowed originally. Further, the workforce, service sector middle class gets squeezed out under IZ, as they are no longer able
to afford the market-priced units--whose price has now increased to cover the subsidized IZ units--but they are not eligible for the subsidized ones. Thus, IZ simply shifts the problem without solving it.
Part of the appeal of IZ is that it presumably gives lower income households access to better neighborhoods and services by intermingling subsidized units with market-rate ones. However, the effect of IZ is to put
renters into homes without allowing them to gain equity in most cases, essentially making them no better
off. And many neighbors still resist the mixed income/housing concept.
There has been increasing difficulty in IZ programs finding qualified buyers for it, and increasing evidence
of homebuyer resistance to lengthy resale price controls. There have been challenges with property maintenance issues as well as the ability of the IZ unit families to afford HOA or condo fees.
In addition, IZ tends to work best only in hot urbanized markets, where pressure on both land and housing prices are more intense. Also, like impact fees, IZ is reliant on the pace of construction and so is not a very
reliable affordable housing strategy. As the recent recession showed, when construction falls off, few affordable units are built. IZ is also not very flexible and adaptable as the market changes and can lock people into what becomes a bad deal. IZ requires ongoing administration by municipal staff who understand
development economics and market conditions. Other nationally recognized researchers have begun to release credible, empirical reviews of inclusionary
zoning. This primer also discusses the findings of this research; goes on to detail communities where
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inclusionary zoning has been discontinued because it was too complex and did not achieve the hoped-for results; and highlights “best practices” of implementing an inclusionary zoning program.
The intent of this paper is to acknowledge the instances where inclusionary zoning may be feasible if the right incentives are built into it and pointing out the areas and circumstances where it has mostly failed as
a policy tool. The “Statutory, Implementation, and Effectiveness Issues” section addresses the many details that should be included in any inclusionary zoning ordinance and operating program and the incentives necessary to make it work for the developer.
The paper concludes with a summary of alternative affordable housing solutions for state and local governments based on extensive research conducted for NAHB by both Abt Associates and Deborah
Myerson, which showcases a comprehensive array of approaches to addressing housing affordability through a variety of innovative non-federal techniques and programs. The Abt report, “Research on State and Local Means of Increasing Affordable Housing”, is extensive but user friendly, with tools organized
by land use strategies, financial ones, and “other initiatives”, such as state-level affordability mandates or appeals processes. It explains how the various strategies work, how they have been funded, where they are
used, and key pros and cons of each. It features thirty case studies of communities that have successfully
used these tools, often in combination. “How Did They Do It? Discovering New Opportunities for Affordable Housing” by Deborah Myerson, conducted in 2016, features a dozen detailed case studies from
across the country that showcase the many ways in which communities can increase housing affordability.
This research reveals that multiple strategies, typically used in a variety of combinations, are needed to close the financing gap and make projects viable.
Given the mixed results on IZ, it is clear that the strategies that get the most press are not necessarily the most effective. Less flashy approaches such as planning and zoning changes to assess development capacity
and encourage affordable housing, expedited permitting processes, and advocacy efforts to reduce NIMBYism can have broad effects on housing affordability. Housing trusts that are broadly funded by a percentage of the property tax, which is paid by both existing and new residents, combined with land trusts
acting as an intermediary between the private and public sectors both to assemble land and manage homes once they are built, appear to hold particular promise as an equitable and successful combination strategy.
Abt Associates completed another report for NAHB in 2015 called “Development Process Efficiency: Cutting Through the Red Tape”, which is a useful addition to this prior research. NAHB staff is available to work with local HBAs as well as jurisdictions looking to address their housing affordability issues, with
balanced information on inclusionary zoning as well as resources on comprehensive and appropriate strategies for achieving housing affordability in ever changing economic times.
For more information, contact NAHB’s Land Use and Design department:
Debbie Bassert, Assistant Vice President, Land Use and Design
202-266-8443 dbassert@nahb.org
Claire Worshtil, Senior Program Manager, Land Use
202-266-8309 cworshtil@nahb.org
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I. RESEARCH ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING
Earlier studies on IZ have failed to be persuasive. One reason for the failure is that these studies did not use formal statistical methods to control for changing housing market conditions, leaving skeptics room to argue
that the studies were not truly isolating the effect of Inclusionary Zoning. Therefore, NAHB funded research into the impacts of inclusionary zoning in two key areas: Economic
effects and legal and regulatory aspects. The latter research report, prepared for NAHB by attorney Tim Hollister of Shipman and Goodwin, will be discussed in the IZ Best Practices section of this paper. NAHB
also retained Abt Associates to explore state and local alternatives to IZ, which is discussed in the section
“Alternatives to Providing Affordable Housing: State and Local Strategies and Solutions.”
A. Price and Production Effects
Economic effects research, titled Housing Market Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning, was conducted in 2008 by Gerrit Knaap, Antonio Bento, and Scott Lowe at the University of Maryland (UMD) Center for Smart Growth. The report compiled considerable data on a large number of jurisdictions in California
between 1988 and 2005.
“Just like other taxes, the burdens of inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, housing producers, and landowners.” - National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education
Having data for multiple jurisdictions over an extended period of time allowed UMD to investigate the
impact of inclusionary zoning on housing production and prices controlling for differences in market conditions even if the conditions were not directly observed or measured. The final models showing the
impact of inclusionary zoning on total housing starts and the single family/multifamily breakdown of starts controlled for:
• Recent changes in housing starts in each California jurisdiction;
• Any factor that was different about a particular jurisdiction (e.g., incomes of residents or attitudes toward growth) whether observed in the data or not; and
• Any factor that was different in a particular year (e.g., state of the overall economy or demand for
housing) whether observed in the data or not.
The final models showing the impact of inclusionary zoning on the price and size of new single family
homes controlled for:
• Basic characteristics of the house such as number of bedrooms and bathrooms;
• Lot size; any factor that was different about a particular block group (containing on average about
500 homes) whether observed in the data or not;
• Any factor that was different about a particular school district, whether observed in the data or not;
• Any factor that was different in a particular year whether observed in the data or not;
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• Any factor that was different in a particular quarter, to control for possible seasonal effects. The
effect of these controls is to reduce the estimated impacts of inclusionary zoning, but the impacts that remain after the controls are imposed are difficult to dispute.
The study concluded that, in California between 1988 and 2005, there was a failure to increase the total supply of new housing. The results of the University of Maryland study showed measurable effects of
inclusionary zoning on a variety of market factors:
• Increasing a city’s multifamily housing starts by 7 percent, essentially shifting production to
multifamily from single family product;
• This effect increased to as much as 12 percent as inclusionary zoning requirements also increased;
• Raising the price of new homes by 2 – 3 percent, and by as much as 5 percent for more expensive homes, compared to communities without inclusionary zoning;
• Reducing the size of new homes by 48 square feet (Knaap, Bento, & Lowe, 2008).
These four results all pass strong tests for statistical significance and are consistent with economic theory
suggesting that such programs act like a tax on housing construction. Just as with other taxes, the burdens of inclusionary zoning are passed on to housing consumers, producers, and landowners, and so such policies
do not come without a cost. Given that more of the units built are multifamily, that the new homes sold are both smaller and more costly, the impacts show that inclusionary zoning means consumers of new housing pay more to get less.
Some may argue that the price increases and size reductions seem relatively small, but to policymakers in areas where affordability is already a concern, a policy that moves at all in the direction of exacerbating a
problem it is intended to solve would seem undesirable and ineffective. And there are certainly easier means of getting smaller multifamily units built, if that should be a community’s express goal, than by using this complex market intervention.
A policy brief released in the Journal of the American Planning Association did indicate that, while there
is a wide variation in how inclusionary zoning programs are crafted and implemented, there is some
correlation between programs that offer greater density bonuses and exempt smaller developments and producing greater number of units (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning:
Comparing policies from San Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Suburban Boston, 2009).
However, the full study “Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse: The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local
Housing Markets”, 2009, which controlled for 27 variables in the San Francisco Bay region and 24
variables in the Boston area, a detailed regression analysis indicated that in both the Boston and San Francisco areas, there is evidence that inclusionary zoning constrains new development, particularly during
periods of regional price appreciate. There is also strong evidence that implantation of region-wide inclusionary zoning was put upward pressure on single-family home prices in the Boston-area suburbs between 1987 and 2008 (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse: The Effects of
Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets, 2010).
Another interesting finding of this study, particularly in the San Francisco Bay region, is that older
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inclusionary zoning programs are associated with a decline in local home prices during times of regional price depreciation (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse: The Effects of
Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets, 2010). So, while making markets more expensive during
times of rapid price appreciation, there is also evidence that IZ policies can actually make home prices decline faster in periods of depreciation, as both regions have experienced in the past five years.
The study also indicated that the region-wide programs had failed to produce a substantial number of affordable housing units compared to other programs. For instance, during the control period of 24 years
(1979-2003), only 9,154 units of affordable housing through inclusionary zoning were produced in the San Francisco Bay area, while 29,636 units of affordable housing units were produced through the federal Low Income Tax Credit program (Schuetz, Meltzer, & Been, Silver Bullet or Trojan Horse: The Effects of
Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets, 2010). There is also research about the economic effects of inclusionary zoning that has focused on the San
Francisco Bay and Metropolitan Boston regions because 1) these are largely fragmented regions politically where numerous jurisdictions have adopted IZ policies, and 2) These regions have some of the least
affordable area-wide housing. In the study “Diffusion of Inclusionary Zoning Across San Francisco Bay Area Governments”, 2009, an empirical conclusion was made that the decision to adopt inclusionary zoning does not reflect a response to an identifiable need for more affordable housing. Rather, it reflects a
variety of political characteristics, including the political bent of residents, a stronger regulatory culture,
and places with more affordable housing non-profits (Schuetz & Meltzer, The Most Popular Kid in the Class: Diffusion of Inclusionary Zoning Across San Francisco Bay Area Governments 2009).
A number of examples also can be cited to show that the total number of affordable units produced by particular inclusionary zoning programs has, by some standards, not been very large, one such instance was
during a brief period in the 1970s and 1980s in Montgomery County. In this instance, a community experiencing rapid growth can provide for the sudden addition of higher
density, multifamily projects in a predominantly single-family community to offset the cost of being required to provide below market rate housing. However as the community becomes denser and less land is available, and as NIMBY resistance grows to added density, growth becomes more restricted and
inclusionary zoning units trail off. Therefore this model is not sustainable.
B. Statutory, Implementation, and Effectiveness Issues
Inclusionary zoning is a complex market intervention, and other recent research, as well as NAHB’s legal
research by attorney Tim Hollister with Shipman and Goodwin that is discussed later in this paper, reveal this. The most recent research on the variety and effectiveness of different programs across the country
comes from the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s report from 2014 titled “Achieving Lasting Affordability through Inclusionary Housing”, by Robert Hickey, Lisa Sturtevant, and Emily Thaden. The paper pulled data from 307 programs across the country and focused on case studies for 20 of those
programs.
The case studies revealed that achieving lasting affordability requires more than simply setting long
affordability periods, which has been a hallmark restriction in IZ programs. “Strong legal mechanisms, carefully designed resale restrictions, pre-purchase and post-purchase stewardship practices, and strategic partnerships are important for ensuring that inclusionary properties continue to be sold or rented at
affordable prices, and are not lost due to illegal sales, foreclosure, or lax rental management practices.
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Despite the acknowledged importance of stewardship, most jurisdictions report having insufficient
resources for comprehensive stewardship and many have not adequately planned for long-term monitoring
and stewardship of inclusionary housing units.”
The Lincoln Land report found that while IZ can create large numbers of affordable units in some communities, overall they have had a relatively small impact on the supply of affordable housing nationwide. While differences in retention levels can be partially explained by program stewardship,
differences in the production levels can be partially explained by local housing market conditions. Strong demand for market-rate housing has produced more affordable units compared to weaker housing markets.
The results of the case study analysis suggested the following conclusions about successful and innovative strategies to help ensure lasting affordability:
• Inclusionary housing programs can only be successful in meeting affordable housing needs if they are both producing and preserving units.
• Without the upfront commitment to long-term affordability, inclusionary housing programs will
not be able to meeting ongoing affordability challenges.
• Long affordability periods that reset offer a compelling alternative to “perpetual” affordability
periods and go a long way towards achieving lasting affordability.
• Supplemental legal tools beyond deed restrictions will be needed to improve notification of defaults, potential illegal resales and burdens encumbered by homebuyers through second
mortgages and refinancing. Inclusionary housing programs should also have in place legal
mechanisms that strengthen the program’s ability to cure or purchase homes in foreclosure. The preemptive right of purchase can help strengthen a program’s control of the resale process and
proactively keep inclusionary units in the affordable inventory. It can also be a helpful tool for
increasing the affordability periods of units built under previous, shorter-term requirements.
• Local jurisdictions need to be responsive to local housing market conditions and household demographics when designing resale formulas and should evaluate the efficacy of their design over
time to ensure affordability is being preserved.
• Inclusionary housing programs must actively monitor and steward inclusionary units, either in-
house or through external partnerships. The programs highlighted in the case study analysis often made good decisions about setting up affordability periods and legal mechanisms with the goal of
promoting lasting affordability. However, critical activities around monitoring and stewardship are
often inadequately implemented. Successful programs should look to develop partnerships with organizations that have strong stewardship practices—including Community Land Trusts—in
order to ensure that the affordable housing created through a well-designed inclusionary housing
programs remains affordable to future owners and renters.
• Tapping local housing trust funds, which can be supported through in-lieu fees, is a practical way to support repair and crucial ongoing maintenance of inclusionary housing units.
Throughout its history of implementation, inclusionary zoning has generally received “good press.”
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Programs such as the one in Montgomery County, Maryland, have been touted, particularly in planning and community development circles, as an affordable housing panacea that can be replicated in any community
that has public officials so inclined to create affordable housing. This line of thinking is naïve, however,
and most jurisdictions in the United States likely lack the financial resources, staff capacity or expertise needed to implement such complex programs. In addition to the administrative burden added to a
community, the tendrils of an inclusionary zoning program reach out and affect a huge array of parties, including the construction industry, lenders, legal industry, affordable housing providers, non-profits, sales and marketing, and the homebuyer. Large and wealthy jurisdictions such as Montgomery County may have
the resources to continually run these cumbersome programs, but most local jurisdictions are not Montgomery Counties.
If a community is considering inclusionary zoning despite these caveats, it must not take this on as a whim or consider it a silver bullet or a panacea.
A body of research conducted for NAHB by attorney Tim Hollister of Shipman and Goodwin in Hartford, CT, provides a national perspective on inclusionary zoning ordinances based on a review of state statutes
and ordinances across the country: National Survey of Statutory Authority and Practical Considerations for the Implementation of Inclusionary Zoning, June 2007.
Not surprisingly, states vary in how they authorize the use of inclusionary zoning at the local level, ranging
from implicit to express enabling authority. Seven states have no express authority; two states prohibit mandatory inclusionary zoning (Oregon and Texas); in two states inclusionary zoning ordinances have been
invalidated as conflicting with statewide rent control laws; and 26 states have no express or implied
authorization in their enabling statutes, so the authority is dependent on home rule powers.
The National Survey includes an extensive list of 45 components that communities should consider before adopting and implementing an inclusionary zoning ordinance. These elements fall within these broad categories:
• General practical issues;
• Defining applicability;
• Resident eligibility;
• Financial information and management
Sections 1-7 Practical Consideration and Challenges
• Factual Justification
• Voluntary vs. Mandatory
• Link to General or Housing Plan
• Construction Incentives
• Financial Incentives
• In-lieu of Fees
• Waivers and Exemptions
Sections 8-11 Defining applicability
• Geographic Applicability
• Minimum Applicability Requirements
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• Type of Developments Included and Excluded
• Type of Construction Covered
Sections 12 – 23 Resident eligibility and selection
• Purchaser and Tenant Eligibility: Local Resident Preference
• Purchaser/Tenant Eligibility: Families vs. Age Restricted
• Required Set Aside Percentages
• Duration of Set Aside Requirements
• Selection of Purchasers/Tenants
• Lotteries
• Marketing and Outreach Requirements
• Renewal and Re-verifications
• Definition of Household Incomes
• Family Size Adjustments
• Down Payment Assumptions
• Minimum Occupancy Requirements
Sections 24 and 25 Construction Issues
• Sequencing of Construction Set Asides versus Market Rate Units
• Administration of Limitations
Section 26 – 40 Financial information and management
• Comparability of market versus affordable units
• Compliance Reporting
• Confidentiality of Income Data
• Sale/resale process and documentation
• Lender documentation
• Required versus Optional Fees
• Utility Allowances
• Government Enforcement
• Real Property taxation
• Use of Percentage of Income in Price Formulas
• Consumer Price Index/ Escalation Formulas
• Capital Improvements to Restricted Price Units
• Principal Residence
• Subletting
• Disposition of Restrictions at the End of Set Aside Period
Sections 41- 45 Procedural and Substantive Legal Challenges
• Procedural Compliance
• Authority to Enact
• Preemption
• Rent Control
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• Illegal Exaction/Regulatory Taking
The number of considerations clearly shows that inclusionary zoning is a complex market intervention that should not be taken lightly or simply copied from another community. It must be considered carefully
before adoption.
Another analysis of the complexities and challenges involved in implementing an inclusionary zoning
program, titled Delivering on the Promise of Inclusionary Housing: Best Practices in Administration and Monitoring, was conducted by Rick Jacobus of the Burlington (VT) Associates in Community
Development. This analysis includes a thorough review of the history of Inclusionary Zoning, as well as
case studies from several programs across the country and the challenges these communities have faced trying to implement these complex, market intervention programs. Most critical about this report is that it
addresses how the perils unleashed by the housing crash negatively impact these programs. Jacobus concedes that inclusionary zoning can work in the cases that sufficient compensation is afforded the builder for providing an inclusionary zoning unit, typically in the form of density. Also, some multifamily builder
members have routinely secured multifamily building permits only on the basis that they provide some amount of Inclusionary Zoning.
However, the most intriguing part of the Jacobus report is that it reveals the “dark side” of these programs that are prevalent and present tremendous challenges yet are seldom discussed by inclusionary zoning advocates.
Such increasing problems as mortgage default bedevil many programs and challenge the notion of a clean
turnover of an affordable unit from one owner to another. Also, the burdensome legal costs associated with
keeping a home deed restricted can cost an agency anywhere from $500 to $20,000, per unit, per sale (Jacobus, 2007).
Jacobus continues to highlight what it would take to implement an ordinance in order to produce affordable housing at a level of any significant impact. A jurisdiction implementing an ordinance would have to focus
their administration logistics on eight primary areas:
1. Production
Home builders forced to produce affordable housing will try to find ways to reduce costs when constructing a home in order to offset the cost. One builder in California even offered inclusionary zoning units without
kitchen cabinets or appliances. Another way to save money on these units is to cluster them in the least desirable location of a project or to use lower cost materials on the exterior of the project. It is up to the administrator of the program to ensure that the affordable units are comparable in external appearance and
that the interior size, quality of finishes and amenities are appropriate.
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At the Capitol Quarter development in Washington, DC, by builder/developer EYA, inclusionary zoning units are offered
as row houses or condominium units disguised as row houses.
In the photo, it is hard to determine which unit is the inclusionary zoning unit. In fact it is the corner unit with three affordable units disguised as a row house. In the same project, row houses were offered as an
inclusionary zoning unit, but with a width of 14 feet, as opposed to a width of 16 feet for the market rate units.
2. Pricing
The definition of “affordable” will vary from program to program, but will often be based on a formula that
takes into account percentage of median household/family income, household family/income, percentage of income spent on housing costs, household size and median home prices. Depending on income levels of
a certain region, the percentage of median income thresholds to qualify for these programs may vary.
For instance, in a jurisdiction with very high median incomes, such as San Francisco County, Montgomery
County, MD; or Fairfield County, CT, income levels up to 120 percent of median income may still qualify
persons to participate in an inclusionary zoning program. Generally, programs expect that an owner or renter of an inclusionary zoning unit will not pay more than 30 to 35 percent of their monthly gross income
on associated housing costs, which almost always include mortgage, property taxes and insurance, and increasingly, homeowners association (HOA) fees.
HOA fees have received relatively scant attention. However, they are quickly becoming of paramount
importance. Particularly in this extended period where homeowners face multiple challenges of falling home values, lower incomes and rising foreclosure costs, HOA fees for those who pay on time are
increasing (Understanding the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, PolicyLink 2008). Oftentimes these increases can be quite high. The reason is that HOAs are under increasing pressure due to defaults and non-payment and therefore raise the dues on those that are paying to cover the shortfall. There is some anecdotal
evidence that in some situations, taxes and HOA fees combined are now more than mortgages (2010 Semi-Annual Foreclosures in Minnesota, August 9, 2010).
These escalating fees due to the financial crises are becoming a greater concern to low and moderate income homeowners who may not have the resources or the pay increases to adjust to increasing HOA fees.
Whether or not jurisdictions and non-profits are going to be able to access additional funds to help residents
offset these increases or to pay fees in arrears has yet to be seen. However, it appears to be increasingly difficult in these times where funds are scarce within all sectors.
3. Marketing
Some communities rely on marketplace mechanisms to market inclusionary zoning programs. Fairfax
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County, VA relies on property owners and rental offices to staff the marketing of their portfolio of rental units. The County maintains standards and offers voluntary training to leasing staff who market the units
along with market-rate units.
Generally, a jurisdiction marketing their for-sale inclusionary zoning units must engage in a myriad of
activities, including performing general outreach to buyers on an ongoing basis; managing a waiting list or interest list of eligible applicants who understand the tradeoffs involved in affordable homeownership; marketing the new development projects both to the existing waiting list and the general public; marketing
individual units at the time of resale; and educating the real estate community about the nature of the program and the available units.
4. Homebuyer Education
Homebuyer education is a common requirement for participants in any affordable housing program. Participants in inclusionary zoning housing programs can be included in general homebuyer education
programs that may be run by the jurisdiction or run by local housing non-profits contracted to the jurisdiction. Such programs typically focus on such issues as basic household finance, the home-buying process, credit repair, understanding mortgages, and basic home maintenance and repair.
5. Selection and Screening
Selection is a labor-intensive process that requires all applicants be screened for such factors as income, age, household size and credit history, as well as level of non-household debt, the ability to qualify for a mortgage, and first-time homebuyer status. Some programs impose different income limits and household
size criteria to different units, adding to the complexity.
In addition, the selection process can be time-consuming, particularly when programs have a high demand.
In a situation where waiting lists occur, some communities rely on a lottery system; others use a first-come first serve system based on those who are qualified; and yet other systems give priority to municipal
employees such as fire, police or schoolteachers. Because Fair Housing laws prohibit certain types of
restrictions to housing, all programs should be scrutinized by municipal legal staff to ensure that Fair Housing laws are being followed (California Affordable Housing Law Project and Western Center on Law
and Poverty, 2002).
6. Financing and Refinancing
Given the recent problems with the mortgage industry, it has become common knowledge that the lending industry has severely tightened their underwriting standards. Although there is no empirical evidence that
this has reduced the number of inclusionary zoning units the banks are willing to underwrite, what is often
forgotten is that these units generally are underwritten by conventional lenders. Therefore one can assume that banks may now have more reservations about underwriting units to be sold to low and moderate income
buyers who may have fewer resources in place than higher income buyers. At the same time, these lenders must take on the additional complexities that run with an inclusionary
zoning unit and understand the additional restrictions on the deed in order to preserve the unit as affordable. Staff must work with the local and national mortgage lending community to ensure that there is an adequate pool of mortgages available to service the number of units anticipated to be produced.
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7. Resale Management
Jacobus points out in his report that one of the most time consuming tasks in running an inclusionary zoning
program is re-sale management. Resale management consists of a number of complex tasks and functions, including responding to homeowner’s questions, maintaining regular communication with all homeowners
in the program, as well as brokers, and title companies. Staff must also coordinate and review home
inspections for every sale and re-sale, and work with outgoing homeowners to determine any credits for improvements or deductions for damage and deferred maintenance.
8. Enforcement and Monitoring
To underscore the problem with enforcing these equity-restricted units, Jacobus points out that in Santa
Barbara County, several commissioners called for the end of the 25-year-old inclusionary zoning program after an unscheduled audit found that as many of a quarter of the 400 units were being used illegally for
rental income; 9 homes had been lost to foreclosure, and several owners were able to take out second
mortgages on the properties far in excess of what the deed restricted value was (Jacobus, 2007).
Although the Commission ultimately decided to keep the inclusionary zoning program and addressed some
of the problems with a restructuring, only one staff person remains in position to carry out all the required functions to maintain the County’s portfolio of inclusionary zoning housing.
Jacobus points out that, while most owners of an inclusionary zoning unit will comply with the requirements of the program, inevitably some will take advantage of the program and break the rules. A 2004 survey by
the City of Palo Alto found that nearly 30 percent of their 179 units of inclusionary zoning had compliance problems of one sort or another (Jacobus, 2007). Perhaps the greatest temptation is to rent out the units at market rate, while still paying a below-market rate mortgage payment. If gone undetected, owners can reap
high monthly profits, especially in regions with high monthly rental rates. Therefore, there is additional pressure on staff to enforce the requirements to prevent this sort of abuse of the system. Affordable housing
programs that do not have these kinds of deed restrictions are therefore easier to manage in the long run.
Given the recent financial crises, more and more homeowners are defaulting on their mortgages, and owners
of deed-restricted, affordable units are certainly not immune. Mortgage defaults are forcing staff to divert
their valuable time away from managing existing units to take action to either avoid foreclosure of the property by the lender or to take extra steps to ensure that the unit remains affordable after the lender has
taken back the unit.
Further complicating the administrative processes is specific guidance from the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) found in ML 94-2 Secondary Financing Provided by Nonprofit Agencies and
Transferability Restrictions Permitted for Property with a HUD Insured Mortgage, which restricts the ability of potential buyers for IZ units to get a HUD-insured mortgage.
The rule states the long-standing HUD policy that a property with a HUD-insured mortgage shall be free of restrictions that prevent the borrower from freely transferring the property. The rule also prohibits a
lender from approving restrictions after the loan is closed. The rule uses the term "legal restrictions on conveyance" to describe such restrictions and this term is broadly defined to include provisions in any kind of legal instrument that would cause a conveyance (including a lease) by the borrower to:
• Be void, or voidable by a third party.
• Be the basis of contractual liability of the borrower.
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• Terminate, or subject to termination, the borrower's interest in the property.
• Be subject to the consent of a third party.
• Be subject to limits on the amount of sales proceeds a borrower can retain.
• Be grounds for accelerating the insured mortgage.
• Be grounds for increasing the interest rate of the insured mortgage.
If a conveyance could cause any of these things to occur, the property is considered to be subject to legal restrictions on conveyance (referred to as "restrictions" for the remainder of this Mortgagee Letter) and is
usually ineligible for HUD mortgage insurance.
This restriction proved to be an issue in Washington D.C. where builders were unable to sell units to buyers
using FHA loans. Potential buyers of these units, due to their incomes, are more likely to use FHA loans. The IZ units in DC remained on the market for over 18 months and one developer sued the District after not being able to sell those units. The city has since amended the covenants clause to remove the resale
restrictions on these units (Scruggs S. , 2013).
C. Latest Reports
In 2012, The Urban Institute conducted research on IZ with the University of Maryland and published
“Expanded Housing Opportunities Through Inclusionary Zoning: Lessons from Two Counties”. Their research examines how effective IZ programs are as a strategy to increase the supply of affordable housing and further other housing- and community-related goals in two study sites: Montgomery County,
Maryland, and Fairfax County, Virginia. These programs were selected because they operate in the same metropolitan housing market and have been in place for decades.
Unlike many other programs, which have failed to produce a large number of affordable units, these two programs have successfully increased the supply of affordable housing in their jurisdictions. Here’s what
the report notes that can be learned from their programs:
1) Ordinance requirements must be clear and administered consistently so that developers are able to
make more informed decisions about where to build inclusionary housing units.
2) The revision of program requirements, which both counties execute every few years or so, may be a disincentive for a builder to pursue inclusionary zoning units because of ordinance complexity.
3) Requirements should allow for a reasonable degree of flexibility and offer a range of options or
incentives to the developer to produce more affordable housing units. 4) Because land values drive the costs of construction and development, local governments that use
or consider using inclusionary zoning to expand housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income families should be cognizant of how these costs can shape development decisions (The Urban Institute, 2012).
In 2015, Robert Hickey at the Center for Housing Policy published a paper called “Making Inclusionary
Housing More Flexible: Four Ideas for Urban Settings,” which outlines best practices for working with
developers in urban areas. Hickey recognizes the need for balance between addressing affordable housing needs and making the requirements feasible for developers. He says that post-recession IZ policies are most necessary in cities where rents are rising faster than incomes, impacting the middle class in addition to low
income households. Middle class residents have high rent burdens but do not qualify for federal housing assistance.
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Hickey says that flexible IZ policies help improve feasibility by offering developers various ways to meet affordability obligations. This is especially important in urban areas where building materials and methods
are more expensive and land costs are high. All of these factors, as well as high HOA fees and NIMBY
mentalities, sometimes make it hard to meet affordability requirements in same building as the market rate units. Historically, one of the most popular options in these situations was to build off-site units or pay a
fee-in-lieu. The issue municipalities’ face when offering these options is they do not further the goal of creating mixed income communities.
How do you lower costs for developers in these high cost cities while still promoting mixed income neighborhoods? Hickey offers four suggestions:
1. Permit off-site development in multiple low-income neighborhoods. If this option is chosen, the
municipality could require a greater number of affordable units and mix of bedroom sizes that may
not have been available if the units were built on-site. Many municipalities require these units to
be built nearby, but the scarcity of affordable land in urban areas makes that a problem. Hickey
suggests that municipalities broaden the geographic realm of off-site locations to any low-poverty
neighborhood with access to core amenities such as transit service, jobs, and above average schools.
2. Offer options to preserve or increase the affordability of existing housing. This is a fairly new
alternative to providing on-site units and it gives developers the option to preserve existing housing
that is at risk of being lost due to rent spikes. This is done by converting existing market rate housing
to deed restricted housing and requires the developer to make minimum level investment in
rehabilitation and energy efficiency upgrades. Some programs also allow developers the
opportunity to provide direct financial assistance to low income homeowners for home renovations.
This is a good option for developers that own existing market rate units in low cost buildings or are
building projects with high HOA fees. It should be noted that the cities that currently offer this
option haven’t had much interest from developers but it may become more popular as land prices
increase.
3. Restrict Fee-Revenue Spending to Broad, Designated Areas. The option to pay a fee-in-lieu is
really good for developers, especially developers of small projects. Both San Diego and Seattle are
fee first programs where units may be built in-lieu of paying a fee. In San Diego the fees are
collected and distributed by community planning area.
4. Provide flexibility on the incomes served. Allowing a developer to select from a menu of income
targets gives them greater flexibility to make sure the mix is right for the project there are building
as well as their bottom line. For example, instead of requiring that 10 percent of the units be made
available to 80 percent AMI, a developer could be given leeway to provide a percentage of units to
50 percent AMI and a percentage to 100 percent AMI.
Hickey points out that not all of these policies will work in all places, but in general, all cities can benefit
from giving developers more pathways to affordability. He also notes that new IZ policies are showing up in locations where IZ has been historically rare, such as Nashville, Atlanta, and Pittsburgh, reminding us
that housing affordability is a constant issue that policymakers are being pressured to address by both regulators and stakeholders.
Most recently, in 2017, Lance Freeman and Jenny Schuetz published a paper in Cityscape: A Journal of
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Policy Development and Research titled “Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?”
“The most widely used policies, local IZ and statewide “fair share” laws, have produced relatively small numbers of affordable units and are therefore unlikely to substantially mitigate the effects of rising housing
costs.” “Expressed as a share of the existing housing stock, affordable housing produced under IZ is less than 0.1 percent of existing housing in all regions (Freeman & Schuetz, Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?, 2017).”
The study concluded that increased demand in central cities by high-income households, together with limited land availability and complex development regulations, contribute to higher-market-rate housing
costs, meanwhile, subsidies for affordable housing and other social safety net programs have declined. The IZ programs aimed to combat these issues have produced a small number of units and are unlikely to meet the demand for below-market-rate housing. They call for housing advocates to develop a better
understanding of why existing state and local programs have produced only modest amounts of affordable housing, whether these programs could be redesigned to be more productive, and the political dynamics of
enacting such programs.
Other strategies include reducing the regulatory burdens on development and increasing densities. The
authors cite NAHB’s Cost of Regulations research which estimates that costs associated with complying
with federal, state, and local development regulations amount to 24 percent of new house prices. Upzoning will make it possible to produce smaller, lower-cost housing units, such as Accessory Dwelling Units
(ADU) and missing middle housing types, in single-family neighborhoods. These two approaches would
also benefit middle income households.
One of the difficulties in employing these strategies is that they require increased public support—both financial and political—for developing high-density housing in affluent communities, which in many communities is hard to come by. The research concludes by echoing the notion that creating affordable
housing is not a silver bullet strategy, as it alone is unlikely to enable disadvantaged households to take advantage of new economic opportunities. It cites HUD’s Choice Neighborhoods Initiative as an example of an approach that attempts to combine affordable housing with other components of human development
necessary for economic mobility (Freeman & Schuetz, Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: What Works?, 2017).
NAHB recently developed a greatly expanded list of incentives based on input from roundtable groups of
developers, financers, builders, planners, and municipal representatives. It includes incentives that can be used with single-family as well as multifamily applications, in a variety of market types, from urban to
small communities. Some include important contributions local governments can make to achieve results
with IZ, as well.
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This research has found that IZ projects usually require the availability of a combination of government incentives to make them financially feasible, and that the relative value of any one incentive or combination
of incentives to a project can vary depending upon the product type––e.g., horizontal single-family versus vertical multifamily––and the market.
The notion that IZ programs need to take development economics into account has been echoed by both EcoNorthwest and the Urban Land Institute, Grounded Solutions Network, and the Urban Institute, all of
whom have developed calculators with a similar goal in mind, to make IZ work for all players.
CONSTRUCTION/DESIGN
Reduction in Interior Amenities
Different Interior Amenities if
Finishes of Durable/Good Quality
FEE REDUCTIONS/WAIVERS
Mitigation (Impact) Fees
Permitting Fees
–Permit Review
–Building Inspection
Utility Connections
DENSITY BONUS
Bonus Formula (e.g.,1 market-rate unit or
lot for each affordable unit or lot)
Bonus Amount Based on Percentage of Affordable Units/Lots
ZONING/SUBDIVISION DIMENSIONAL MODIFICATIONS
Lot Coverage
Building Height
Lot Area
Open Space/Landscaping
Frontage
PARKING MODIFICATIONS
Reduction in No. of Parking Spaces Required
Increase in No. of Compact Spaces Allowed
EXPEDITED PERMITTING
Limit on No. of Days for Completion of Review and Approval
Separate Approval Process
Priority Processing of Project
INFRASTRUCTURE
Tax increment financing of infrastructure
Extension or updating of
utilities to serve site
PUBLIC COST LIMITING/ SHARING
Payment of In-Lieu Fee for
Required IZ Units
Tax incentives
Contribution or lease of underutilized or vacant land
Demolition cost
Tax abatement
Environmental liability
Soft (Forgivable) Second
Mortgage
Funding or implementation of social support programs for
project
Units Off-Site
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II. PROMISING STATE AND LOCAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR PROVIDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Different markets and different income segments require different tools for improving affordability. At the
lower end of the income spectrum this may be multiple direct subsidies. For families higher on the income
range this may be better planning for housing and removal of some regulatory barriers to allow the market to function more efficiently.
Unfortunately, an increasing number of communities today are adopting and imposing inclusionary zoning in the belief that this approach alone will close this gap. It has become a politically expedient means for
communities to show they are addressing the affordability problem instead of taking a more comprehensive
approach to understanding and resolving this complex issue.
Most inclusionary zoning programs impose controls that limit the resale prices of such units for a period of 5 to as long as 20 or even 30 years. The purpose of this is to keep the housing units affordable, but the result is that owners in these units are barred from building equity. In an effort to avoid takings challenges and
enhance participation in these programs, such programs also typically offer developers density bonuses and other incentives such as waivers/reduced requirements and expedited permitting, yet on-the-ground experience shows that such incentives are increasingly difficult to achieve in the development approval
process today.
Inclusionary zoning should only be implemented with sufficient compensation to developers and builders
and should only be considered as part of a “broad and comprehensive strategy to address housing affordability at the state and local level that closely examines the causes of that problem and relies on a
variety of targeted approaches to address those causes, including direct income and housing subsidies,
removal of zoning and regulatory barriers to provide for sufficient number of housing units to meet projected growth, rather than relying primarily on mandatory Inclusionary Zoning.” This is language found
in NAHB’s current policy on Inclusionary Zoning.
In order to focus on a more comprehensive approach to funding affordable housing, NAHB hired Abt
Associates to research other non- federal approaches to housing affordability. Abt provided a 350-page compilation of state and local affordability strategies entitled “Research on State and Local Means of Increasing Affordable Housing” (2008) that also includes how these programs are funded, where they’ve
been used, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Many communities have enjoyed significant success with innovative programs designed to address the housing affordability challenge, and many of the most innovative and successful approaches are detailed in this extensive but user friendly report.
The report includes 30 detailed case studies that explain how local governments used these strategies to
address their housing affordability needs. These case studies represent the most comprehensive report ever
compiled on the subject of non-federal solutions. Most of them highlight new examples not previously described in other reports by such organizations as HUD, the Center for Housing Policy, and the Urban
Land Institute.
The Abt Associates report focuses on three types of strategies:
• Land use strategies, such as planning, zoning, and novel development strategies;
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• Financial strategies, including property taxes, other taxes, state tax credits, impact fee waivers,
regional financing approaches, and other sources of financing;
• Other initiatives, such as informational strategies, organizational strategies, reforms to zoning and development codes, and state legislation.
The Abt Associates study also found that the most successful places rely on an array of strategies to encourage affordable housing, and that the strategies that get the most press are not necessarily the most
effective.
A good example is a case study of North Kingstown, RI, which used a variety of strategies, including state
mandates and guidance for local planning and a significant density bonus and streamlined permitting program for developers.
Emeryville, CA established zoning codes and development regulations to encourage infill and brownfields development, high-density housing and mixed-use development. Among the successes is Emeryville
Warehouse Lofts, which includes 140 lofts, 129 other residential units, 7,000 square feet of retail space, a
4,500 square-foot landscaped courtyard and a renovated parking structure.
Since the report was published in 2008, there have been other interesting developments. The HOME
Connecticut statute, officially known as the Housing Program for Economic Growth, was created by the state in June 2007 to provide incentives to municipalities that voluntarily choose to expand their array of
mixed-income housing options, as well as financing to developers of affordable housing. Under the law, municipalities may qualify for planning and technical assistance grants of up to $50,000 to determine what housing options are needed and whether suitable locations can be found. Municipalities that agree to create
housing in responsible growth locations (near town centers, transportation facilities, or existing or planned infrastructure) must meet two criteria: (1) to create Incentive Housing overlay Zones (IHZs) with minimum
densities of 6 single-family, 10 duplex or townhouse, or 20 multifamily units per acre; and (2) ensure that
at least 20 percent of the units in the zone are affordable to residents earning 80 percent of the area median income or less.
In return, municipalities that meet those two criteria receive from the state (1) zoning incentive payments of $2,000/unit that could be built in the designated IHZ (e.g. 100 units in the zone = $200,000; payments
are for both market-rate and affordable units); and (2) building incentive payments of $2,000/multi-family
unit or $5,000/single-family unit at the time that building permits are issued in the IHZ.
The statewide funding is combined with local and federal resources to help buy down the cost of affordable
housing units. Local non-profits and non-profit builders are crucial as the builders of these homes. Community banks, such as Liberty Bank, the United Way, and federal sources such as Federal Home Loan
Bank of Boston provided low-interest financing to developers. Municipalities may create as many IHZs as they want, but no single zone can be larger than 10 percent of
the municipality’s land area, and all zones can total no more than 20 percent of the municipality’s land area. To date 55 municipalities have either received or are in the process of applying for grant funding to help
implement an Inclusionary Housing Overlay Zone.
In Charlotte, North Carolina, the city and building community worked together in unprecedented fashion
to establish affordable housing strategies that both worked for the building industry and addressed
Charlotte’s problems with concentrated low-income housing. Housing Charlotte 2007 was a combined city and community task force recommending that the city explore giving a developer conventional financial
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incentives to include low-income units, such as density bonuses and expedited permitting processes.
More innovative approaches suggested would be to use money from the city's Housing Trust Fund to help
builders comply with regulations that increase the cost of building, such as the city's tree ordinance and Urban Street Design Guidelines; subtle rezoning techniques, such as reintroducing duplex zoning in single
family communities, to allow for affordable higher density rezoning in stable neighborhoods; and other locally financing sources and tax credits to assist developers building affordable housing.
The city of Boulder, Colorado has some of the most expensive housing in the state and scarce land available for new construction. In order to provide an affordable, single-family option for residents, Thistle Communities and Allison Management partnered to develop Yarmouth Way, a 25-unit development
featuring 10 affordable units and 15 modestly priced market-rate units. Approximately three-quarters of the city’s permanently affordable homes are one- or two-bedroom units,
and less than 10 percent of these affordable properties are single-family detached units. This project includes a mix of attached townhomes, duplexes, and single-family detached homes. The non-profit and
for-profit development team partnered to acquire a vacant parcel and the ratio of market-rate to affordable
units allowed the sales of market-rate homes to offset the losses associated with the deed-restricted units. The project’s 10 deed-restricted units constitute 40 percent of the development, double the number of
affordable units required under Boulder’s ordinance.
The lesson to be learned from this model is through the development of offsite units that is required by the
city of units cannot be build onsite. The developers coordinated directly with another developer to meet their 5-unit obligation at Yarmouth Way, with the Yarmouth Way developers receiving a $100,000 in-lieu payment for each additional affordable unit provided. In addition to the transfer of in-lieu fees, the project
benefitted from financial assistance in the form of an interest-free loan for predevelopment costs provided by NeighborWorks America.
In 2016, NAHB hired planning consultant Deborah Myerson to research innovative, affordable projects that were built without the use of inclusionary zoning programs. The report, “How Did They Do It? Discovering New Opportunities for Affordable Housing” reveals that multiple strategies, typically used
in a variety of combinations, are needed to close the financing gap and make projects viable. Some of the dominant approaches that have helped communities increase the local affordable housing supply include implementing a strong local housing policy, engaging in effective public-private partnerships, and
embracing high design standards.
All of these examples show that the creation of affordable housing is a complicated undertaking that
requires not only financial support from multiple resources, but also community support, political support, specialized expertise, a project lad by perseverance, and a little bit of luck. The projects are listed below,
along with the key strategies that made each one a success.
Peak One Neighborhood, Frisco, Colorado
• Donation of town-owned land for affordable housing development
• Local affordable housing policies
• Dedicated funding to support affordable housing
• Successful public engagement and comprehensive master planning
• Deed restrictions for qualified incomes and residency
• Limited equity appreciation for permanent affordability
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Ferry Crossing, Old Saybrook, Connecticut
• Incentive Housing Zone program established to guide communities to proactively plan for affordable housing
• Technical assistance from the Housing Connections of Connecticut program, a partnership between Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Connecticut Housing Coalition
• Project financing from the Connecticut Department of Economic and Community Development, Liberty Bank, and the Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston
• Strong community support to meet housing needs for residents priced out of current supply of market-rate housing
• Nonprofit advocacy organization to spearhead community engagement
• Experienced non-profit housing developer to secure financing and oversee construction
• Municipal land donation and remediation to lower the cost of development
Wildflower Terrace at Mueller, Austin, Texas
• A robust public-private partnership
• Substantial, long-term public engagement
• A strong public policy commitment to affordable housing
• Design guidelines and review process for a cohesive neighborhood fabric
Daybreak, South Jordan, Utah
• Mixed-use development
• Variety of housing types and price points
• Green building
• Sustainable development
• Multimodal transportation options
• Pedestrian-friendly design
Old Town Commons, Alexandria, Virginia
• Strong Housing Market
• Collaborative public-private partnership
• Experienced developer of mixed-income communities
• Leadership from the housing authority
• Supportive city council
• New community center
Lofts at Reynoldstown Crossing, Atlanta, Georgia
• Strategic adaptive reuse that emerged from a failed upscale condominium development
• Housing and transportation linkages for sustainable development
• Rapid turnaround from acquisition to closing
• Pilot for community land trust condominium units
• Drawing for units that generated quick and successful closings
• Land banking of 1.4 adjacent acres for future development
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• Providing accessible and affordable financing to workforce buyers
Arcade Apartments, St. Louis, Missouri
• Historic rehabilitation of a local landmark
• Vibrant mixed-use redevelopment
• Downtown revitalization
• Public-private partnership
• Widespread support and will to transform a derelict but architecturally significant property
Oxford Mills, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
• Successful partnership of mission-driven private developers
• Workforce housing for an underserved market
• Creative financing of affordable housing with New Market Tax Credits
• Attractive rehabilitation and conversion of a formerly derelict industrial property
• A successful model for development replicable across different markets
• Neighborhood revitalization
CityView @ Van Ness, Fresno, California
• Housing authority engaged in community building
• Collaborative effort between the housing authority and the city
• Affordable housing in a mixed-use property as an economic stimulus for downtown
• Modern, attractive design that challenges conventional notions of affordable housing
• Careful consideration to address the historic significance of the site
Affordable Housing Corporation of Lake County, Libertyville, Illinois
• Partnership with local government for political and financial support
• A revolving loan fund
• Ability to absorb a higher-than-usual level of risk to renovate the most derelict, vacant units
• Neighborhood stabilization
Rainier Vista, Seattle, Washington
• Housing authority served as master planner for a comprehensive redevelopment
• City of Seattle’s collaborative commitment to coordinate on infrastructure development
• Rainier Vista design book for consistent design standards throughout the project
• Active Citizen Review Committee for stakeholder engagement
• One-to-one replacement policy for public housing units
• Transit-oriented design to prepare for the new light rail line
• Doubled density from the original project to create a mixed-income community
• Infrastructure redesign to integrate with the existing street grid
The Rose, Minneapolis, Minnesota
• Long-term vision and persistence over a 15-year redevelopment project
• Community engagement in the final outcome
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• Commitment to innovation and cost management to achieve pioneering green building in
affordable housing
• Teamwork between nonprofits with complementary strengths
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III. CONCLUSION
Households continue to struggle to find housing that meets their needs at a price they can afford. Many are still forced to commute long distances, pay a disproportionate share of their incomes on housing, or live in
housing that simply does not meet their needs. The reality is that inclusionary zoning may not work at all in some markets, and may actually worsen the
shortage of affordable housing in others. In fact, as pointed out through the case studies described in this paper, inclusionary zoning often provides far less affordable housing and in a far more cumbersome way
than many of the traditional affordable housing programs such as HOME, CDBG, non-profits and the low
income housing tax credit have been able to provide for.
An interesting phenomenon related to the recession is the impact it had on inclusionary zoning programs.
Inclusionary zoning units that are repossessed by the bank need to be resold to below market rate incomes, but often this can be difficult to ensure in the public auction process. It added yet another layer of complexity
and challenge to an already tedious affordable housing program.
The research by both Abt Associates and Deborah Myerson demonstrates that there are successful
alternatives to inclusionary zoning that can have a far greater impact in meeting the housing needs of low-
and moderate-income families.
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APPENDIX
STORIES FROM THE FIELD: Communities that have Discontinued or Reshaped
Inclusionary Zoning
Because of its complexities and the effort required to administer it, there are a growing number of communities that have discontinued the use of IZ or reshaped it to incorporate other tools for achieving
lasting affordability.
Madison, Wis.
Since the program’s inception in February 2004, 48 developments were approved in the City of Madison with a total of 2075 homes, of which 173 (8.3 percent of total) were affordable under the inclusionary
zoning guidelines, and 33 (19 percent of affordable and 1.6 percent of all homes) have been sold to date
(Inclusionary Zoning Advisory Oversight Committee, 2008). An article written by Terrence Wall of Smart Growth Madison and published in the Madison Isthmus
Weekly pointed out that:
“Inclusionary zoning, Madison's well-meaning program to increase the supply of affordable housing, has
had a starkly perverse impact on the local housing market: Vacancy rates have declined and rental rates have increased, producing exactly the opposite effect that IZ advocates wanted (Wall, 2007).”
His article includes research that indicates that in the period 2001 to 2003, developers built 3,257 housing units (of all types) in Madison, compared to only 1,954 units from 2004 to 2006, a 40 percent decrease after
the IZ ordinance was passed in early 2004. In 2006, Madison issued only 143 permits for market-rate apartment units, down from 660 in 2003. That
143 number is incredibly low when one considers that the city has on the average issued permits for 807 units annually since 1993, the vast majority of which were market-rate units.
The dramatic downturn in new construction caused vacancy rates to decline in existing units and net rents to increase, thereby achieving the opposite effect of what the city intended, overall higher costs of housing for everyone. Kent Disch, former Community Affairs Director of the Madison Area Home Builders
Association, indicated that the ordinance was constantly under amendment due to the complex nature of the policy.
Even advocates for workforce housing had to concede that the program was not effective when only 15 inclusionary zoning homes were sold in 15 years. Disch stated that “The program just didn’t make sense,
our inclusionary zoning lots sat empty because the market was flooded with existing homes listed below
the inclusionary zoning unit price, and prospective home buyers just were not interested in purchasing an equity restricted house with a more complicated financing and closing process.” Another helpful
amendment was that after 270 days without selling, the inclusionary zoning lots could return to the market rate price. Disch added “Many builders simply waited out the required time period before aggressively marketing those lots.”
The City suffered additional blows to their faltering program. In 2006 the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck
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down the entire ordinance as a form of rent control, which is banned by Wisconsin state statute. The City therefore had to revise the ordinance to remove the rental component of the ordinance. Given the low
number of units generated by the program in the four years since its inception (only 1.9 percent of all new
dwelling units), and the ongoing controversy that the program had created in the community, the City Council decided not to renew the program when its sunset provision came up for renewal in 2009.
St. Cloud, Minn.
St. Cloud, population 66,000, is the primary city of a half-dozen cities clustered around the Mississippi
River in central Minnesota, about 60 miles northwest of Minneapolis. One might think that in such a location affordable housing would hardly be a major policy issue. However, by 2001 there was a concern
in the community that more and more residents of central Minnesota were being priced out of quality housing and homeownership opportunities. It was estimated that during 2001, the price of housing rose by about 16 percent in the area, due to increased demand and lack of supply.
The Central Minnesota Task Force on Affordable Housing was created to address the issue. One of the many proposals considered was recommending that the six cities in the region adopt inclusionary zoning
ordinances for what was referred to as “Life-Cycle Housing.” The premise in St. Cloud and other central Minnesota cities is that minimum lot sizes required by area
zoning laws are now so large that they are impeding the ability to provide for affordable single-family homes (Bannanian, 2002). If local governments were to provide density bonuses by allowing for smaller
lot sizes, in exchange for providing 15 percent below- market rate housing units, the theory goes, it would
be a “win-win” for all parties involved.
However, this was not to be the case. As this case study demonstrates, inclusionary zoning is often an ill-
suited fit for a community. Similar to the Madison example, there was just little interest by the home buying public in purchasing equity-restricted new home, when similar homes nearby could be purchased at lower
prices with no restrictions. At its April 2007 meeting, the “Life Cycle Housing” Board voted to terminate the inclusionary zoning program, which was adopted in 2004, and replace it with a standing committee on affordable housing under the St. Cloud Area Joint Planning District Board. The five city councils voted to
ratify that action, which means that the inclusionary zoning program no longer exists.
In 2006 and into 2007, the Life Cycle Housing Board considered reducing the percentage (15 percent to 5
percent) of inclusionary zoning housing lots because of the high number of vacant lots (several hundred in St. Cloud alone); the fact that funding sources were no longer awarding funds to proposals submitted for inclusionary zoning housing; and because the City of St. Cloud’s housing efforts, through its Housing and
Redevelopment Authority (HRA), directed at existing housing in existing or core neighborhoods, which appeared to be effectively addressing the affordable housing problem in the region.
Under the various funding mechanisms for lifecycle housing, including Inclusionary Zoning, there were a total of 28 homes (or 40 depending on the source) built and sold since the program’s inception in 2002.
During the same time, the St. Cloud HRA acted independently of the inclusionary zoning program and sold
more than 83 single family detached homes and townhomes, all without the equity restrictions. (inclusionary zoning units were sold to households with annual incomes of less than 80 percent of the state
median income, and resold with 50 percent equity restriction in years 1- 10, declining to no equity restriction after year 20).
The existing inclusionary zoning homes went into a 90-year community land lease. The developer/builder
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holding life-cycle lots will individually negotiate with the respective city.
The unintended consequence of the inclusionary zoning program and the St. Cloud HRA efforts was that
first-time home buyers were not purchasing existing homes in existing neighborhoods, fixing them up, and using that equity to purchase their next home. With existing homes not selling, interest rates dropping, and
being in a large college community; these homes were purchased by investors for rentals. (St. Cloud is a regional center on the Mississippi River with older neighborhoods and a 15,000 student university located in one of those neighborhoods).
As St. Cloud city leaders and citizens of the area viewed their changing neighborhoods and causes, they became adamant that existing homes be the primary focus of the housing affordability efforts, not new
housing attained through an inclusionary zoning program, and that financing assistance be available to potential buyers. This action became the reason for the termination of the inclusionary zoning program as the City of St. Cloud began to concentrate on the existing housing in its core neighborhoods, and felt it
could not commit resources (funds and personnel) to a program with emphasis on new housing.
In lieu of an inclusionary zoning program, the St. Cloud HRA established the boundaries for the core
neighborhoods and then pooled existing funds to launch this program—almost an “urban pioneer” program:
• revised the existing CDBG homeowner rehabilitation program to a zero interest deferred loan of up to $15,000 for repairs to existing homes, payable at time of sale, refinance, or move-out;
• separate funds were set aside to assist households that had incomes below 70 percent of area median income, or 70 percent to 100 percent, or more than l00 percent;
• provided gap financing of zero interest, no payment deferred loan, payable at time of sale, refinance, or move-out; to households with dependents, and not exceeding 80 percent of state median income; and
• created a homestead incentive program of five year forgivable loan, prorated forgiveness each year. This funding was exhausted in a few months by providing 40 loans totaling $200,000. This equals
40 new owner-occupied existing homes in core neighborhoods.
The St. Cloud HRA is seeking additional funding because, within a few months, the program was so
successful that the HRA was able to rehabilitate 40 existing homes for low and moderate income buyers that will be owner-occupied in those core neighborhoods with no equity restrictions.
Tallahassee, Fla.
The City of Tallahassee is the state capital of Florida, with a population of around 250,000. The city enacted
an inclusionary zoning ordinance in 2005, with a revision to the program in 2008. The basic requirements of the program are a 10 percent set aside for affordable units, with a 25-percent density bonus and a minimum threshold of 50 units to be applicable to the program (City of Tallahassee, Adopted 2005,
Amended 2008).
To date, no units of affordable housing have been created through the program (City of Tallahassee, 2009).
As stated in the City’s Consolidated Plan, the City recognizes that the recent downturn in the state’s housing market has hampered the City’s ability to generating housing using this method.
The production of new units is still a viable option for the City of Tallahassee; however the weak new construction market combined with a 12-month surplus of housing available for sale and a high foreclosure
rate in the city means that in the next 2 to 3 years the City will likely focus on rehabilitation and
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reconstruction rather than new construction.
The fact that the City has not built one unit of affordable housing through their inclusionary zoning program
underscores how susceptible these programs can be to recessionary cycles, particularly in smaller communities.
In contrast, the city also implements an affordable housing program utilizing formula grants from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s HOME and CDBG programs and the Low Income Tax
Credit. Currently there are approximately 4,037 affordable rental units made available in the city by the Low Income Tax Credit. CDBG funding and the state’s State Housing Initiatives Partnership Act (SHIP) program are also used to provide for 420 down-payment assistance programs as well as 50 deep subsidy
loans for homeownership for households 50percent below the median household average. Additionally, the Community Housing Development Organization, a non-profit affordable housing program will use grants to rehabilitate 25 existing homes in the next four years into workforce housing home-buying opportunities
(City of Tallahassee, 2009).
In addition to the failure to produce even one unit of affordable housing in six years, the City also had to
go through a costly lawsuit. In Florida HBA, Tallahassee BA, Hermitage Ventures and Sue Boynton vs. City of Tallahassee, the plaintiffs filed suit against the City claiming a violation of due process because the
ordinance was “arbitrary and capricious,” in terms of who in the public the program would benefit; that it
was an unlawful taking because the ordinance targeted only a small group of the citizenry to provide a public good without just compensation; and that it was an unlawful state tax because municipalities in
Florida are barred from levying real estate or personal property taxes (Zurier, 2006). Although the Circuit Court ruled in favor of the City in the case, the City had to spend tax dollars and manpower to defend a program that has yet to produce any units.
Palm Beach County, Fla.
Similarly, in Palm Beach County, during the height of Florida’s frenzied housing boom, an alarmed County Commission decided to “take action” on housing affordability and, with the reluctant collaboration of the local HBA, enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance in early 2006. Then the bottom fell out of the market.
In 2000, the median house price in Palm Beach County was $135,200 (United States Census Data, 2009),
by the First Quarter of 2006 that price had escalated to $393,000 (2010 Survey by Florida Associations of Realtors), but by 2009 had plunged to $244,500 and fallen even further by Third Quarter 2010 to $226,600
(2010 Florida Realtors Report). Chris Roog, former Executive Officer of the Gold Coast Builders Association and Government Affairs
Director, indicated that since the ordinance passed in 2006, not one inclusionary zoning unit has been constructed in the county of more than 1.3 million people. “The demand simply isn’t there. The industry
has been so hard hit that there literally have been no projects approved in the last four years. If projects
have received approval, none have broken ground.” With no development projects approved there is no way to create the associated percentage of affordable housing. “Plus, with the huge number of foreclosures
in the County, people can purchase a single-family home for as little as $50,000.”
Based on the formula for inclusionary zoning units set in the ordinance, which are based on average annual
income for the county, inclusionary zoning units would have to be marketed at around $150,000. Roog noted “why would anyone pay more for an “affordable” unit when the market is providing units at lower prices, with none of the equity restrictions attached. If the County were really interested in promoting
affordable housing they would be scooping up the huge overhang of foreclosures we have weighing down
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housing prices and assisting moderate income buyers with financing and down payment assistance so they can buy these homes.”
Doing so would not only provide affordable housing but also prop up home values and boost the construction industry by taking foreclosed properties off market. “The County would rather just keep the
phantom IZ ordinance on the books because they don’t know what else to do…” Fortunately for Roog and the south Florida home builders, the County reviews the ordinance once a year.
If the program continues to produce no units, there may be a chance for eventual repeal of the in the future.
McCall, Idaho
In 2008, the Fourth Judicial Court of Idaho struck down an ordinance enacted by the city of McCall mandating private builders and developers to build and deed-restrict properties for "workforce housing." In
2007 the local REALTORS association had filed a lawsuit against the city of McCall seeking a declaratory
ruling that McCall's ordinance was an unconstitutional taking of private property rights, an illegal taxing scheme, and that the city exceeded its jurisdiction and authority in passing the ordinances. The court’s
overturning of the ordinance highlights the perils faced by local jurisdictions considering adoption of an inclusionary zoning ordinance.
Among other things, the ordinances required that developers and builders set aside, build and deed-restrict 20 percent of a development for "workforce housing." Under the ordinances, the deed-restricted properties
were reserved for people making 100percent to 160percent of the median wage in Valley County in central
Idaho. The local government would award priority points to certain types of jobs that would qualify for the housing. Such homes would be permanently price-restricted. The ordinances mandated an equivalent "in
lieu of" fee as an option to building such homes.
The 4th Judicial District Court included the following points in the Memorandum Decision:
• "These restrictions go much further than merely regulating the use of property; instead, they
essentially regulate ownership of the property by dictating to whom a unit may be sold or rented."
• “This Court concludes such 'regulation' is arbitrary and unreasonable as a land use provision."
• "This Court is convinced that the imposition of the subsidy or fee required under Ordinance Nos.
819 and 820 are, in reality, a tax, and not a regulation." Idaho Association of Realtors Chief Executive Kevin Price was quoted on the court’s decision, stating "The
City simply went too far and exceeded its authority. The imposition of this burden on the landowners or developers amounts to an unlawful tax. In addition, the ordinances go much further than the City's authority
to regulate the use of property. By dictating to whom a housing unit may be sold or rented, the City has
improperly attempted to regulate property ownership. We certainly agree with the Court's determination that this "regulation" is arbitrary and unreasonable. There are developments in Valley County constructed
under the ordinances. When the market softened, consumers had a choice between purchasing deed-
restricted lots that can't appreciate in price, or unencumbered lots for the same price. Naturally, buyers chose to purchase homes with no free-market restrictions. Some of these "affordable workforce housing
units" have been lying vacant for months. The people who were forced to build them are really taking a bath February 2008 Idaho Association of REALTORS Press Release)."
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Bozeman, Mont.
In yet another example of how inclusionary zoning is very susceptible to downturns in the housing market,
two years after the city of Bozeman’s Workforce Housing Ordinance went into effect, no homes were built under the program. While the city points out that all home building has slowed with the economic downturn,
many within the building community have called for it to be repealed.
The workforce housing program requires developers of some subdivisions to price a portion of their homes
or condominiums under $200,000 and trains Bozeman residents for homeownership. The Bozeman City
Commission adopted the ordinance in July of 2007 in hopes of giving working class families who makes less than $70,000 a year wider options for owning a home in Bozeman.
In its original approval of the ordinance, the city commission stipulated that its effectiveness be reviewed in two years. They looked at an update on the program compiled by staff, but did not discuss it during their
meeting. Instead, they voted to review the program again in another year, hopeful that the market will
improve and give the program a chance to work (Ricker, Amanda, Bozeman Daily Chronicle, September 1, 2009).
Davie, Fla.
South Florida is one of the epicenters of the current housing price crash and foreclosure crisis. The Town of Davie, until recently, was a fast growing bedroom community with a population of approximately 90,000 located immediately west of Fort Lauderdale. Since 2000, the population increased by 14,609 people or by
approximately 5,555 dwelling units (2000 and 2010 U.S. Census Data). In response to rapidly escalating prices during the housing bubble years, Davie finalized adoption an inclusionary zoning policy in early 2008. To date, not only have no affordable units been created through the program, hardly any residential
building units have been constructed at all, relative to the boom years earlier in the decade. In 2007, 274 residential units were constructed in the city; in 2010, that number was reduced to 72 units (Town of
Davie, Florida Building Department).
The Town’s Vice-Mayor stated that “I have been told that this (ordinance) is prohibiting a lot of people
from building in our town (Bryan, 2011).” A local realtor recently informed the Town Council that a
developer who wanted to build a 50-unit housing development in the town decided not to after reading the inclusionary zoning ordinance (Bryan, 2011).
In a time of budgetary crisis, stagnant home building and shrinking tax bases, communities desperate for new development do not need burdensome regulations such as inclusionary zoning hampering their ability
to resolve their fiscal problems. The Town Council has subsequently voted to suspend the Ordinance for two years.
Longmont, Colo.
In August 2011, the City of Longmont, Colorado voted to end its inclusionary zoning program after a year-
long debate within the community. Longmont is located about 29 miles northwest of Denver and has a population of 86,000.
Although the program managed to produce some units, the City realized that having an inclusionary zoning ordinance was an impediment to bringing jobs and businesses to the community in a challenging economy. The repeal did not just take effect for future housing units, but also lifted all re-sale deed restrictions for
housing built under the inclusionary zoning ordinance. This was seen as an added benefit to existing
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residents in the community, akin to a tax break and would provide for an added shot in the arm for the local community.
In lieu of the repealed ordinance, a stakeholder group was established by the Council to re-examine the
state of housing affordability in the community given the falling real estate prices. Denver is the only other jurisdiction in the metropolitan Denver area that has an inclusionary zoning ordinance, and two council members in that city are seeking to revisit the ordinance.
Montgomery County, Md.
In Montgomery County, only 77 inclusionary zoning units were produced in 2007, an all-time low in the 36-year history of the program; this after 400 units were produced in 2005, at the height of the building boom (Montgomery County, MD Department of Housing and Community Services). This reinforces the
notion that inclusionary zoning programs are highly susceptible to market and economic fluctuations and
cycles, and when affordable housing production is mandated on the backs of the market-price housing industry.
Santa Fe, N.M.
Santa Fe’s experience with IZ is further evidence that this tool is best suited for the strongest markets during
the best times. In 2005, the city started enforcing an IZ ordinance that required at least 30 percent of all new developments be affordable. However, only 27 out of 181 proposed affordable units have been built and
sold over the last nine years. Meanwhile, the local housing trust says they have 200 – 300 people waiting to buy an affordable home.
The ordinance was developed during the housing boom without developer input and when the recession began, it made meeting the requirements of the ordinance impossible. The 30 percent number was modeled
after similar ordinances in more expensive, higher density areas like San Francisco and Chicago, where
incomes are also higher than in Santa Fe.
In order to reduce the onerous requirements, the city has reduced the required percentage from 30 percent
affordable to 20 percent affordable. Santa Fe also reduced the affordability term for rental units from 20 years to 10 years. According to staff, this decision was driven primarily by the city’s interest in encouraging
more market-rate rental housing in the city. The city has also changed the resale requirements. For example,
if a homeowner originally bought a house worth $175,000 for $125,000, and its value jumped to $250,000 by the time of sale, they would owe the city $75,000 instead of $50,000. The new ordinance allows
homeowners to repay only the dollar amount of subsidy they received when they first bought the house.
New York, N.Y.
In 2014, New York City’s Mayor De Blasio unveiled his plan for an overhaul of the city’s existing IZ program. Former Mayor Bloomberg’s model allowed developers to build 20 percent bigger if they set aside
20 percent of the new apartments at below-market rates. While the program under Mayor Bloomberg remained voluntary, the new program will be mandatory when building in a targeted neighborhood that has been upzoned for higher densities. The new program will require developers in those areas to build projects
that are a 20 percent low-income, 30 percent middle-income, and 50 percent market-rate split. Opponents still do not believe the changes in the program will produce positive outcomes. IZ units only
accounted for 1.7 percent of housing growth between 2005 and 2013, and the new program isn’t that
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different from the old program. Additionally, the inclusionary rents are based on Area Median Income (AMI), which is calculated over an area that includes both the city and its wealthy suburbs. In 2013, AMI
for an average household in the New York metro area was $77,310; in the city alone, however, the average
family made $50,711.
IZ programs also receive a lot of criticism from the residents they are meant to serve due to fears of gentrification. Tom Angotti, the director of the Hunter College Center for Community Planning and Development, argues that inclusionary zoning’s proponents “deal with housing as if it existed in a free
market — as if it were just a matter of individual apartments combined. But it exists in a land market, where values are determined largely by location and zoning capacity. In areas with high land values, the new inclusionary development will just feed the fire of gentrification.”
In New York City, inclusionary zoning could actually incentivize the destruction of existing affordable housing. Many New York City neighborhoods are filled with rent-control apartments, often at lower
densities than the new inclusionary zoning rules would allow. The average income for rent-stabilized tenants is $37,000; for rent controlled tenants it is $29,000. Both are significantly lower than the income
targets for many inclusionary apartments.
Seattle, Wash.
The city of Seattle has turned the fee-in-lieu concept on its head and instead adopted a “fee-first” ordinance that gives residential and commercial developers the option to create onsite or offsite units in lieu of paying
the fee. Between 2002 and 2013, in every case where developers had the choice, they chose to pay the fee.
Cornerstone Partnership analyzed data from Seattle’s Office of Housing and found that $27 million of fee
revenue the city generated from 2000 to 2013 enabled it to bring in $97 million in federal and state housing funds that would not have been invested in Seattle otherwise.
This allowed Seattle to produce an affordable home for each $50,000 in fee revenue it received. A typical downtown high-rise rental project paid a fee of about $150,000 for each home that would have been required
onsite, a lower cost than actually producing the affordable unit. For these downtown projects, Seattle could
use the fee revenue to produce three times more affordable homes than would have been built onsite.
Portland, Ore.
In December 2016, Portland’s City Council enacted a citywide inclusionary housing requirement that all
multifamily developments of 20 or more units set aside 20 percent of newly constructed apartments for families earning no more than 80 percent of the region’s median household income. This is one of the most stringent inclusionary zoning policies in the country. In other large cities, like Chicago and New York City,
the inclusionary zoning policies only apply to projects seeking upzoning, but in Portland, the requirement applies to all new development.
Since its enactment, multiple reports have suggested that the program has brought new apartment proposals in Portland to a near standstill. Portland builders raced to get 14,000 apartments approved, which was three
times the amount permitted annually during the recent apartment boom, before the new policy went into
effect. From 1999 to 2016, Oregon jurisdictions had been prohibited from enacting mandatory inclusionary policies. Home Builders and Realtors sought to continue the prohibition, worried that IZ would hurt local
housing markets.
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In an effort to remove some of the barriers to affordable housing development, Oregon SB1051, passed in
2017, expedited the review period for certain qualifying projects with an affordable component, sets
objective standards for that review, and tries to make sure developers can achieve the maximum allowable density.
Telluride, Colo.
Telluride had a shortage of affordable units for people who work in the resort town, so they enacted an
inclusionary zoning requirement that developers set aside a certain percentage of new construction as affordable. However, the state of Colorado has had a prohibition on rent control since 1980, so a developer
building a rental project sued the city of Telluride, saying that requiring him to set aside units at below-market rates was essentially rent control. The case went all the way to the Colorado Supreme Court in 2000 Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture and resulted in the decision that the ordinance violated the state
prohibition on rent control.
Denver, Colo.
Denver’s Inclusionary Housing Ordinance was enacted in 2001, but as of September 2016, it had been repealed. The program required all newly constructed, for-sale housing developments of 30 or more units
to make 10 percent of the units affordable for people earning 95 percent AMI or less, depending on what
type of building is constructed. Over those 15 years, 1,166 units were built; however, most of them were built in the early years of the ordinance (Denver Office of Economic Development, 2015).The reasons for
this include tighter lending standards after the downturn, construction defects liability and requirements, a payment-in-lieu option, the fact that many developers were choosing to build under the threshold to avoid the requirement, effectively lowering the density in some areas, and Telluride. Because of the Telluride
decision, the city of Denver can’t actually make developers of apartment buildings include affordable housing, but they can make rental restrictions a voluntary condition of receiving public money for a project.
After realizing that most of the affordable housing built from 2001-2016 came from the funds collected through the fee-in-lieu program, Denver created a new affordable housing plan that focused on building
housing with funds coming from a combination of property taxes and fees on new development. On
September 21, 2016, Mayor Michael B. Hancock signed Council Bill 16-0625 into city law. The bill creates a dedicated affordable housing fund to help create or preserve affordable homes, funded in part by a linkage
fee on commercial and residential development.
State of Louisiana
Both the Louisiana Senate and the Louisiana House Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committee recently voted to approve a ban that would forbid local governments from requiring developers to include
affordable housing in new developments. The bill is now moving to the full House for approval before going to the Governor’s desk. The Louisiana State Constitution prohibits government from regulating or limiting the value of one’s property for the economic benefit of a third party. The HBA of Greater New
Orleans argued that mandatory IZ does precisely that - the government essentially mandates a forced
discount on the owner’s units that are required to be held below market value, then allows a selected third-party renter/buyer to enjoy the benefit of that discount. Despite their efforts and the bill passing both the
House and the Senate, the Governor ultimately vetoed the bill in favor of affordable housing advocates.
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